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

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MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS

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The main emphasis of the work of St Antony's College, Oxford, since its foundation in 1950 has been in the fields of modern history and international affairs. The College organizes a number of regular Seminars at which are read papers produced by its members in the course of their research or by visiting experts from other institutions. The College further sponsors the delivery of lectures in Oxford by scholars of international reputation in their respective fields.

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ARAB RADICAL NOTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

By Malcolm Kerr

SINCE THE PALESTINE war, and more particularly since the Egyptian revolution, it has been increasingly remarked that Arab nationalist political and social ideas were entering a new radical phase and that the age of liberalism was at an end. The stream of western social and political values that had begun to trickle into the East at the time of Napoleon and had reached flood tide by the 1920's seems by now to have been somehow diverted, or dried up. The ideas themselves – notions of constitutionalism, individual civil rights, the electoral competition of political parties, and so forth – are as familiar as ever to educated Arabs; but they no longer strike an enthusiastic response. Often Arabs are now heard to say that these ideas are irrelevant to their needs; that they are of superficial value unless preceded by a social and economic revolution; that democracy is a fraud without social justice; that the West no longer has a monopoly of ideas, any more than a monopoly of arms for sale; that they, the Arabs, will shop in the open market-place of the world at large for political, social and economic ideas, buying only what suits their taste wherever they find it; and finally that they have no need or wish to import artificial ideologies, but will develop their own indigenous product out of their own experience.

The simplest explanation given for this new radicalism is that the brief experience of several Arab states since 1920 with western-style constitutional systems was an unhappy one, and therefore the experiment was abandoned on pragmatic grounds. A few years of rigged elections, musical-chair cabinets, suspended constitutions, arbitrary arrests, playboy monarchs, and absence of reform legislation should have been quite enough to convince the Arabs that they should give all this up and try something else – anything else. This was particularly the case after 1948, when it suddenly became clear that their governments were not only corrupt but, what was worse, that they were weak.

But this explanation does not take us very far. On the one hand it unjustly implies an extraordinary naïveté on the part of Arabs as to the

cultural and moral basis of western institutions. In actual fact there has been no lack of Arab thinkers and statesmen who have told their people that to have constitutional democracy it was necessary to develop certain qualities of citizenship, a certain attitude toward science, a spirit of tolerance, a concept of secularism, and so forth. These preachings can be traced well back into the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the above explanation tells us nothing of the nature or background of the particular new ideas that have now begun to take hold. Not only has constitutional liberalism receded into the background, but another more radical concept of democracy has risen in its place. This concept has taken its most extreme form in Egypt, where it has been forcefully promoted by the government. But in a subtler fashion it has influenced the mentality of a growing class of Arabs elsewhere who are anxious for reform. The idea is not – as is sometimes supposed – simply to strengthen the economic and social foundations for constitutional democracy, if necessary even by temporary authoritarian means. For not only is social and economic reform an extremely long-term and revolutionary proposition, but already in the course of organizing these reforms new political ideals have begun to take shape. It is not a question of a transition period by which Arab society would be led through a detour back again in the end to some western model of constitutional liberalism. It is irrelevant to argue that the longer the detour the less likely it is to lead back to the main road. For the so-called transition period creates its own goals appropriate to itself. The detour has become the main road, not by miscalculation but quite deliberately, leading straight to a newly accepted destination, on the assumption that its surface will become smoother as one follows it along. Revolutionary government is looked upon by its enthusiasts not as a path back to liberalism but on to a radically different form of democracy.

The radical conception of democracy is not really new, either in the west or in the Arab world. But it has re-emerged in recent years in a new form and amid new conditions. Essentially the conception is that described by J. L. Talmon as "totalitarian democracy" and typified for him in the excesses of the French Revolution and in the ideological tradition of Rousseau and Marx as opposed to Montesquieu, Locke and Bentham. It is characterized by a moral preference – not just a tactical preference – for maintaining the maximum degree of unity of purpose and action at all political and social levels; by an emphasis upon the virtues of group solidarity and the evils of individual self-absorption and self-seeking; by a mistrust of competition, bargaining, and the promotion of special interests; and by a vision of strong government as

a liberator rather than a danger to liberty. The free individual is not primarily a man who is left alone to do as he sees fit, but one whose usefulness and security in society are assured. Therefore it is not privacy but sociability that must be promoted. The role of government is not to maintain respect for a disparate mass of private individual purposes, but to take the lead in formulating and pursuing great national ideals which all can enthusiastically share. Individualism is criticized as a narrow, constricting, negative concept with which the western world is obsessed and by which it is blinded to the problems of African and Asian countries, if not indeed to some of the ills of its own society.

Thus the Arab radical rejects the familiar western assumption that the division of power and initiative in society among competing groups is inherently desirable, and that too much concentration of power in the hands of the state is a natural threat to private right. For him, the essence of democracy is found not in the existence of a parliamentary opposition but in the creation of a socialist programme and the enlistment of mass support in implementing it.

What are the forces which press the Arab radical to reject ideas of pluralism and decentralization of power? Are there historical roots or precedents for this rejection? Is it legitimate to consider the history of Arab thought at all, or is the Arab radical so completely cut off from his Islamic intellectual heritage that the conceptions of the latter are irrelevant?

A case can be made that certain forms of traditional Islamic thought, though not others, do provide some significant points of similarity to present-day radicalism. The link between the two is found in those Islamic modernists of the early twentieth century who took as their ideological starting point a doctrine of the Caliphate that had been elaborated in the later centuries of the Abbasid Empire. They interpreted it in a manner suitable to their own concerns and purposes, which were in some ways closer to those of today's radicals than to those of their medieval forbears. Indeed the modernists were, in their own odd way, among the radicals of their time. Yet the Abbasid doctrine was a well-chosen model which naturally led itself to the particular adaptations of the modernists, for it was based on similar assumptions about the organization of power in a morally purposeful society. And on the question of the organization of power, the radicalism of the 1950's represents a revival of those assumptions and a break with the liberal constitutional philosophy of the West.

Abbasid Islam presents the paradoxical spectacle of a society that in

practice was decentralized and pluralistic, with only a limited role assigned to the state, but whose predominant political theory was monistic and even totalitarian. In practice, society had already begun to be split into a series of entities, geographical, religious, and professional, each enjoying a measure of *de facto* autonomy and each absorbing a proportion of its members' loyalty. The state – i.e. the ruler and his ministers, the bureaucracy, and the army – not only lost its own internal cohesion of authority but was not always able to control the great class of judges and religious teachers, so that an implicit duality of church and state emerged. Thus not only religious doctrine and discipline, but also education, jurisprudence, and the administration of social services established by *waqf* endowments were insulated from state authority. On the other hand the non-existence of an organized church in Islam, the inherent conservatism of religious spokesmen, and the right of the ruler to appoint judges and other officials and define their sphere of competence, prevented these functions from being systematically used in a positive way to promote political power in the hands of the religious establishment rivalling that of the state. The weapons of the *'ulama* were therefore defensive ones. The elaborate rules of legal interpretation, for instance, helped prevent the ruler from fully developing an arbitrary legislative power at the expense of the jurists, and yet they did not enable the jurists themselves to evolve into a conscious and self-willed body of legislators. The gulf between ruler and scholar was recognized in the saying that the best ruler was the one who consulted the *'ulama*, and the best *'alim* was the one who avoided the company of rulers.

But these divisions and tensions, however much they might exist in practice and whatever limited benefits they might provide, were tolerated by Abbasid political theorists only on grounds of distasteful necessity. While Baghdad was dominated by Seljuq and Buyid usurpers, such orthodox writers as Baghdadi and Mawardi were holding up a very different image of the structure of authority: that of the monolithic community, united in pious loyalty to the ideal of an Islamic brotherhood and virtuously led by an heroic or saintly figure, whose power was saved from abuse not by institutional checks – as in actual practice – but by his own conscience and by the friendly moral pressure of the community. The image was patterned on the model of the semi-mythical age of the four caliphs of Medina, wherein all necessary precedents were found: the ruler as a combination of Imam and *Amir al-mu'minin*; his duty to consult with the nebulous *ahl al-sunna wa-l-jam'a*, or guardians of the conscience of the community; the rules of

succession; the idea of an administrative hierarchy derived exclusively from the caliph by individual delegations of authority; and above all, that exclusive and pervading social bond and moral criterion provided by religion, which distinguished neither between public and private spheres of activity nor between state, society, and church. It has often been noted that medieval Arabic offered no word for "state". The true Islamic society modelled on Medina, like the modern-day communist utopia, needed none, for it had no politics: conflicts of interest and competing ideologies could have no place in a classless community of true believers. (Even when the word *siyasa* was introduced by post-Abbasid scholars like Ibn Taimiya, it denoted only a special, non-political kind of politics, the *siyasa shar'iya*, or canonical statecraft.) There must be government, but only to administer the divinely inspired, non-controversial General Will. There might be differences of opinion within the community, but only of a non-political kind: variations of judgment and interpretation which would either be resolved through consultation and persuasion or, in minor matters, tolerated within whatever limits were necessary. Underlying this whole conception was the assumption that the interests of all members of the community were in common, that these common interests were fully provided for in a single body of revealed law, and that therefore the moral and political solidarity of all true believers would be assured.

The obvious fact that such a virtuous society did not exist (after the period of the Rashidun at any rate) did not suggest to the theorists that it was an illusion beyond practical reach, but only that the key condition was lacking: religious conviction. Either the caliph or his subjects, or both, had strayed from the path. Ultimately the task must be to bring them back to it; but in the meanwhile another set of principles was implicitly recognized under the heading of "necessity", somewhat as in modern international law the condition of war makes applicable the Laws of War in place of the Laws of Peace. In the condition of "necessity", the object was to make the most of a bad job, and the recommended means for achieving this were to take cover, keep out of trouble, and endure what came with patience and fortitude. "Happiness and authority do not mix", advised one proverb. "Forty years of tyranny are better than a single day of anarchy", declared another. Meanwhile the moral fabric of private social life and the principles of religious teaching were salvaged by the process described above of withdrawing them from the competence of the government.

Force majeure scarcely seems a firm foundation for a system of political theory, and yet given the moralistic approach of Islamic teaching

to the problem of power, it could scarcely do otherwise. Apart from Ibn Khaldun there are no Islamic writers of note who conceive the problem of abuse of power in terms of harnessing the tensions of conflicting interests and directing them into constructive channels. As Professor Lambton has remarked, there was no place in traditional Islamic thought for either "fruitful tensions" between church and state (or anywhere else in society, it might be added) or for notions of balance of power.[1] Power is good or bad according to the righteousness of its possessor. It is true that there were efforts to bridge the gap, but these tended to take the form of exhorting the ruler to improve himself by consulting the *'ulama*, lowering taxes, and enforcing justice: in other words, efforts to put the train back on the rails by appealing to conscience, which was the only recognized corrective to tyranny.

With this background of idealism, writers of the modernist Salafiya school early in the twentieth century anxious to revive what they considered to be "true" Islamic political principles looked back on the whole of Islamic history since the death of Ali as irregular and provisional and resting on the principle of necessity. One such writer, the Egyptian jurist Abdel Razzaq Sanhoury, in the course of a lengthy treatise on the "irregular" caliphate, argued for example that even the pious Umayyad caliph 'Umar ibn Abdel Aziz was "irregular" because, among other things, his authority was restricted by the influence of his entourage.[2] In a manner characteristic of his medieval predecessors, Sanhoury did not brand the "irregular" caliphate as illegal, but instead decided, as Ghazali, Ibn Jama'a, and others had done centuries before him, that in the interests of the welfare and stability of Muslim society, it had been necessary to recognize the *fait accompli*. What was new with Sanhoury and other modernists was their eagerness to re-create a political system that was not only "legitimate" but "regular" – that is, ideal, on the model of Medina – by taking prompt political action which they planned and described in detail. The implication was that when this was done, the millennium would be at hand. Whereas medieval writers had described the ideal conditions of the caliphate as an apologia for existing regimes and as polemics against Shi'ites and other opponents, the modern Salafiya reformists drew up blueprints which they intended to implement.

This difference was of great significance because it caused the mod-

[1] Ann K. S. Lambton, "Quis Custodiet Custodes? Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government", *Studia Islamica*, V (1946), p. 126

[2] *Le Califat: son évolution vers une Société des Nations Orientales* (Paris, 1926), p. 218

ernists to bring to the surface, more clearly than their predecessors had had to do, some of their fundamental assumptions about how political power should be organized and how human nature could be expected to respond to the conditions of such an organization. On the other hand, there were important points on which they failed to be so specific, despite the apparent practical need for them to be; and here the reasons for their vagueness are equally instructive.

One of the leading examples to consider in this connection is the study of the caliphate made by Muhammad Rashid Rida in 1923,[3] from which Sanhoury drew much of his inspiration. Rida's ideas are confusing and ambiguous, and give rise to widely divergent interpretations, because he was influenced both by western notions of secular constitutionalism and by traditional Islamic doctrines of the caliphate. Thus one recent writer finds it possible to compare his view of national sovereignty to that of Rousseau[4] while another describes his book as "the scrupulously faithful reproduction of the [traditional] doctrine, with the same formulas that had been taught for more than eight centuries".[5] Perhaps this is because Rousseau has more in common with traditional Islamic doctrine than either writer would recognize. A third critic is closer to the mark in saying that Rida's ideas "appear less as a simple working out of Muslim assumptions than as the Muslim re-casting of Western assumptions" [6]; but in Rida's mind it is the Muslim assumptions that remain fundamental.

Rida shows his western constitutionalist influence by proposing the formation of a sort of parliamentary body which would combine the functions of a number of vaguely identified groups traditionally mentioned in medieval treatises: the *ahl al-hall wa-l-ʿlaqd* ("those who loose and bind", or electors of the caliph); *ulu-l-amr* ("those in authority" who, according to Quran IV:58, must be obeyed along with God and the Prophet); *ahl al-shura* (counsellors of the ruler); *ahl al-ijmaʿ* (jurists whose consensus on legal questions is authoritative); and the *jamaʿa* or *umma* (the group or community of believers as a whole). None of these entities is specifically identified, nor is any means of identifying them proposed. They are "the leaders whom the Community follows

[3] *Al-Khilafa aw al-imama al-ʿuzma* ("The Caliphate, or the Greater Imamate") [Cairo, 1923]; French translation by Henri Laoust, *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rasid Rida* (Beirut, 1938)

[4] Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1956), p. 126

[5] Emile Tyan, *Institutions du droit public musulman*, Vol. II: *Sultanat et califat* (Paris, 1956), p. 264

[6] Louis Gardet, *La Cité musulmane: vie sociale et politique* (Paris, 1954), p. 352

in its general affairs",[7] "the most important rulers and those whom the Imam consults",[8] "those who represent the Community by virtue of their positions of rank and prominence".[9] As if to compound the confusion, Rida adds that in the time of the Prophets these were "neither the jurists, nor the generals, nor the governors: they were the principal Muslims whom the Prophet consulted".[10]

Such vagueness was possible for Rida for the simple reason that in the homogeneous community of believers, all motivated by the same spirit of piety and solidarity, it did not matter precisely who these individuals were or how they might be chosen. No distinction was accepted in principle between the society as a whole and the select body of its respresentatives, and Rida took pains to establish that the terms *jamaʿa* and *umma* could be applied to the latter as well as to the former.[11] The important thing was to uphold the indivisible organic unity and solidarity of the community, in which the presence of factions was impossible; thus the *hadith* which Rida quotes from Tabari: "When the people no longer have an Imam and are divided into factions, one must then avoid taking part and remain aloof if possible, for fear of falling into harm."[12] There is no suggestion that the representatives are bound to the community as a whole by some form of contract: they *are* the community, and it is they who (under divine authority) are sovereign. "True obedience is due only to God, and worldly authority belongs to the *jamaʿa* of the community. The chief [*al-raʾis*, i.e. the caliph] is only a representative of its unity."[13]

Among these leaders the caliph is reduced by Rida to being the first among equals, and it is his duty of consultation with them, together with the citizens' duty to accept their collective judgment, that binds the caliph to the people and constitutes the basis of his responsibility to public opinion. The limits to power are primarily moral rather than institutional, in keeping with the traditional spirit. "The Imam is not an absolute ruler as many people suppose", wrote Rida. "He is limited by the prescriptions of the Quran and the Sunna, by the general example set by the Rashidun caliphs, and by consultation."[14]

Rida's distaste for factionalism and private ambitions is exemplified in his attacks on the Umayyads and on Ibn Khaldun's view of *ʿasabiya* or group spirit. The Umayyads are held responsible for the "corrup-

[7] *Khilafa*, p. 17
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 14
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 15, quoting the seventeenth-century jurist Saʿd al-Din al-Taftazani
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 14
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 129
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 30

tion" of "causing the caliphate to deviate from the path traced for it by Islam and making it dependent upon the force of *'asabiya* and conquest. This corruption is the source of all others and of all evils that struck the Muslims in their spiritual and temporal interests."[15] Ibn Khaldun is held mistaken in considering *'asabiya* an aid to prophetic missions and to the caliphate, whose true social purpose was rather to supplant *'asabiya* by the rule of divine law.[16] Islam, to Rida's mind, demands that human ambitions be not merely channelled but actually laid aside in the interests of an institution whose functions are temporal but whose foundations are purely moral. Islam, with its just and salutary principles of government, came to put an end to the miserable historical cycle of "royal sovereignty with its tyranny, selfishness, and arrogance".[17]

Implicit throughout these and other passages of Rashid Rida's writings was the vision of a community of good citizens who not only were induced by their faith to set private interests aside, but who could be expected to hold a common view of how the principles of that faith ought to be applied to particular public problems. There need be no lasting intellectual basis for partisanship, then, any more than a basis of selfishness. This assumption finds its most explicit expression in a discussion on the subject of how Rida's proposed quasi-parliamentary body would arrive at legislative decisions on contemporary problems in the light of the principles of the Religious Law. If all members agree, of course, no problem arises; but if not, there is still no problem, for they would simply refer their disagreement to the two basic textual sources, the Quran and the Sunna, and act according to what is found there. Rida explains that

> "this is better and sounder than other procedures, such as acting on the opinion of a majority of the nation's delegates in enacting the statutes of Europe and her imitators, for our law is opposed to them in this matter. It is one of the advantages of our law that a dispute within the Community ceases with the giving of judgment by the Quran and the Sunna, and that all the delegates of the Community are satisfied with what appears to be the most likely indication in these sources, so that no room is left for rancour and dispute." [18]

This appears to be a circular argument, begging the question of what happens when there is some really serious and deep-seated disagreement over interpretation of the Quran and the Sunna. But it was not Rida's nature to consider such a situation, any more than medieval writers

[15] *Khilafa*, p. 47
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 134
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 129
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 93

schooled in the faith that all vital questions of legal interpretation were resoluble by *ijmaʿ*. Rida's *ijmaʿ* is different from the traditional one, being institutionalized and therefore explicit and in a way legislative. But the mystical assumption of unity persists: one God, one Revelation, one Islamic community, one loyalty, one universal caliphate, and one common view of the truth on all important public questions.

Such modernists as Rashid Rida are in some ways typical of the general political consciousness of the eastern Arab countries early in the twentieth century. In other ways they stand in marked contrast to other groups. Their implacable hostility to secularism of course sets them apart from much of the nationalist and liberal opinion of the time, though by no means all of such opinion. It certainly sets them in contrast to the post-war radical current of nationalism represented by Nasser. But secularism is a question that does not concern us here, however much importance it might have in other contexts. What is relevant here is a comparison on the one hand between Salafiya revivalism and the European-inspired liberalism that was so widespread among the educated Arab classes before and just after the first world war, exemplified in Egypt by the likes of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid; and on the other hand between the Salafiya and the leftist radicals of the period after the second war. The question of secularism, although an important one in some respects, has often overshadowed other points of comparison or contrast which are important for other reasons. Ali Abd al-Raziq, the well-known opponent of the caliphate, for example, was the object of some of Rashid Rida's most bitter and intemperate attacks, and yet each in his own way was a modernist and could lay some claim to be carrying on the work of Muhammad Abduh, as could also Lutfi al-Sayyid, who was not particularly concerned with the question of religious government. All three were advocates of progress, reform, social reconstruction and reintegration; all inveighed against the dead hand of the past, of blind traditionalism and obscurantism. Even though Rida might appear to be bound by old formulas (as in some respects he was), he could nevertheless express his disgust for a tradition of endless submission to tyranny in the name of necessity. Tyranny may be

> "better than anarchy, but it requires a constant readiness to put an end to it as soon as possible. People should not accustom themselves to its perpetuation, nor should it become like a ball to be tossed back and forth by usurpers, as is the case with nations that are oppressed, or content with oppression, because of their ignorance of their own

latent power or because of the strength of their overlords. Those, on the other hand, who are enlightened by political awareness rise up to overthrow their tyrannical governments and rulers." [19]

Compare this passage to the following by Lutfi al-Sayyid:

"We cannot at present have all the liberties of Americans or Englishmen or Frenchmen, but if we cannot attain what we want it is reasonable to want what we can attain. We must get away from personal rule, which leads to sloth of mind and body." [20]

Salafis and secular liberals were at one in wishing to replace a society that was static, complacent, indifferently administered, respectfully obedient, and stratified with one that would be progressive, constructive, efficiently and responsibly governed, aspiring, idealistic, and mobile. The beginnings of this new attitude go back to the mid-nineteenth century, and as time has passed it has steadily grown. Since the eclipse in 1954 of the Muslim Brethren secularism has ceased to be a pressing issue, but perhaps it can be said that religious revivalism was less important as a principle of government in itself than as a language, a medium of expression, in which was conveyed a general spirit of idealism and activism that was (and still is) held by those who have spoken in the language of secularism. On this level the line from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh runs unbroken through both Rashid Rida and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, as well as Saad Zaghlul and such secularists as Ali Abd al-Raziq and Muhammad Husain Haikal, to both Hasan al-Banna and Jamal Abdel Nasser.

But this element of continuity becomes so all-embracing when followed through to this conclusion that its significance becomes obviously limited, and one is driven to look again for the differences, if not in the secular-religious issue, then elsewhere. Here we come back to the essential point of totalitarian monism, on which the Salafiya diverged sharply from constitutional liberalism, as well as from premodern Islamic quietism. The society envisaged by Rashid Rida was not only dynamic and idealistic; it was militant, heroic, dominated by a common faith. It was not only purposeful, but enrolled in a great moral cause. By contrast, Arab liberals, like western liberals, did not attach primary importance to these things. They upheld the virtues of

[19] *Khilafa*, p. 38

[20] Quoted in Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* (London, 1960), p. 109, from the Cairo newspaper *Al-Jarida*, 1 January 1914

diversity, voluntary private association, individual freedom from restraints, tolerance of disagreement, and a type of good citizenship and social responsibility derived from rational self-cultivation rather than from the mobilization of mass enthusiasms. They were nationalists, but to them nationalism was only a pre-condition for the effective application of more important principles: constitutionalism, parliamentary representation through political parties, above all the spread of education and the gradual improvement of individual moral character in society. For this programme they saw no institutional focal point in the state or elsewhere. Lutfi al-Sayyid, for example, though much interested in the spread of education, was sceptical of state-organized education, for the same reasons that he was opposed to socialism:[21] it dampened the spirit of private initiative, creativity, and self-cultivation.

Without going into any detail on ideas and movements of the 1930's and 1940's it may briefly be remarked that during these years in a number of Arab countries, while western-style constitutional systems were in force (though frequently suspended), and while parliaments were dominated by parties which at least nominally subscribed to secular liberal ideas, a growing disenchantment gnawed continuously at their foundations. Large numbers of angry young men grasped in desperation at a variety of militant ideologies, from the Muslim Brethren to fascism and communism, or merely strident expressions of nationalism. Like many present-day Arab radicals, they were, as Jamal Ahmed aptly puts it, "barely educated but emotionally exalted and heroic in an uncalculating way".[22] Even in the early 1930's, in an Iraq that had barely gained its independence, such groupings as the super-nationalist *al-Ikha' al-watani* gave evidence of disillusion with constitutional liberalism, as did such leaders as Antun Saadeh in Lebanon and Ahmed Husain in Egypt, out of impatience with its emphasis on moderation and tolerance.

It is also notable that the Muslim Brethren, quite apart from the religious question which they reintroduced into Arab politics, offered a political doctrine which (though hazy on many points) shared the militant and revolutionary spirit of the secular radicals, and in fact far outdid them by spelling out so frankly the totalitarian nature of its programme, from "eliminating political parties and orienting the political

[21] Ahmed, pp. 103, 108–9
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 123

forces of the nation in a single direction and in a single bloc" to "organizing the summer resorts in such a way as to eliminate the disorder and license which negate the fundamental purpose of summer vacationing".[23]

But it should not be supposed that religious puritanism is the only basis of the totalitarian mentality. For one thing, after the abrupt disappearance of the Brethren from the political stage in 1954 there were other symbols to which "emotional exaltation" and "uncalculating heroism" could readily attach themselves. For another, one may very well ask whether, in the Arab world of the 1950's, *any* reform-minded thinker determined to get to the bottom of existing social and economic problems and put them right by prompt and energetic political action, was not prone, wittingly or not, to encourage totalitarian methods and ideas. There is, then, potentially a double entrée to totalitarianism: first the emotional excesses of the nationalist mystique, and secondly the relentless logic of a socialist programme, unimpeded by any lasting social barriers from reforming and reorganizing society down to the smallest detail. Nationalism without any social content, if it tries to compensate for the lack by still more nationalism, presents the danger of an irrational tyranny; socialism (or any other systematic principle of social reconstruction) may lead to a rational one.

It is true, of course, that many Arab socialists are moderate men who believe not only in parliamentary democracy but in the encouragement of diversity, voluntary social organizations, free individual expression of opinion, and so forth, and that their only aim is to establish economic and social justice in order to make these things possible on a wider scale. A case in point is the widely popular book by the Jordanian Baath writer Munif al-Razzaz, *Maʿalim al-hayat al-ʿarabiya al-jadida* ("Outlines of the New Arab Life").[24] Written on the eve of the Egyptian Revolution in 1952 and now in its fourth printing, the book presents a comprehensive statement of political, economic, and social principles and proposals, which for the most part seem like a combination of English utilitarian and Fabian ideas. On the political plane the keynote is respect for free individual self-expression and for the diversity of individual tastes and interests. Tracing his ideas deductively from axioms reminiscent of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, Razzaz insists without qualification on freedom of speech, of political activity

[23] Hasan al-Banna, *Al-Rasa'il al-thalath* ("The Three Articles") [Cairo, n.d.], pp. 113–20; French translation by J. Marel, *Orient*, 1957, No. 4, pp. 59–62

[24] Cairo, 1953; Beirut, 1960

and party life, parliamentary elections, and so forth. He dwells at length on the need for more modern political parties based on programmes rather than personalities, and is sharply critical of the existing (1952) party systems in the Arab world, but rejects appeals for the establishment of dictatorial reform governments to suspend party life or for the establishment of a single-party system, on the grounds that there can be no progress without a continuous process of conflicting interests, whose free expression dictatorships suppress. Dictatorship "tries to dye all the thoughts of the people in a single colour . . . and to produce individuals who are really only copies of one another and who lack the spirit of innovation and creativity and independent thought, and are no more than cogs in this great complicated apparatus of the state". Furthermore, "as Nehru has said [*sic*], 'Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely' ".[25]

In economics, while accepting a general Marxist criticism of the evils of capitalism (e.g. that as the machine age progresses, the middle class is squeezed out, and only the very rich and the growing class of the poor remain),[26] he finds dangers and excesses in Marxist solutions. Excessive nationalization would cast too heavy an administrative burden on the state and turn the whole population into a government bureaucracy; it would create "an atmosphere of dreary and monotonous routine in which there was no pleasure, no novelty, no satisfaction of the appetites and no room for change". People should not all live in identical houses with identical furniture all manufactured by the same state company, and wear identical clothing.[27]

A number of Razzaz's specific economic proposals closely anticipate the programme of the Nasser regime up to 1959, such as the creation of corporations jointly owned by private and government capital but under government direction, the encouragement of producers' and consumers' cooperatives, and the construction of the Aswan High Dam. But despite his constant defense of diversity and individualism, and his general tone of moderation and good sense, very different implications creep in at other points of his programme. Razzaz is sickened by the material greed of Arab society: "The primary characteristic of the present system is that of exploitation. Its ideal is that of acquisition, which is the sole controlling element in the present society." [28] No real reform is possible until lust for money is removed as the basis of the economy. Money today buys power and prestige; it creates hatreds and resentments; it spoils the spirit of public service; it is wasted on luxuries.

[25] Razzaz, pp. 175–6
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 112
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 200–2
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 193

"Whatever system we propose must aim at making money the means of serving all society, not just certain individuals, and making the right of any individual to own property conditional on this wealth being used for the benefit of all." The government must "supervise production and consumption"; it must assume complete control of foreign trade, ensuring that "not one piastre" is spent on imported luxuries as long as mass-consumption commodities and capital equipment are needed.[29] All "heavy and medium" industry, if not fully nationalized, must be "fully supervised" by the government. Private enterprise may be left free to produce "jewelry, children's toys, and sweets" subject to government supervision of the use of capital and profits and prevention of "exploitation" by the owner; this measure of private enterprise (such as it is) should be preserved as a means of allowing the individual to "assert his own personality and inclinations, and develop himself in the way he desires".[30] The poor cannot afford the means of raising their children properly, and the state should therefore assume the task of rearing them, "since it is these children who in the near future will become the men of the sound society we wish to create".[31]

Razzaz's concern is to eliminate the social tyrannies and injustices practised by privileged against deprived individuals. The state in Arab countries has been a political tyrant as well, but only as a reflection of the economic and social interests of the classes controlling it; and no constitutional provision for political liberty will be of any use to the masses until their economic misery is alleviated.[32] On these points one could scarcely disagree with Razzaz, given the facts of social and economic life in the Arab world in 1952 or, for that matter, today. But in reading Razzaz's economic and social chapters one suspects that his liberal political ideals have become irrelevant even for Razzaz himself. He writes that his economic proposals are not ends in themselves but only prerequisite conditions for the development of individual initiative and liberal democracy.[33] But is this really so, or has he become so absorbed with the need for radical economic solutions that they are no longer judged in the light of the political conditions they are likely to produce? One might wonder what measure of latitude for personal taste and enterprise, for the competing interests of private associations, for the right of political dissent, and for a multi-party parliamentary system could be expected to thrive under a regime which organizes all economic enterprise above the level of the manufacture of sweets, prohibits all importation of luxuries, "supervises and directs a centralized

[29] Razzaz, pp. 198–9 [30] *Ibid.*, pp. 201–2 [31] *Ibid.*, p. 243
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 120 [33] *Ibid.*, p. 190

national organization of cooperatives",[34] and "undertakes the exploitation" of the funds of the rich, as "this money is the property of society, not theirs".[35] Razzaz does not argue the point; he simply ignores it. There is of course a case to be made for his programme on purely economic and social-welfare grounds, and he appears satisfied with that. Unconsciously, he has made his choice between pluralist politics and collectivist economics. Other thinkers were to make the same choice more consciously and consistently, introducing collectivist political ideas as well.

The springboard for such ideas on the political level has been the question of the class struggle, of which Razzaz made no specific mention, but which other writers, including Razzaz's fellow-Baathists, have treated with increasing emphasis. Thus Abdullah Abd al-Da'im, a professor in the University of Damascus, while making general statements about the democratic virtues of individualism and tolerance of diversity rather similar to those of Razzaz, is more explicit in defining their limits. We cannot speak of democracy in a given society, he writes, without considering the social conditions peculiar to it. Freedom cannot exist in the abstract (*mujarrad*) but must be "embodied" (*mushakhkhas*) in concrete forms.

> "Democracy, in essence, is an attempt to reconcile the demands of the individual with those of society. It is a type of accommodation between individual liberty and social compulsion. The concrete expression of this is found in the line we draw in making this accommodation. Consequently we cannot accuse a society of being undemocratic except after determining, by a study of its conditions, that it could have been brought to a greater degree of harmony between the freedoms of society and those of individuals. . . . The liberty of the individual, as it is often said, ends where the liberty of the group begins. . . . This means that for every society there is a limit to the liberty it can permit to its individuals, but that the least restrictive possible interpretation of that limit, and the effort to push the line ever forward, are the criteria of the democratic character of that society." [36]

What, then, are the limits he recognizes? In principle, the "fundamental limit which may not be exceeded, is the prohibition of those

[34] Razzaz, pp. 205–6

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 199

[36] Abdullah Abd al-Da'im, *Al-Jil al-'arabi al-jadid* ("The New Arab Generation") [Beirut, 1961], p. 167

creeds which call for change by means of violent armed revolution".[37] But in practice he is prepared to go far beyond this. Despite the need to preserve a united national front in the face of imperialism, and to "substitute national cooperation for the class struggle and to try progressively to dissolve this struggle in pursuit of the greater national goals", this should not lead us to

> "make a truce with the exploiters and to make undue concessions in our socialist approach . . . To be a truly revolutionary truce [*sic*] it must constantly carry within itself the features and form of the socialist society which is progressively achieved. Everyone must realize that this truce is only a transitional policy aiming at the piecemeal absorption of capitalist life, always assuring the progressive gains of socialism and the ultimate achievement of a socialist society."

The truce, then, must rest on the clear understanding that it is really an arrangement under which the reactionaries and capitalists will quietly be done in.

> "For the capitalists can only accept a gradual surrender in favour of the national interest by virtue of two combined factors: first, belief in the national objective . . ., and second, awareness of the existence of a tremendous popular current, and of popular forces of production [i.e. means of economic pressure] to which they are compelled to yield, as otherwise they would be forced to make an even greater surrender. This second factor is important. For it is this which makes the capitalist class fear that its gains may be entirely lost, and consequently feel impelled to accept gradual surrenders. These two complementary prerequisites will be achieved when a popular regime representing the popular class is established, in which the people are the moving force behind the regime." [38]

In these passages the transition in Abd al-Da'im's thoughts emerges. From signifying individual liberties and the tolerance of all dissent short of armed violence, democracy has come to denote the supremacy of that mystical and featureless entity called the "popular class", whose only common identity lies in their lack of identity, but whose organic unity of will is nevertheless so readily assumed by radical nationalist writers in the Arab world and elsewhere. Abd

[37] Abd al-Da'im, p. 175
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 137–9

al-Da'im makes this transition explicit by proceeding directly from the above-quoted remarks to a fulsome account of the principles of Sukarno's "guided democracy", in which "leadership is qualified by the process of consultation, but this consultation is guided by wisdom, not by debates and manœuvres which end in trials of strength and the counting of votes", and in which freedom of speech is assured "within certain limits" to protect "the safety of the state" and public welfare.[39]

Whether it is more important to preserve a front of national unity, comprising all social groups, against presumed outside dangers, or to promote "popular" solidarity against domestic "reactionaries" in the name of future progress and a more lasting form of social cohesion, is a dilemma that has concerned a number of writers (although in either case, of course, in the end it is "unity" that is considered to be at stake). But it is the second alternative which tends to have the last word. Thus Michel Aflaq, while rejecting the pure Marxian view of the class struggle for its exaggerated internationalism and for its disregard of nationalism as a focal point of loyalty for the working-class in a given country, recognizes that within national boundaries the economic class factor is fundamental. The Arabs, he argues, cannot afford a national partnership between exploiters and exploited, because that would remove all positive significance from nationalism itself: "Nationalism is nothing more than words and phrases if coupled with oppression, poverty, and deprivation." [40] Arabs must beware of those exploiters who, in order to save their own skins, claim that they too are nationalists. "We are not afraid to use force against all those who prevent this progress and growth. The people must conduct a violent and determined struggle against those rulers and others who with their material and moral interests are obstructing the unity of the nation." [41]

Arab unity assumes the proportions of an apocalyptic vision in the mind of Aflaq. Within the Baath's almost theological trinity of "liberty, socialism, and unity" it holds first place, on the grounds (as Aflaq explains) that socialism and liberty cannot be truly achieved except on its basis. And in contrast to the superficial unity of the Arab League, the Baath version of unity is "fundamental, living, having its own theory as liberty and socialism have theirs, and, like them,

[39] Abd al-Da'im, pp. 182–3

[40] Article entitled "Our View of Capitalism and the Class Struggle" in *Dirasat fi al-ishtirakiya* ("Studies in Socialism"), by various contributors (Beirut, 1960), p. 27

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 29

having its own daily organized and continuous struggle of principle".[42] The cause of unity is bound up with that of socialism, for, although unity is the primary goal, "it cannot be achieved by governments, nor foreign states, nor politicians, nor thinkers, but only by the people alone"; but "the people" will play this part only if assured of social and economic justice. Socialism is the "body", unity the "spirit". Socialism is "only a means and a step toward a greater goal, namely the unification of the Arab homeland; and this unification is not the final goal, but is in its turn a means whereby the Arab nation may play its part in life. This mixture of the two goals, this incarnation of an idea in a body, is something fundamental which we always insist on." [43]

Unity – whether between the Arab states or within the ranks of the nationalist movement or of Arab society as a whole – is the symbol of militancy, of the mobilization of energy, enthusiasm and purpose. The Baathist writer and politician Abdullah al-Rimawi, asking whether "revolutionary Arab Nationalism" has progressed with the speed demanded of it by the "new logic" of the "battle" in which it is engaged, poses the following criterion of success:

> "That in the Arab homeland the modern Arab nationalist movement become the one revolutionary movement with the one clear doctrine, relying on the oneness and clarity of its doctrine to provide the Arab nation with unity in its organization and unity in its struggle, and to provide it in its battle with unity of leadership and unity of revolutionary practical planning and tactics, so as to mobilize the nation's masses and harness its energies in a rising, conscious historic tide, on which this nation can proceed with the requisite speed toward the realization of its goals and the performance of its mission." [44]

Similar ideas were expressed in simpler and more coherent language by Fayez Sayegh, who in 1955 criticized the divisive effect of political party life on Arab politics. Partisanship, he wrote,

> "splits the nation into blocs, when it is in dire need of the cooperation of all its sons to the utmost limit. Partisanship puts party interests in place of public interests, and substitutes short-sighted conceptions for far-sighted ones. Partisanship means a predisposition to

[42] Michel Aflaq, *Ma'rakat al-masir al-wahid* ("The Battle for a Common Future") [Beirut, 1958], pp. 18–21

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–9

[44] Abdullah al-Rimawi, *Al-Mantiq al-thawri* ("Revolutionary Logic") [Cairo, 1961], pp. 166–7

enmity not because of differences in final aims or discrepancies in degrees of sincerity but because of differences in party membership and enrollment. Finally, partisanship destroys objectivity in judging movements and individuals, intentions and ideas and actions. The partisan judges matters not according to the extent of their affinity or usefulness to the national interest, but according to the extent of their affinity to the interest of the party." [45]

Similarly the Lebanese socialist writer Clovis Maqsud laments the fact that many of the left-wing Arab nationalist parties have tended to devote more energy and attention to their own organizational strength than to the development – in common with one other – of a coherent ideology, and even to be jealous and critical of one another's ideological achievements. The result is that Arab socialism lacks the "oneness and clarity of doctrine" which Maqsud, like Rimawi, desires:

"Socialism has come to have various connotations, and is no longer a radical revolutionary doctrine, but rather is characterized in many cases by the middle or opportune solution between reaction and communism. As a consequence of losing the theoretical outlines of socialism, these party groupings which arose in the Arab nation within the ranks of the Arab elite designated themselves as socialist, without being prepared to achieve socialism – that is, to achieve the ideal society – because of their lack of serious, sound, conscious commitment to socialism and their lack of an intellectual apparatus capable of embracing its content. And this in turn causes the Arab elite to lack a plan for the Arab struggle by which to progress constantly toward the socialist society to which they aspire." [46]

But despite Sayegh's and Maqsud's common distaste for factionalism and their common desire for ideological coherence, they are poles apart on a more fundamental issue. Maqsud, like Rimawi, Aflaq, and some others, is consumed with devotion to the cause of transforming Arab society. If the precise outlines of the cause are not entirely clear that is not said to reflect on its validity but only on the present degree of understanding on the part of its adherents. Not only must they organize their ranks, unify their leadership, mobilize their energies, and draw up their plan of battle, but they must clarify and elaborate their

[45] Fayez Sayegh, *Risalat al-mufakkir al-ʿarabi* ("The Mission of the Arab Thinker") [Beirut, 1955], p. 97

[46] Clovis Maqsud, *Azmat al-yasar al-ʿarabi* ("The Crisis of the Arab Left") [Beirut, 1960], pp. 57–8

vision of the great transformation lying just over the horizon. What is its nature? It cannot be the ideal Islamic society imagined by the Rashid Ridas and Hasan al-Bannas only a few years earlier in Egypt, nor is it communism. It must take the form either of nationalism or socialism, or both, for these are now the only effective rallying points. But it must carry within itself some all-embracing principle of social morality comparable to that of the Islamic and the communist utopias.

It is this implicitly totalitarian tendency against which Sayegh very sharply reacts. In a pair of short articles in 1959 he discussed the question of the "limits" of the nationalist ideology he wished to see developed. There is a danger (he wrote) that to counteract the challenge of communism, Arabs will be tempted to create against it an ideology of equally comprehensive proportions. Communism "passes judgment... on all human activities, including creative activities in the fields of science, art and philosophy, and on such human values as freedom and morality. It is a system which anchors the bases of all these things in itself, and no part of human life, individual or collective, escapes its judgment." Some Arabs think they must have a nationalist answer to communism on every one of these points. But this is a mistake. Nationalism, if it presumes to judge all aspects of human life, will become tyrannical. Nationalism should therefore aim at evolving an ideology which is not "totalitarian" (*kulli*) but only "adequate" (*wafi*).

Sayegh's concern is to preserve what he defines as "secularism" (*'ilmaniya*), by which he means the distinction between personal and social affairs. Secularism is destroyed either when a religious or philosophical creed, dealing with personal and private matters as well as social questions, asserts its control over the state and thus establishes a theocracy, or when a social doctrine such as communism, socialism, or for that matter nationalism, asserts its sovereignty in personal affairs. Secularism means not only keeping the religious establishment out of politics but, conversely, isolating the social authority from personal and spiritual life. Totalitarian social ideologies tend to make religion, philosophy, art, etc. the servants of their own desired social system, on the assumption that the whole existence of man is of purely social significance.[47]

To these points Maqsud replies with two arguments. In the first place, he says, nationalism itself should not be allowed to become an ideology. Nationalism is only a loyalty to a certain concept of identity,

[47] *Al-'Ulum* magazine (Beirut), July and September 1959

and should be no more than a prerequisite to domestic social and political action. Those who attempt to make an ideology out of nationalism alone are likely to end in an irrational totalitarianism.

In the second place, Maqsud distinguishes between what he calls "total" (*kulli*) and "totalitarian" (*jama'i*) ideology, inserting the English terms in his text to make his meaning clear. His own socialist ideology, which is "total", does not rest on common ground with communism, nor is it a response to the communist challenge, but is simply a comprehensive and systematically integrated view of life.

Therefore

> "Dr Sayegh is correct in concluding that the nationalist ideology, if it becomes total, will become tyrannical and will strip the nationalist movement of its positive values. But this does not apply to the 'totalness' of the socialist ideology. The chief difference between us is that Dr Sayegh insists upon a nationalist ideology, and in order to lighten its inevitable tyranny, takes refuge in making it 'adequate' (*wafi*). The mistake lies in his commitment to the ideological character of nationalism, instead of being satisfied with the nationalist movement as a preliminary stage . . . This major difficulty confronts many of our Arab thinkers who hesitate to commit themselves to socialism as a programme and as an image of the society they want to create . . . The appeal to an 'adequate' ideology, in my view, does not stem from a conviction of its soundness, but from the desire to reconcile one's hesitation to commit oneself to socialism as an ideology on the one hand, with a deep consciousness and fear of the danger of nationalism as an ideology on the other . . .
>
> "The political position of socialism toward non-socialist ideologies might cause it for tactical reasons to welcome their being 'adequate', but this does not at all mean that it agrees that an adequate ideology of socialism would be sound by virtue of being adequate; on the contrary, making socialism adequate would mean making it indeterminate, incomplete, and incapable of shouldering the comprehensive revolutionary responsibility that is thrust upon it. Hence the necessity of defining the total quality of socialism . . . " [48]

Those who share Sayegh's apprehensions may well ask why socialism, if it purports to be a comprehensive doctrine of life as Maqsud says, is any freer than other ideologies of the danger of totalitarianism. What guarantees of individual liberty does "total" socialism provide?

[48] Maqsud, pp. 167–8

On these points Maqsud offers a characteristically verbose and vague, yet revealing, explanation. True socialism holds that

> "man's freedom consists in his ability to expand the scope and horizons of his active participation in life so that he may give to life and to society something of value from his own being, and take in return something that will help him achieve his own happiness. It is the 'total' nature of socialism that organizes the social framework in a form that embraces individual initiative, and assures a system of public relationships that will not alienate sections of the people from actively exercising their initiative under guise of preserving liberty. In practice, liberty is exercised only as the result of liberating oneself, and will only be complete if the liberation has been complete. If we decide that man's problem is a totality, and that socialism is the doctrine capable of solving the problem in a manner compatible with the needs of evolution and equality, then socialism must be total... Socialism is not socialism at all unless it is total: that is, unless it comprises the totality of human experience and takes a stand on all issues in conformity with the assumptions in which it believes and the values stemming from them. If on the other hand we content ourselves with an 'adequate' doctrine of socialism, we will have condemned Arab thought to a dissipation of its potentialities and to reliance on what is fragmentary and only immediately necessary, and we will have exposed it to the frightful contradictions and the distorted and false positions into which many of the right-wing socialist leaderships in Europe have fallen." [49]

Perhaps the key phrase in the above passage is "If we decide that man's problem is a totality", from which it follows that "socialism... [must] take a stand on all issues . . . " Maqsud nimbly sidesteps Sayegh's point by making *kulli* mean "total" as opposed to *jama'i* or "totalitarian" (though "collective" would be a more natural translation of the latter term). But by *kulli* Sayegh clearly meant "totalitarian", and it is difficult to see that Maqsud's ideas, as he himself describes them, escape the substance of Sayegh's argument.

Recent political writing in Egypt is of a very different quality from that of radicals in the Fertile Crescent countries. The latter are critics of existing regimes; they are individuals, not committed to any established line, and they carry on a genuine debate among themselves. They have not deliberately turned their backs on western liberal thought, but

[49] Maqsud, pp. 170–1

have gradually drifted away from it. Hence their critique of liberalism has generally been an indirect and implied one, and many of them would no doubt protest against some of the conclusions drawn in the foregoing discussion.

In Egypt, on the other hand, while there is no real debate, the trend of ideology is more explicit, under the stimulus of an authoritarian regime that has made a point of scrapping western constitutional forms and erecting new experimental institutions in their place. It is natural, therefore, that it should be in Egypt that the frontal attack on liberal traditions has been made, in a manner that substitutes bluntness for sophistication.

In Egypt, where a government dedicated to sweeping reform has been in power for a decade, a curiously ambiguous attitude to ideological questions has developed. On the one hand the men in power have continued over the years to insist on their aversion to theoretical speculation and their preference for an empirical and *ad hoc* approach to individual problems. At the same time the very pace of government action, its determination to reach the masses effectively and to cut through the fog of their tradition-bound mentality, its enthusiasm for large-scale construction and reorganization, has increased the need for a systematic framework of explanations and exhortations to the public. Demagoguery might be sufficient to communicate a spirit of nationalist emotion, but not to justify and guide a calculated social revolution. President Nasser himself showed some signs in 1961 of recognizing that such a need might exist. His speeches on the occasion of the sweeping socialist decrees of July 1961 referred to the class struggle and to the exploitive nature of capitalism; in October he spoke of the incompatibility of the people's interests with those of their enemies, and the need to establish a criterion for "isolating" the latter from public affairs. Still he was reluctant to set himself up as an official ideologist. In an address to the Preparatory Committee of the National Congress of Popular Forces, he reproved Egypt's intellectuals:

> "At the Law College you teach political economy – Adam Smith's theory of supply and demand – and you say that such talk is the best in the world, and that such theories are ideal. People would then look at us in surprise and say: What we have learned at the Law Faculty differs from what is being applied here. I say: No, the process is not one of supply and demand. We are forging a new system. To achieve a social revolution we should write books. Some authors have written books on economics which were simply copied from other

countries. Who has written a book on the economy we are now dealing with? When we have written such a book we can say we have written a theory.

"But we cannot say that we have produced a theory when we refer to books on well-known economic systems . . . There are thousands of such books available. We cannot say: O Jamal Abd al-Nasser, produce a theory for us! I shall not be able to produce a theory; you must produce the theory. The intellectuals must produce the theory. When I find a suitable book on the nature of our economy, on our experience, then I will feel that this book constitutes a large part of the theory, and that we have actually begun to lay the foundations. But when I realize that these economics books are merely a repetition of what we were taught at the Law Faculty in 1936, then I am filled with endless disappointment." [50]

The difficulty is that the atmosphere in Egypt in the past decade has scarcely been conducive to the publication of very original, creative, or sober books, even if Nasser himself might welcome them. Each new step the government has taken has produced in its wake a rash of hastily written popular justifications. The creation of the National Union led to attacks on political parties; the nationalization of the Press in 1960 led to attacks on private publishers who distort or suppress the news; the socialist decrees of 1961 led to attacks on capitalism and to cheap versions of the theory of surplus value. An ideology had begun to emerge, but whether Nasser intended it or not it was inevitably his own creation.

In the deluge of second-rate books and articles inspired by each new action taken by the regime, a sort of Gresham's Law takes effect whereby sycophantic propaganda drives serious discussion out of sight. Even on those occasions when notice is taken of the isolated and demoralized condition of Egyptian intellectuals, such notice takes a form likely to discourage creativity and independence even more. Thus the editor of *al-Ahram*, while drawing attention to "The Crisis of the Intellectuals" in a series of feature articles, identified the crisis as a long-standing conflict "between the force of revolutionary impetus and the intellectuals", as if to brand the latter as a group of reactionaries. He went on to contrast "experts" (as a category of intellectuals) with "trustworthy people" (i.e. army officers) and to explain why it was the latter to whom political power must be confided.[51] Another

[50] Speech of 25 November 1961

[51] Muhammad Hasanain Haikal in *al-Ahram*, June 2, 16 and 30, 1961

journalist attributed the crisis to the fact that "every word that an intellectual says, every phrase or idea he expresses, makes him, according to the interpretations of certain groups, an outlaw".[52]

In these circumstances one cannot judge from recent Egyptian political literature what the mood of educated opinion really is. One might therefore be tempted to dismiss what is written as unworthy of attention, were it not for the fact that however tedious much of it might be, it does indicate what sort of ideological pattern Egyptian publicists find it advisable to conform to, and what sort of arguments are open to elaboration. The gradual development of an official political ideology, while it may have closed the door to controversy on certain questions, has certainly not cut down the flow of publications: quite the contrary.

Within established limits there has been room for a certain variety of emphasis and degree in ideas. Thus since the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution it has been understood that a multi-party system was unacceptable, and that the National Union, as a nationwide popular organization, was above the level of parties and a more truly democratic means of representation. Yet it was possible, in the autumn of 1961, for a prominent journalist to criticize the loose organization and ideological open-endedness of the National Union and to demand the creation of a single tightly-knit political party in its place, not representing all classes but only those elements of the population having a vested interest in socialism.[53]

Likewise, although by the end of 1961 there had been no particular tendency in the Egyptian President's speeches to suggest that western democracy in the west itself rested on false principles (it being said only that western institutions were inappropriate to the Arab countries), it was open to individual writers to apply the full range of Marxist and other criticisms to western practice and to denounce it as a fraud perpetrated by the exploiting capitalist classes. Thus one writer, for example, asserts that American politics, as well as those of Britain and France, have fallen under the domination of capital, and affairs of state have come to be directed by "monopolists and the owners of factories and oil companies". The two American parties, which are instruments of the moneyed interests, have "taken over" the Congress and local government, "interfering in the elections and working with capital to falsify them, and – after succeeding in the elections – controlling the Congress, the municipal councils, the police, and the local courts with-

[52] Lutfi al-Khawli in a panel discussion on "The Crisis of the Intellectuals", *al-Ahram*, 14 June 1961

[53] Ihsan Abd al-Quddus in *Rose al-Yusuf*, 4 and 11 December 1961

out any reference to the people". This perversion of the true purposes of democracy is due to the historical circumstances in which western democracy first arose, namely, the intrusion of the capitalist middle class into affairs of state to protect themselves against the feudal nobility, but without reference to the great majority of the people. "Thus the present domination of capital over the western democracies is only the expression of a status quo that has existed from the time when this democracy first arose until the present." [54]

Elections are rigged (the same writer continues) by local officials and police who are bribed by the capitalist-dominated parties. The government works only for the interest of the party rather than the people; appointments to public office are made on the basis of the spoils system without regard to competence. "And this is not all, for monopoly capitalism has set itself up as the ultimate authority in supervising government officials, by means of a special law called the Hatch Act, whereby it gets rid of any official whose loyalty to the party which finances him is in doubt, through special committees which fix the accusation of communism on such officials." [55]

The National Union system, by contrast, reflects "the will of the whole people, which is of the will of God . . . The people are not limited by partisan principles but are gathered together around their national goals to achieve the mission of Arab nationalism and to stimulate their efforts for the sound political, social, and economic construction of the nation." [56]

This writer's interpretation of American politics is a crude and somewhat extreme, but by no means untypical, example of recent Egyptian literature. Such an attitude is, after all, a logical extension of the very widespread Arab view that the essence of democracy consists in the triumph of the will of the masses over the selfishness and privilege of a small group of individuals, and that a system that perpetuates and institutionalizes conflicts of interest is obstructing the emergence of the true popular consensus and is therefore not fully democratic. Democracy is a process of uniting the people rather than dividing them, of emphasizing their points of agreement rather than their disagreements.

One is reminded of the notion, familiar in a long series of social philosophers in Europe, of "rational self-realization" according to which individuals (or whole societies) must be liberated from their

[54] Muhammad Hamid al-Gamal, *Adwa' ʿala al-dimuqratiya al-ʿarabiya* ("Light on Arab Democracy") [Cairo, 1960], p. 83

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 95–6

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 159

own blindness, selfishness, or passion by those who possess true insight into the dictates of objective reason. The interests of all citizens, when properly understood, can only be harmonious because they are rational. "To compel men to adopt the right form of government, to impose Right on them by force, is not only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who has both the insight and the power to do so." [57]

Thus it was explained that the reason Nasser had simply issued the July 1961 social legislation by presidential decree, without submitting it to the National Assembly as required by the Constitution,[58] was that "it could not have obtained the Assembly's consent, despite the necessity [for such legislation] in order to begin the social revolution".[59] It scarcely seemed necessary for anyone to argue the point farther than this, for clearly the promotion of socialism could not yield precedence to parliamentary procedure. This was not a sacrifice of democracy for the sake of welfare, but an affirmation of democracy. Being in the rational interest of the masses, the socialist programme must be assumed to have their implicit support, which would be made explicit once they were enlightened.

> "The [local] committees of the National Union must make their members apostles to spread the gospel of socialism while explaining the obstacles and pointing out the difficulties as every true apostle must do, and drawing a picture of the glorious future", wrote a journalist. "Within these committees the scope of the discussion and debate must be widened, until the whole people sense their role in the construction of their future. And when all the people are engaged in this work, they will all feel it spontaneously and enthusiastically, and they will look to the future with pleasant anticipations." [60]

From such assumptions it was but a short step to the adoption of a doctrine of class conflict and to the view that those who did not share in what was identified as the general will, or who at a given stage of his-

[57] Auguste Comte, quoted by Isaiah Berlin in *Two Concepts of Liberty* (Oxford, 1958), p. 36

[58] Article 53 of the UAR Provisional Constitution provides that "While the National Assembly is not in session, the President of the Republic may issue any legislation or decisions originally within the competence of the Assembly, should the necessity arise. Such legislation and decisions must be submitted to the Assembly at its following meeting." But before the Assembly could meet to consider the July decrees it was dissolved by the President.

[59] Haikal in *al-Ahram*, 6 November 1961

[60] Salah Abd al-Sabur in *Rose al-Yusuf*, 16 October 1961

tory did not fully support what was presumed to be the national cause, simply did not belong to "the people". As Nasser declared on November 25, 1961,

> "The word 'people', of course, varies according to circumstances and ideologies . . . In the current stage of socialist construction, the people are all the groups and classes who support and contribute to it. So these are the ones to whom we have given full freedom and democracy. The rest, those who are against social justice and the social revolution, those who are against liberation from political, economic, and social exploitation, those who want to rule, or who in the past represented the influential class and the minority – are these the people? In my view they do not represent the people, but represent something else."

A Press commentator added that there is a vital difference between conflicts between the people and their enemies, on the one hand, and among different elements of the people on the other. The first is "a conflict of enmity which may not be susceptible of resolution by peaceful means, so that the people may be compelled to resort to other means to break the power of their enemies, such as arrests, sequestration of property, and deprivation of political rights". The second class of conflicts are "natural, non-antagonistic" ones that can be resolved by "debate, exchange of views, and persuasion".[61]

Freedom, then, could only exist when the enemies had been overcome and only the non-antagonistic conflicts remained, and when the harmony of true interests could rise to the surface unimpeded by the unnatural selfishness and hostility of an earlier, lower stage of history. "The enemies of the social revolution must be swept aside so that the masses thereafter can exercise their full and unconditional freedom. The uncongenial mixture of the minority who do not desire the social revolution with the great majority who desire it was the main obstacle which impeded the course of freedom." [62]

The westerner who sits comfortably amidst his own liberal axioms is apt to look aghast at much of this radical ideology, and at the monolithic shape that one or two Arab regimes have been taking, and conclude either that Arab radicals are blind and naïve, or that some evil genius has taken them by the hand and is deliberately leading them down the path to totalitarianism.

[61] Muhammad Khafif in *al-Ahram*, 27 November 1961
[62] Haikal in *al-Ahram*, 7 November 1961

It would be more to the point to bear in mind that many recent Arab thinkers, though well schooled in western liberal teachings and by no means attracted in any conscious way by totalitarianism as such, chafe at the exclusive pretensions of the liberal system, just as an earlier generation, faced with the claims of traditional Islamic doctrine, felt suffocated and anxious to break out of its closed circle. Western liberalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a breath of fresh air to those Arabs who wished to introduce a principle of movement and creativity into their society. It was a challenge to the monopolistic pretensions of Islamic traditions, and a means of facing new problems that had begun to arise. Today liberalism is believed to be similarly outmoded. The communist system is not particularly attractive to Arabs in certain respects, but Marxism is at least relevant to their concerns in many ways. Separated from the example set by the particular countries in which they have been applied, and freed from the irritating dogmatism and arrogance of orthodox communists, many aspects of Marxism have a natural and powerful appeal, particularly when disguised by another name such as "Arab socialism".

It might be argued that the new radicalism is not so much a rejection of liberalism as the extension of a certain form of it. To a great extent the liberalism in which many Arabs were schooled one and two generations ago, particularly in Egypt and Syria, was of a rather idyllic type. Arab liberals owed more to the universalism of the French Enlightenment and to nineteenth-century French Romanticism than to the English constitutionalists or utilitarians, and far more to the inspiration of the French Revolution than to the English Revolution of 1689. The scepticism and sense of limits of a writer like Burke, which might usefully have tempered some of the euphoric exaggerations of liberal mythology, never made a strong impression. Thus the Egyptian writer Khalid Muhammad Khalid, who in recent years has stood out in his country as a continuing and fervent believer in parliamentary democracy and civil liberties, is typical not only of many past and present Arab liberals, but of radicals too, in reacting with disgust and incomprehension to Disraeli's statement: "I prefer the liberty that we now enjoy to the principles that the Liberals promise us; and I prefer the rights of Englishmen to the Rights of Man." [63]

Nevertheless even Khalid himself, despite his interest in social reform, was shown to be out of step with the new radicalism by the debates in the Preparatory Committee for the Congress of Popular Forces, which

[63] Khalid Muhammad Khalid, *Al-Dimuqratiya abadan* ("Democracy Forever") [Cairo, 1953; third printing, 1958], p. 24

met in Cairo in the autumn of 1961; and it would be wrong to suppose that this radicalism in Cairo and elsewhere is something less than radical, and that it does not signify a departure from previous ideological conventions. It is, perhaps, the Arab radical's conception of the nature of his society's problems that has changed, rather than his understanding of what liberal ideas mean, or his esteem for the liberal virtues in themselves. These have simply ceased to have practical meaning to him. But while the virtues seem irrelevant in the abstract, in practice they often appear as outright vices, for they conflict with what *is* considered relevant: the need to pull together the scattered fragments of Arab society and to instil in its members an awareness of common moral bonds and a sense of citizenship; to hasten the end of an outdated stratification, immobility, and quiescent spirit in what remains of traditional society, which foster resigned acceptance of weakness and injustice; and to overcome the alienation and rootlessness of the new classes, which alternately promote opportunism and despair. And overlaid on the radical's preoccupation with all these problems is the humiliating sense of national impotence that continues to fester after several generations.

In these circumstances the desire for a government that is strong and determined (whatever else it might be) is overwhelming. John Stuart Mill would find widespread agreement with his view that "many a people has gradually emerged from this condition [of passiveness and submissiveness] by the aid of a central authority, whose position has made it the rival, and had ended by making it the master, of the local despots, and which, above all, has been single". [64]

No Arab writer has yet produced a comprehensive, relevant, and sophisticated theory of social, economic, and political development that can effectively compete with the great world ideologies of communism and democratic liberalism. Nor has anyone made a satisfactory attempt to make liberal principles applicable in any systematic way to contemporary Arab problems. The radical ideas described in this article indicate that the search for principles is on, but that often it takes the form either of a fragmentary rejection of outmoded or inappropriate doctrines, or an unattributed but uncritical borrowing of other ones. There are a great many unanswered and even unrecognized

[64] *Considerations on Representative Government* (Forum Books, New York, 1958), p. 60 (Chapter 4: "Under What Social Conditions Representative Government is Inapplicable"). Cf. the application of Mill's ideas to Arab problems by Manfred Halpern in Chapter 11 of *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton University Press, 1963), to which I am indebted.

questions about the political implications of economic development. A great gap exists between ideologues and economists: where are the Arab Fabians? If ideas are not available to shape events, then by default events will shape ideas, in keeping with their own unplanned and, perhaps, grotesque course.

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PERSIAN POLITICAL SOCIETIES 1906–11[1]

By Ann K. S. Lambton

SECRET AND SEMI-SECRET societies, which had spread the "new learning" derived from the West and the desire for government founded on "the law", interpreting both in terms of Islam, had prepared the way for the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–6.[2] With the grant of the constitution on 5 August 1906 these societies were succeeded by "political associations" (known by the general term of *anjuman*, society, association, club, or council), which had strong local, craft, or professional affiliations. The early secret or semi-secret societies had assumed that with the spread of education victory would automatically come. Consequently they had seen their function to be the dissemination of knowledge. There is little to show that they thought in terms of a revolution or even in terms of political activity other than the spread of enlightenment. The measure of the success of their efforts is to be seen in the large numbers of *anjumans* which sprang up almost immediately in the capital and the provinces in defence of the constitution and the National Consultative Assembly; and of their failure in the small number of the members of the *anjumans* and the Assembly who had anything more than the most elementary idea of what the functions of a parliament were, or how a code of laws could be regularly applied, and who would have turned the Assembly into something "between a Debating Society, a Court of Justice, and a Council of State".[3] It was to the *anjumans*, rather than to the deputies, that the preservation of the constitution and the Assembly was due; it was they who rallied to the defence of the Assembly and defended it when it was attacked by Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāh. They were not

[1] Unpublished Crown Copyright material in the Public Record Office has been reproduced in this article by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office, to whom I wish to express my thanks

[2] See my article, "Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905–6" in *St Antony's Papers*, number 4, *Middle Eastern Affairs*, number 1 (London, 1958)

[3] Cf. *Cd. 4581. Persia No. 1 (1909)*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, October 10, 1907, No. 54, p. 59

concerned, as had been the earlier societies, with the spread of modernism and "the new learning"; they were concerned with action rather than enlightenment. So far as they thought of "freedom" it was freedom from the tyranny and extortion of the government of the shah, whom the strictly orthodox had in any case always regarded as a usurper. The terms *fidā'ī* (devotee) and *mujāhid* (warrior) were applied to those members of the *anjumans* and others who were militant in the defence of the constitution and the Assembly. In Azarbayjan and Gilan, where the ranks of the *fidā'īs* were swelled by Caucasian revolutionaries, they developed in some cases their own organizations, which were influenced by revolutionary organizations in South Russia and Transcaucasia and eventually developed along rather different lines to the *anjumans* elsewhere. The latter with their strong local, professional, and craft associations were typical manifestations of the traditional corporate tendency of Persian society. This paper is concerned only with the role of the *anjumans* in the years 1906–11 and not with the details of the struggle between the nationalists and Muḥammad ʿAlī, the intervention of Russia in his support, the part played by Great Britain, or the interaction of Anglo-Russian relations and Persian internal politics, though some of these matters will be touched upon in the course of the narrative.

The constitutional revolution unfolded against the background of Anglo-Russian relations. The presence of both powers had long been felt in Persia; but their primary concern there had been not their relations with Persia but rather with each other. Great Britain's interest in Persian internal affairs in the early twentieth century arose mainly from the fact that a change in the *status quo* would affect Anglo-Russian relations. Great Britain had always wanted a common policy with Russia in Persia and hoped that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 would, at least, limit the area of conflict. The aims of the two powers were, however, different. British interests lay in an independent Persia, a prerequisite to which, by the early twentieth century, was a reform of the administration. British policy was, thus, to prevent the disintegration of Persia through internal disorder, but to avoid, as far as was compatible with this aim, intervention in Persian internal affairs; and to counsel moderation on Russia. But Persian internal weakness and Russian pressure on Persia and opposition to the nationalist movement involved Great Britain also in a degree of intervention which was incompatible with Persia's status as an independent state. Further, the constitutional movement developed against the background of financial crisis. The population had no security against the irresponsible

exactions of the shah's ministers. The treasury, nevertheless, was usually empty and unable to pay or maintain a force for the preservation of order. This fact also drew the two powers into the arena of internal conflict because of Persia's difficulty in servicing earlier loans made by the Powers and her demand for new ones. In this connection also there was a difference in aim between the two Powers. British policy felt it incumbent to meet the demand for funds in order to prevent the disintegration of the Persian state, provided proper safeguards could be given that the money would not be used against the nationalist movement, whereas Russian policy was inclined to provide loans with a view to bolstering up the existing regime against the nationalists.[4]

In these circumstances it was not surprising that the nationalist movement should be a dual movement, against both internal misgovernment and foreign intervention. There was already by the beginning of 1907 a noticeable growth of an anti-foreign feeling in the National Assembly, which took the form of a strongly developed fear of both England and

[4] For example Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir A. Nicolson on 13 January 1909, as follows:

"In reply to your telegram of the 9th instant, His Majesty's Government are opposed to any kind of intervention respecting the position in Tabreez or Ispahan.

"We have not ceased to regard the granting of a Constitution as a factor of much importance in the restoration of order, and it may be that wholesome influence may be produced on the Shah by the disturbances in those two places towards the granting of such a measure.

"So long as there is no reform in the Shah's Government there will be no improvement of a permanent character; and while any proposals emanating from the Russian Government will be most carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, they hold that to give the Shah money would, in the present circumstances, be worse than futile, and would amount to intervention in Persia's internal affairs. For it is probable that such money would be employed in the suppression of the national movement on behalf of a Constitution; moreover, when once the money had been spent, the situation would be as bad as ever, even if not worse." *Cd. 4733*. Foreign Office, January 13, 1909, No. 52, p. 22.

On 17 February 1909 Sir Edward Grey in another telegram to Sir A. Nicolson stated:

"In my opinion the Shah will take no notice of any advice unaccompanied by a threat. We wish to avoid active intervention, and thus such a threat would have to be of a negative character, and to the effect that neither Government will afford him support of a financial or other nature until he redeems his promise to his people by proclaiming a Constitution, and so pacifies the country. It seems to me that the only means of saving the country from internal disaster is to make it clear to the Shah that he will be left to his own devices, but we desire to do nothing to which the Russian Government do not entirely agree." *Ibid.* Foreign Office, February 17, 1909, No. 86, p. 52. Cf. also *ibid.* Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey, St Petersburgh, February 23, 1909, No. 95, pp. 54–5

Russia, and especially of the two combined. Any overt sign of co-operation was regarded as aimed directly at the independence of Persia.[5] The *anjumans*, however, on the whole were scrupulously careful not to endanger foreign lives or foreign interests, knowing that Russia would seize the slightest pretext to bring in military forces, ostensibly to defend Russian subjects. Throughout the siege of Tabriz (1908–9) the foreign communities in the town seem to have been in little danger, although in October 1908 Sattār Khān apparently refused to guarantee the safety of the Russians in Tabriz.[6] One observer stated on 18 November 1908 that "Foreigners generally speak with gratitude of the attitude towards them of the Nationalists throughout the troubles, and, with the exception of the Russians, show no apprehension for their personal safety." [7] Only at the very end of the siege, when food supplies had become critical, was the situation of the foreign communities dangerous.[8] The Russian government, however, took a different view from the beginning and held that there was serious danger to the Russian community in Tabriz;[9] and eventually they brought troops into Persia in 1909 on the pretext of protecting Russian and foreign legations and nationals.[10] When the nationalists finally marched on Tehran to restore the constitution in 1909 they denied the allegations made in some quarters that their intention was to molest foreigners and stated categorically that foreign subjects would in no way

[5] *Cd. 4581*. Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, January 30, 1907, No. 17, p. 16

[6] *Ibid.* Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey, St Petersburgh, October 18, 1908, No. 268, p. 193

[7] *Cd. 4733*. Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay, Tabreez, November 18, 1908. Inclosure 1 in No. 58, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, December 30, 1908, p. 32

[8] On 20 April 1909, the British and Russian representatives at a joint audience read a note to the shah which stated:

"The situation of our fellow-subjects in Tabreez is serious in the extreme. It seems that the food in the town is so scarce that the people are desperate, and there is reason to apprehend that an attack on the British and Russian Consulates-General is in contemplation in order to secure provisions.

"In these circumstances, the Representatives of Great Britain and Russia are compelled to point out to your Majesty that the two Governments will hold him personally responsible for any harm which may come to their fellow-subjects and to the Consulates-General in Tabreez." F.O. 416/40. Inclosure in No. 395, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, April 20, 1909, p. 170

[9] *Cd. 4581*. Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey, St Petersburgh, October 18, 1908, No. 268, p. 193

[10] Cf. Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff to Sir Edward Grey on July 5, 1909, No. 66, p. 55 in F.O. 416/41

be exposed to danger from the nationalists and that their persons and property would be safe and whenever necessary protected by the constitutionalists.[11] When they entered the city they kept their word and foreign nationals were in no way molested or subjected to danger. Mr G. Churchill, Oriental Secretary to the British Legation, in a memorandum dated 16 July 1909 wrote: "I venture, however, to state my absolute conviction that at no time have any foreigners been in any danger, excepting, of course, from stray bullets, provided they took normal precautions. The 'fedai' and the Bakhtiaris show remarkable respect towards foreigners . . . "[12]

Muẓaffar ud-Dīn Shāh finally signed the constitution on his deathbed on 1 January 1907. He was succeeded by his son, Muḥammad ʿAlī, on 8 January. Traditionally the power of the shah had been arbitrary, subject only to seizure by another despot more powerful than he. The people had had no responsible share in the government prior to the constitution. Muḥammad ʿAlī and his ministers from the first hated the constitution, which threatened them with the loss of their privileges; and were determined to overthrow it. They profoundly distrusted and despised the people. This distrust was especially strong with regard to the *anjumans*, who were the main organs through which the new cry of freedom and liberty was expressed, and who were the focal point of the long-delayed reaction against tyranny and misgovernment. The distrust between the shah and his ministers on the one hand and the people on the other was, in part, the result of the centuries-old gulf between the "government" and "the governed", which so far as it had been bridged in the past, had been bridged by the religious classes, certain sections of whom had, in some measure, been the defenders, or, at least, the refuge of the people. But there had always been also the religious leaders who had been on "the government side". In the constitutional revolution this was also the case: there were the reactionary mullas who worked with the shah and the court party, and the "nationalist" mullas who supported the constitutional movement and had, with the secret and semi-secret societies, helped to prepare the way for it. There were also those among the religious classes, as among other classes, who, once the constitutional movement looked like being successful, joined it in the hope of retaining their power. This pattern was not new, and the threat it offered to the established order serious but not unduly alarming. The spontaneous growth of *anjumans*

[11] *Ibid.* Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, July 5, 1909, No. 69, p. 56

[12] *Ibid.* Inclosure 1 in No. 427, same to same, Gulahek, July 23, 1909, p. 255

with local, professional, and craft affiliations on the other hand was something different; and it was this which the shah and the court party feared – and with reason, since it was mainly from the *anjumans* that active opposition to their arbitrary and tyrannical use of power and subservience to foreigners came; and among whom there developed "the sentiment of independence in the widest sense, of nationality, of the right to resist oppression and to manage their own affairs".

When the National Assembly eventually met it forced the shah to accept the formation of local assemblies or *anjumans*, which were to be elected in every province to oversee the administration, which was no longer to be in the hands of arbitrary governors.[13] Finally, when the Supplementary Fundamental Laws were promulgated on 7 October 1907, article 90 made provision for provincial councils (*anjuman-i vilāyatī* and *anjuman-i ayālatī*), which were to be elected by the people (Art. 91); and were to be free to exercise supervision over all reforms connected with the public interest (Art. 92).[14] "Popular" *anjumans*, as distinct from the provincial *anjumans*, were permitted by Article 21 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws in the following words:

> "Societies (*anjumans*) and associations (*ijtimā'āt*) which are not productive of mischief to religion or to the state and are not injurious to good order, are free throughout the whole empire, but members of such associations must not carry arms, and must obey the regulations laid down by the law on this matter . . . "

There were, thus, two types of *anjuman*, "official" *anjumans* and "popular" *anjumans*. The former were elected bodies, the latter political clubs or associations. The Tehran *anjumans* were all "popular" *anjumans*. Tehran was the seat of the National Assembly and there was therefore no reason for the setting up of "official" *anjumans* in the capital. In the provinces, on the other hand, the intention appears to have been that provincial *anjumans* – local or provincial councils or assemblies – should be set up, and just as the function of the National Assembly was considered by many to be mainly that of an advisory body, so the function of the provincial *anjumans* was seen to be supervision of the administration of the local governor. The dividing line between the provincial *anjumans*, or the "official" *anjumans*, and the "popular" *anjumans* is, however, sometimes difficult to draw, notably in the case of Tabriz. In that town the provincial *anjuman* became in

[13] E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909*, p. 143

[14] See also Kasravī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭiyyeh-i Īrān* (Tehran, 4th edition, n.d.), pp. 466 ff.

effect a "popular" *anjuman*, acting as a central body to which the various "popular" *anjumans* of the town reported; and when government forces were expelled from the town in 1908 it took over the administration of the town.

In Tehran within a short space of time after the grant of the constitution over one hundred "popular" *anjumans* were formed; the largest are said to have had over a thousand members.[15] The purpose of these *anjumans* was to strengthen the constitution, advocate reforms, and to watch over the actions of the government and its officials and to demand redress for citizens in cases of real or alleged injustice. A central *anjuman* was set up in Tehran composed of representatives of the various *anjumans*.[16] Similarly in Tabriz numerous *anjumans* were formed when news of the grant of the constitution was received; many had local affiliations, each quarter or street having its own *anjuman*. An Anjuman-i Ayālatī or Provincial Council was also set up for the purpose of electing deputies to the National Consultative Assembly; but when the deputies had been chosen, Muḥammad ʿAlī, who was then governor-general of Azarbayjan, ordered it to be dissolved. It reformed itself almost immediately as the Anjuman-i Millī, though subsequently it appears to have been known by its original name. The local Tabriz *anjumans*, which held regular meetings to investigate the complaints of the people, reported to the Anjuman-i Millī.

As a result of the assembly's decision that provincial *anjumans* should be set up to oversee the administration, councils or assemblies were formed in many of the provincial towns. Their nature varied from province to province; most were hostile to the government; some arrogated to themselves the functions of government;[17] and some were

[15] Sayyid Ḥasan Taqīzādeh states their numbers at one time reached one hundred and forty-four. *Tārīkh-i avāʾil-i inqilāb va mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān* (Tehran, 1959–60), p. 44. According to a list of over one hundred *anjumans* furnished to the British Legation *c.* February 1908 the Anjuman-i Āẕarbāyjān (the president of which was Sayyid Ḥasan Taqīzādeh) was the largest with 2,962 members. *Cd. 4581*. Extract from the Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 105 from Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, February 28, 1908, p. 107

[16] Malikzādeh, *Tārīkh-i inqilāb-i mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān* (Tehran, n.d.), ii, 207–8

[17] A curious instance of this was the action of the Mashhad council, which held a special sitting in November 1907 after various Turkoman raids had taken place on different places in Khurasan. The chiefs of the Tīmūrī and Hazāreh tribes and the *lashkarnivīs-bāshī* of the Khurasan army were summoned to attend. The council finally resolved that the government should be called upon to furnish these chiefs with the necessary funds and that the latter should give an undertaking to produce fully equipped horsemen. A letter was then sent to the governor-general instructing him to find the money required. *Cd. 4581*. Extract from the

parochial in their outlook in the extreme, showing little or no comprehension of constitutional government, and used much of their time and energy to indulge in local factional strife. One of the earliest provincial *anjumans* to be formed was the Anjuman-i Muqaddas-i Millī of Isfahan (also known later as the Anjuman-i Ayālatī), which was opened on 22 December 1906. It was run by the leading *'ulamā*, merchants, and citizens of the town. It heard plaints and demands for redress, issued decrees concerning local affairs, and fixed the price of certain commodities. Shortly after its formation Ẓill us-Sulṭān, the governor of the province, wrote to it informing it of his support and stating that the *mullā bāshī* was duly authorized to represent him at its meetings and to support and execute its decrees; and that soldiers and *farrāshes* had been placed at his disposal for the furtherance of the affairs of the Anjuman. Shortly after its formation regulations laying down the scope of its authority were transmitted to it from the National Assembly in Tehran. These laid down that: (i) The Anjuman was to be under Ẓill us-Sulṭān, who was to execute its decrees; (ii) its decrees, which were to be in accordance with the *sharī'a*, were to be executed equally and without prejudice with regard to all classes; (iii) all plaints were to be submitted in writing; (iv) its deliberations were to be concerned with general matters affecting the public welfare and not the investigation of personal matters or the discussion of matters of detail; (v) it had no right to interfere in military affairs, but could investigate complaints which affected such matters and give a ruling in accordance with the *sharī'a*; (vi) it was not to interfere in financial affairs but it could investigate complaints of extortion and demand redress from the governor; (vii) it was to have not more than twenty-four and not less than eighteen members, two-thirds of whom would form a quorum; (viii) in the event of its being considered necessary the Anjuman had the right to send two of its members to the royal presence to ask for directions; and (ix) the formation of public companies and other public matters required the approval of the Anjuman. The Anjuman, which met twice a week under the presidency of Shaykh Nūrullāh, virtually arrogated to itself the government of the province, producing thereby a certain degree of administrative confusion.[18] It seems that the Anjuman-i Muqaddas-i Millī did not inspire the local

Diary of His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed, Inclosure in No. 83, Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, November 25, 1907, pp. 81–2

[18] Cf. *Cd. 4581*. Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 18 from Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, February 1, 1907, No. 18, p. 17

public with complete confidence in its integrity; in any case about July 1907 an Anjuman-i ʿAdliyya (also termed the Anjuman-i ʿAdālatī), composed of two *ʿulamā*, two merchants, and two persons chosen from the craft guilds (*asnāf*) was set up. It was outside and separate from the Anjuman-i Muqaddas-i Millī (Ayālatī), and presumably charged with the investigation and settlement of trade disputes. Various "popular" *anjumans* were also set up in Isfahan, such as the Anjuman-i Tijārat, the Anjuman-i Taraqqī, the Anjuman-i Ittiḥādiyya, which was formed by the students of the religious schools in Isfahan, and the Anjuman-i Ittiḥād va Ittifāq, composed exclusively of sayyids, non-sayyids being admitted only as associate members; the last-named *anjuman* was formed expressly to support the National Assembly, which was alleged, at its opening meeting, to be under pressure from Great Britain and Russia, and to uphold Islam against foreigners.[19]

Provincial assemblies were also set up in many other towns, including Shiraz (*c.* January 1907), Enzeli, Rasht, and Kirman. Numerous "popular" *anjumans* were also formed in the provinces. In Shiraz an Anjuman-i Islām was founded about March 1907 by some two hundred members of the religious, mercantile and other classes, who took an oath to support the constitutional assembly with their lives.[20] These popular *anjumans* from time to time found themselves in opposition to the provincial *anjuman*. On 17 May 1908, for example, representatives of various popular *anjumans* of Isfahan assembled at the meeting place of the provincial *anjuman* refusing to leave it unless reforms in the election of that body were promised; they also demanded security of the highways, the punishment of those who spoke against the constitution, the establishment of a Court of Justice, and the abolition of the custom of taking sanctuary at mosques and the houses of religious leaders. The Governor and the *anjuman* after some discussion agreed to their requests. The agitation appears to have been aimed primarily against Āqā Najafī, one of the leading figures of the provincial *anjuman* and a reactionary.[21] Often the provincial *anjumans* were torn by local dissensions; elections were in some cases accompanied by violence and

[19] See the weekly paper published by the Anjuman-i Muqaddas-i Millī-i Iṣfahān, 1907–8, and especially the issue dated 1 Rajab 1325/10 August 1907; and also Muḥammad Ṣadr Hāshimī, *Tārīkh-i jarāʾid va majallāt-i Īrān* (Isfahan, n.d.), i, 290

[20] *Cd. 4581*. Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 23, Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, March 28, 1907, p. 25

[21] *Ibid.* Monthly Summary, Inclosure in No. 177, Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, June 19, 1908, p. 164

bloodshed.[22] In others the local population showed little interest in the proceedings of the provincial *anjuman*. Thus, the provincial *anjuman* of Kirman was reported in May 1907 to meet periodically but in the absence of any regulations not to know what to do and therefore to do nothing.[23] This is somewhat odd because Kirman had been one of the early centres of the "popular movement".

The membership of the "popular" *anjumans* varied from place to place. Whereas that of the secret and semi-secret societies in Tehran up to the grant of the constitution had been mainly drawn from the religious classes and the intellectuals, in the second phase after the grant of the constitution the Tehran "popular" *anjumans* had a close connection with the craft guilds and strong local affiliations. The inhabitants of the different quarters formed *anjumans*, such for example as the Anjuman-i Barādarān-i Darvāzeh-i Qazvīn; and the people of different districts and provinces domiciled in Tehran also formed *anjumans*. One of the largest and most powerful of these was the Anjuman-i Āẕarbāyjān. It is alleged to have had 2,962 members in February 1908.[24] In Azarbayjan from the first the "popular" *anjumans* and the Anjuman-i Millī (Ayālatī) were opposed to the large landowners and had a strong "middle class" bias. In February 1907 Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Minister at Tehran, reported of the Anjuman-i Millī as follows:

> "its position hardly seems so secure as it was, nor its popularity so general. The members have had several violent quarrels among themselves, while the senior clergy of the town are adopting an attitude of sullen hostility towards an institution which deprives them of much of their importance and emoluments. The landed proprietors, too, find their interests directly menaced by the action of the 'enju-

[22] Thus, for example, the local assembly at Enzeli was torn by local dissensions, a disturbance taking place there on 7 May 1907. *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 29, Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, June 21, 1907, p. 35

[23] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 26, same to same, Gulahek, May 23, 1907, p. 30. However, later in the year elections to the Kerman assembly led to disturbances. *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 55, Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, October 10, 1907, p. 61. These continued for some time and the government eventually seized and deported the popular leader, Nāẓim ut-Tujjār; and five or six persons were killed when the troops were ordered to fire upon the mob. Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 61, same to same, Tehran, November 8, 1907, p. 71

[24] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 105, same to same, Tehran, February 28, 1908, p. 107

men' in causing the price of grain and wheat to be reduced, and the mercantile and lower classes can alone be considered as whole-hearted supporters of the committee which was at one time so popular." [25]

In Isfahan, on the other hand, where, perhaps, as a legacy of Safavid times, the religious classes held a more than usually influential position, the Anjuman-i Muqaddas-i Millī and the "popular" *anjumans* were largely dominated by the local religious leaders. In Mashhad also the religious classes played a prominent part in the *anjumans* and there seems to have been considerable opposition between them and the merchant classes. The religious leaders in Mashhad are alleged to have been for the most part "reactionary to the core" and to have taken part in the deliberations of the provincial *anjuman*, "not out of sympathy for reform but in order to try and control the popular movement which they realized they could not check and feared would otherwise develop independently of them and possibly end in the destruction of their power". [26] This was to some extent true of certain of the religious leaders in Isfahan also, such as Shaykh Nūrullāh and Āqā Najafī. In Rasht some of the members of the Anjuman-i Millī, which developed close relations with the Anjuman-i Millī of Tabriz, are said to have been connected with the Social Democrat party of Baku.[27] Apparently the *fidā'īs* in Rasht had two types of association, one public and one secret; and were under the authority of directing bodies in the Caucasus; and their attitude was distinctly revolutionary.[28]

So far as the members of the *anjumans* had political experience it was transmitted to them through Persians who had had experience of Russian revolutionary organizations in Transcaucasia, Caucasians and Russian emigrés.[29] But for the most part the members of the *anjumans* had had no political experience; and many perhaps joined

[25] *Cd. 4581.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 21, Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, February 27, 1907, p. 20

[26] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 23, same to same, Tehran, March 28, 1907, p. 24

[27] Malikzādeh, *Tārīkh-i inqilāb-i mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān*, ii, 264

[28] *Cd. 4581.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 18, Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, February 1, 1907, p. 17; and *Cd. 4733*, Memorandum by Mr Churchill, Tehran, March 18, 1909, Inclosure in No. 169, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, March 23, 1909, p. 79. Already in 1906 Persian subjects in the Caucasus, to show their adherence to the popular cause, had formed a secret society and called themselves *fidavis* (F.O. 416/30, *General report on Persia for the year 1906*, p. 6)

[29] By October 1908 there were according to the Russian minister for foreign

them without any very clear notion of the nature of the issues between the nationalists on the one hand and the shah and the court party on the other. Some, perhaps, merely saw in the *anjumans* a means through which they could carry out the duty incumbent upon all Muslims, namely to enjoin what is good and to forbid what is evil;[30] while others joined them simply out of a kind of intuitive clinging to Shi'ism, because they conceived of "the law" which the constitutional movement would establish to be the *sharī'a* and associated, in some obscure way, the triumph of the nationalist movement with the return of the Hidden Imam, whom they regarded as their true king. The *anjumans* had, in fact, a semi-political and semi-religious or messianic character.[31] At times their activities were accompanied by outbreaks of fanaticism against the religious minorities.[32] Thus, in Isfahan the Jews were subjected to disabilities by the provincial *anjuman*. At the beginning of February 1907 the representatives of the Jewish community were summoned before the *anjuman* and forced to sign an ordinance that in future no Jew would (i) sell wine or spirits to a Muslim, or (ii) hawk goods for sale within a radius of eight miles of Isfahan.[33] An

affairs 300–500 Caucasian revolutionaries with Sattār Khān in Tabriz. *Cd. 4581.* Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey, St Petersburgh, October 18, 1908, No. 268, p. 193. See "The Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia", Persia, in *Central Asian Review*, iv, 3, pp. 289 ff., for a discussion of Soviet writing on this subject; and 'Abd ul-Ḥusayn Zarrīnkūb's review of Amīr Khīzī's book, *Qiyām-i Āẕārbāyjān va Sattār Khān* (Tabrīz, 1960–1), in *Rāhnamā-yi kitāb*, year 3, No. 5, Dei 1339, pp. 623 ff.

[30] Cf. Kasravī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭiyyeh-i Īrān*, p. 265

[31] Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, writing to Sir Edward Grey from Tehran on 27 February 1907, noted that the national movement as a whole had a dual nature. He wrote:

"It is clear that a national movement of a semi-political and semi-religious character does exist and is spreading. The great Mujteheds of Kerbela are now entering on the scene, and delegates are being sent out from the capital to the provinces to preach the principles of liberty.

"Patriotism, of a distinctive Persian type, has always been the characteristic of the Shiite believers. The present Shah of Persia has no religious status, and, in the view of the religious leaders, no fundamental right to the allegiance of the Persians, whose real chief is no living king, but the twelfth Imam, the coming Messiah, even now present on earth, though unseen. The patriotism of the Persian Shiite . . . is, or can be, of a highly revolutionary character" *Cd. 4581.* No. 20, p. 19.

[32] Thus, a sayyid in Shiraz, passing along a street, on a certain occasion, shouted "Long live freedom" and punctuated his patriotic cry by sticking a knife into one of the pupils of a Jewish school passing near him. *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 23, Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, March 28, 1907, p. 25

[33] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 21, same

attempt appears to have been made to couple this hostility towards non-Muslims with anti-foreign feeling. Shaykh Nūrullāh issued a decree ordering the local merchants to close their accounts with Europeans (though Āqā Najafī denied this to the British Consul-General); but this attempt proved abortive and by January 1908 opposition to foreign trade had ceased.[34] In general, however, where the *anjumans* were controlled by the mullas it was not uncommon for them to have a tendency towards fanaticism and hostility towards foreign interests. This was, for example, the case in Sultanabad, which was an important centre of the carpet trade. The British vice-consul in that town reported on 6 June 1908:

> "that there were six Political Societies each trying to govern the district, that the Governor was powerless, that the leaders of the Societies were intolerant priests who were trying to create an anti-European feeling, and that Messrs. Ziegler and Company, who had advanced money and wool to the value of 30,000*l.* to weavers, were finding it daily more difficult to collect outstandings." [35]

Some writers are critical of the *anjumans* and charge them with indulging in idle talk,[36] but the general consensus of opinion is that the *anjumans* played an important part in creating a public opinion in favour of constitutional reform and in defending the National Assembly.[37] They were in fact the main channel for the expression of that intense feeling of patriotism which was abroad in Persia at the time.[38] Further, through the contact, tenuous though it often was, which the

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to same, Tehran, February 27, 1907, p. 20. A large number of the small travelling merchants in the Isfahan neighbourhood were Jews

[34] *Cd. 4581.* Extract from Summary of Events in Persia for the last four weeks, Inclosure in No. 91, Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, December 31, 1907, p. 89; and Extract from Summary of Events for the month ending January 30, 1908, Inclosure in No. 99, same to same, Tehran, January 30, 1908, which states that active opposition by the Āqās to foreign trade seemed to have ceased (p. 102). Rumours towards the end of 1907 were spread in Kirman that British troops had landed and were coming to Kirman to force Christianity upon the people. *Ibid.* Inclosure in No. 91, p. 89

[35] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events in Persia, Inclosure in No. 226, same to same, Gulahek, August 12, 1908, p. 174

[36] Cf. Kasravī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭiyyeh-i Īrān*; and ʿAbdullāh Mustawfī, *Sharḥ-i zindagī-i man* (Tehran, 1945), ii, 245

[37] Cf. E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*; and E. Aubin, *La Perse d'aujourd-hui* (Paris, 1908), p. 212

[38] *Cd. 4581.* Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, May 23, 1907, No. 26, p. 27; and same to same, Gulahek, September 13, 1907, No. 42, p. 50

anjumans established with each other, they fostered a certain sense of solidarity among those who were seeking to assert themselves against the arbitrary, and often tyrannical, rule of the provincial governors. Prior to this time any attempt by the people to assert themselves against the local authorities was isolated, or, as in the case of the opposition to the Tobacco Régie, led by the *mujtahids*. The *anjumans* created a sense of community of interest and this gave the people in widely separated districts courage to act; though admittedly when the constitution was suspended in 1907 and Tabriz carried on the fight the *anjumans* in other provinces were unable to send effective help in men or money to Tabriz, but eventually they rallied their forces and were largely instrumental in bringing about a restoration of the constitution.

Muḥammad ʿAlī on his accession immediately showed his determination to work against the nationalists and especially the *anjumans*. Provincial *anjumans* had by this time been organized in many of the provincial cities, and appeared to aim at a kind of local autonomy. The governors were showing themselves powerless to deal with them. Niẓām ul-Mulk, who took over the governorship of Tabriz early in January 1907, found the Anjuman-i Ayālatī so hostile that he complained to the shah. The matter was brought up at the National Assembly but the deputies upheld the Anjuman.[39] In Shiraz the provincial *anjuman* showed a similar spirit; and the British consul was told on 23 March 1907 that the government authorities could no longer restrain the populace whose feelings were being worked upon by letters from the women of Tabriz reproaching them for inaction.[40] In May of the same year Sir Cecil Spring-Rice described the growth of the *anjumans* in the following words:

> "In every town there is an independent Assembly, which acts without consulting the Governor or the Central Assembly at Tehran. One after another, unpopular Governors have been expelled, and the Central Government and the Tehran Assembly have found themselves powerless to resist. The danger of universal disorganization seems a real one. A spirit of resistance to oppression and even to all authority is spreading throughout the country. The leaders are unknown. The inspiration seems to come from the north, perhaps from the Caucasus . . . The sentiment of independence in the widest sense, of nationality, of the right to resist oppression and to manage their

[39] *Cd. 4581*. Extract from Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 18, same to same, Tehran, February 1, 1907, pp. 16–17

[40] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 25, same to same, Tehran, April 24, 1907, p. 26

own affairs is rapidly growing among the people. It is strongest in Azerbaijan. It is very strong in the capital . . . " [41]

The tendency to disorganization and lawlessness was also found in the "popular" *anjumans*; and at times there was a tendency by the unscrupulous to abuse them. Thus, in the spring of 1907 an *anjuman* appears to have been formed in Tehran with the object of robbing the public systematically in the name of Islamic law. The National Assembly, upon whom the discredit was thrown, asked the Minister of the Interior to put a stop to this state of affairs and to suppress the offending *anjuman*. The government thereupon took steps to suppress all *anjumans*. The Assembly again intervened, insisting upon the suppression of only the offending society, and eventually got their way.[42]

With the appointment of Mīrzā ʿAlī Aṣghar Khān Amīn us-Sulṭān, the Atābak-i Aʿẓam, as prime minister on 2 May 1907 the struggle between the nationalists and the shah was intensified. The *anjumans* regarded the appointment of Amīnus -Sulṭān with grave misgivings;[43] and after his assumption of office there was a great increase in the number of "popular" *anjumans*, secret and otherwise, formed for the purpose of defending the constitution.[44] On 13 May the populace of Tabriz, having expelled one of the principal *mujtahids*, closed the bazaars and the provincial *anjuman* went to the local telegraph office and informed the National Assembly that the country was tired of waiting for a constitutional government, and that the bazaars would remain closed until the Fundamental Law was promulgated. They did not receive a satisfactory reply and so they threatened to make a special law locally for Azarbayjan unless the Fundamental Law was promulgated within ten days. On 16 May armed demonstrators paraded the streets clamouring to be led to Tehran.[45] This marked the opening of a new phase in the activities of the *anjumans*, a phase which was provoked by the shah's unwillingness to work the constitution. The nationalists began actively to prepare themselves to take up arms, not only in Tabriz but in other cities also. Meanwhile allegations reached

[41] *Cd. 4581*. Same to same, Gulahek, May 23, 1907, No. 26, p. 28

[42] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 25, same to same, Tehran, April 24, 1907, p. 25

[43] E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, pp. 139–40

[44] Mustawfī, *Sharḥ-i zindagī-i man*, ii, 244–6; and *Cd. 4581*, memorandum by Mr Churchill, Inclosure in No. 26, Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, May 23, 1907, p. 27

[45] *Cd. 4581*. Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 26, Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, May 23, 1907, p. 29

Tehran that certain persons had been paid by the shah's agents to murder some members of the Tabriz Anjuman. Demonstrations in its support were thereupon held in Tehran and Rasht. In Tabriz the streets were patrolled nightly by bodies of armed men in its service. Patrols held the entrances to the town, challenging and searching all persons leaving or entering the town.[46] In Isfahan disorders spread and the support for the provincial *anjuman* tended to be associated with social discontent. The followers of the leading religious dignitaries, who were the most influential figures in the provincial *anjuman*, began to parade twice a week in the *maydān*, most of them carrying firearms, their numbers increasing as men from the villages owned by the large landlords enlisted as *fidā'īs* in order to obtain the protection of the religious leaders and escape the payment of rent or other debts. They were drilled by former members of Ẓill us-Sulṭān's army, who were sought out for the purpose.[47]

Little was done at Tehran to implement the constitution and disorders were fomented by the shah and the court party in the provinces. Turkey meanwhile invaded north-west Persia in August; and Russia was suspected, and not without reason, of aiding and encouraging the shah against the National Assembly. The belief grew that there was secret collusion between the shah and Amīn us-Sulṭān for the overthrow of the National Assembly and the sale of the country to Russia. On 31 August Amīn us-Sulṭān was assassinated by a certain ʿAbbās Āqā, who immediately afterwards shot himself. On the assassin's body a paper was found stating that he was national devotee (*fidā'ī-i millī*) number 41 of the Anjuman. Which of the various *anjumans* this was has never, as far as I know, been established. Be that as it may, the murder heightened the morale of the nationalists. Popular sentiment approved the murder and regarded ʿAbbās Āqā as the saviour of the country. The streets of Tabriz, of which he was a native, were illuminated and there was general rejoicing.[48] The assassination put fear into the court

[46] *Cd. 4581.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 29, same to same, Gulahek, June 21, 1907, p. 34

[47] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 44, same to same, Gulahek, September 13, 1907, p. 53

[48] Kasravī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭiyyeh-i Īrān*, pp. 447 ff.; E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, pp. 150 ff. Sayyid ʿAlī Āzār alleges that ʿAbbās Āqā was connected with the Tehran Ijtimā ʿiyyūn-i ʿĀmmiyyūn party, which had branches also in Tabriz, Baku, and Tiflis. *Qiyām-i Kulunil Muḥammad Taqī Khān Pisyān dar Khurāsān* (Tehran 1950/1), pp. 52 ff. See also Malikzādeh, who alleges another plot had been made to assassinate Amīn us-Sulṭān by the revolutionary committee originally set up in 1904. *Tārīkh-i inqilāb-i mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān*, iii, 22

party, and gave rise to a belief that the membership of the "popular" *anjumans*, secret and otherwise, whose members would not stop at political assassination to gain their ends, was spreading. So much so, shortly after the murder of Amīn us-Sulṭān the shah was informed by a committee composed of Qājār princes, high military and civil officials, large landlords, and all the reactionaries of prominence, that unless he maintained the constitution and worked with the National Assembly their support would be withdrawn from the throne.[49]

On 27 September the reactionary party attended the Assembly, and headed by Jalāl ud-Dawleh, the eldest son of Ẓill us-Sulṭān, took an oath of loyalty to the constitution.[50] This group, conforming to the prevailing tendency to form associations, appears to have reformed itself into an association called the Anjuman-i Akābir. It was composed chiefly of high functionaries, with a fair number of military officers, and its president and vice-president were the Amīr-i Aʿẓam and Ḥusayn Qulī Khān Nawwāb respectively. It had no official standing but arrogated to itself the right of giving advice to the responsible ministers in the conduct of the business of the departments of state. It was irresponsible, but the influence of its members was such that its advice could not be wholly disregarded.[51] Support for the nationalist cause meanwhile grew both in Tehran and the provinces, largely through the activities of the "popular" *anjumans* and the provincial *anjumans*; though sometimes this support was mainly an expression of local factional strife. Thus on 13 October a certain Sayyid ʿAbd ul-Ḥusayn Lārī arrived in Shiraz with seventy followers to support the Majlis-i Millī, as the provincial *anjuman* was sometimes called, which was agitating against the return of Qavām ul-Mulk and his sons. Sayyid ʿAbd ul-Ḥusayn, whose avowed intention was to break the power of the Qavāmīs, was alleged to have been invited and paid by Muʿtamid-i Dīvān, the leader of a rival faction. Nevertheless Sayyid ʿAbd ul-Ḥusayn appears to have been welcomed by the bulk of the population of Shiraz.[52]

Meanwhile the internal situation became serious: the authority of the Central Government had been reduced to almost nothing and could

[49] *Cd. 4581.* Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, October 2, 1907, No. 46, p. 55

[50] *Ibid.* Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, October 10, 1907, No. 53, p. 58

[51] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, October 10, 1907, No. 54, p. 59

[52] *Ibid.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 61, same to same, Tehran, November 8, 1907, p. 72

only be exercised through the provincial *anjumans*; and its influence with these bodies could not always be counted on. The treasury, moreover, was empty; and there was no public force to maintain order and enforce the law. The moral authority of the old regime in the provinces had been destroyed by the provincial *anjumans*; and the framework of such elementary administration as had once existed had almost disappeared.[53] In these circumstances the shah promulgated the Supplementary Fundamental Laws on 7 October 1907. Encouraged by the Russian Legation, he was, however, still determined to overthrow the nationalists. On 12 November he paid a state visit to the Assembly and for the fourth time swore to be faithful to the constitution, in spite of the fact that he was preparing means for its overthrow. Public opinion, represented by the numerous *anjumans*, rightly had little faith in his protestations and was profoundly disquieted. Fear of foreign intervention limited the actions of the *anjumans*. According to some observers the shah owed his life to the mere fact that the *anjumans* dreaded the aftermath of a royal assassination in the troubled conditions which prevailed at the time.[54] The signature of the Anglo-Russian convention on 31 August 1907 had greatly contributed to their misgivings, and may also have encouraged Muḥammad ʿAlī in his designs against the nationalist movement, since he may well have assumed that the existence of the convention was likely to make it more difficult for Great Britain to oppose Russian attempts to work against or overthrow the nationalist movement.

According to the narrative of Nāṣir ul-Mulk, shortly after the shah had pawned his jewels at the Russian Loan Bank in Tehran, money was distributed among the disorderly elements in Tehran, the shah's *farrāshes* and muleteers, by Amīr Bahādur Jang, one of the shah's favourites. A conflict was provoked on 21 November between the Sīlākhwur Regiment, which was under Amīr Bahādur Jang, and the Cossacks, in the course of which there was much firing in the air. Nāṣir ul-Mulk, who at the time was prime minister, complained to Amīr Bahādur Jang and the Cossack colonel, who each replied that it was none of his business, and that he was responsible to the shah alone. The National Assembly protested against the disorders and there were meetings of the *anjumans* in the mosques. The shah then prepared a rescript to the Assembly, which was read to them on 28 November. He insisted on the necessity of entirely separating the executive duties of the government from the legislative powers of the

[53] *Cd. 4581*. Same to same, Tehran, October 10, 1907, No. 54, pp. 53–4

[54] E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, p. 161

Assembly, and urged the suppression of the *anjumans*, which, he claimed, unduly interfered in government affairs, and announced that his ministers had been given orders to effect their suppression. The Assembly reminded the shah of Article 21 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws, which allowed the formation of *anjumans*, and promised to draw up regulations for their governance.[55]

It was alleged that the rescript was prepared by Sa'd ud-Dawleh, who, with the shah's Russian secretary, Shapsal (who had formerly been the shah's tutor), acted as intermediary between the palace and the Russian Legation. Nāṣir ul-Mulk then called on the Russian Minister, M. Hartwig, and warned him that unless the shah changed his attitude there would be trouble. The ministers after consultation decided that as both they and the shah had sworn allegiance to the constitution, which included a clause guaranteeing freedom of public meeting and debate, they could not undertake to convey to the Assembly a message from the shah condemnatory of these rights. Accordingly they decided to tender their resignations in the event of the shah insisting. In the meantime a large number of people had assembled in the Artillery Square, where their proceedings were most disorderly. A reactionary mulla, Shaykh Farajullāh, who was in the shah's pay, encouraged demonstrations against the Assembly and the nationalist movement. The Cossack colonel, with Shapsal at his side, appeared in the square with his soldiers, and his attitude toward the mob was encouraging. Meanwhile a large number of people, largely from the *anjumans*, had collected in the mosques, where the mullas on the nationalist side were haranguing them. The ministers, however, induced the crowds in the mosque to disperse, apart from a certain number who were detailed to the Assembly to protect it. A demonstration of the shah's *farrāshes* and muleteers was then made against the Assembly but they were driven off. The mob in the Artillery Square was reinforced by Amīr Bahādur's soldiers and persons brought in from the neighbouring villages, who were believed to receive so much a day from the shah. The ministers meanwhile received encouraging telegrams from the provinces and assurances from the people of Tehran. They nevertheless discouraged a proposal for an armed demonstration and for the closing of the bazaars. On 15 December the ministers received an order to wait on the shah at the palace.[56]

[55] *Cd. 4581*. Memorandum by Mr Churchill on Proceedings of Persian National Assembly from November 9 to December 2, 1907, Inclosure 2 in No. 84, Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, December 4, 1907, pp. 84–5

[56] Narrative of the Nasr ul-Mulk [*sic*], late Prime Minister of Persia, communicated by Sir C. Spring-Rice, February 25, 1908, in F.O. 416/35

Nāṣir ul-Mulk, was the first to arrive, and was immediately arrested.[57]

The Assembly learning of this dispersed. The *anjumans*, either from lack of experience or unwillingness to provoke an armed conflict, or both, at first also remained inactive. On the following day they regained their courage and began to collect in armed groups round the Assembly, occupying the Bahāristān Square and the Sipahsālār mosque, which adjoins the Assembly; by the evening some 3,000 armed members of the *anjumans* had assembled. The Assembly meanwhile met and on 17 December formulated their demands of the shah, which were that (i) Sa'd ud-Dawleh be exiled; (ii) Amīr Bahādur Jang be placed under the orders of the Minister of War; (iii) the Cossacks also be placed under that department; (iv) the shah take an oath before the Assembly to observe the constitution; (v) the men who had fired on the Assembly be punished; and (vi) a national guard of two hundred men be formed for the protection of the Assembly. The shah temporized, and by evening some 6,000–7,000 armed men had assembled to defend the Assembly. On 19 December telegrams of support for the nationalist cause were received from Rasht, Qazvin, and Tabriz; and the *anjumans* of the latter town announced that the shah should be deposed. On 20 December more telegrams came in from the provincial *anjumans* demanding the deposition, and, in some cases, the death of the shah.[58] In Isfahan the bazaars were closed and volunteers began to

[57] Mr Marling reported to Sir Edward Grey that the news of the *coup d'état* was brought to him about 6.30 on the same day by the Iftikhār ut-Tujjār, a relative of Nāṣir ul-Mulk, and a servant, who had accompanied Nāṣir ul-Mulk to the palace, and who asserted that as the latter was led away he had whispered, "Let the British Legation know I am to be killed by 10 o'clock."

Marling reported: "I at once sent Mr Churchill to the Palace . . . On reaching the palace . . . after some delay he was conducted to the Shah, whom he found walking up and down one of the courts of the palace. His Majesty was in the highest spirits. He declared, of course, that he had no intention of injuring Naṣr ul-Mulk . . . or any of the Ministers and kept repeating 'They are frightened, they are frightened.' " *Cd. 4581*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, December 31, 1907, No. 92, p. 90. Nāṣir ul-Mulk was eventually permitted to leave the country and was accompanied to the frontier by two *ghulāms* from the British Legation. He was met en route by crowds at Qazvin, Rasht, and Enzeli, and the *anjumans* at Qazvin and Rasht urged him to return to Tehran. At Baku a crowd of upwards of 2,000 persons met him, among them many Russians and Caucasians. He was much impressed by the strength of the popular organization in Southern Russia, which seemed to be closely connected with the movement in Persia. Narrative of the Naṣr ul-Mulk; and *Cd. 4581*, Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, December 31, 1907, No. 92, pp. 90 ff.

[58] *Cd. 4581*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, December 31, 1907, No. 92, pp. 91–2

drill.[59] The shah, meanwhile, became alarmed; his anxiety was further increased by the fact that Ẓill us-Sulṭān appeared to be aiding the nationalists, furnishing arms and possibly money to the *anjumans*, while his sons had shown themselves armed at the Bahāristān.[60] On 22 December the British and Russian representatives had a joint audience with the shah and asked him to give assurances that he had no hostile designs towards the constitution. In reply he said he had no hostility to the constitution and merely desired to suppress those *anjumans* which abused and vilified himself and his family and were only seditious.[61] The Tabriz *anjuman* meanwhile had succeeded in circulating throughout Persia the threat of deposing the shah, and the larger cities were greatly excited. Telegrams promising armed support were received from Shiraz, Isfahan, Rasht, Qazvin, Kirman, and Mashhad. In the evening the shah yielded and accepted the demands formulated by the majlis.[62]

The peace thus made was little more than a truce; no confidence existed between the two sides. In the first instance it had been the intransigence of the shah and the court party which had forced the "popular" *anjumans* to take up arms: and after their defeat of the shah's abortive attack on the Assembly, they tended, partly because of their distrust of the shah, to extend their activities beyond mere supervision of the actions of the government and to interfere in the day-to-day conduct of affairs. They had, however, had no experience of administration; and by their irresponsible interference in the affairs of the executive and the National Assembly, they made orderly government difficult.

[59] *Cd. 4581*. Extract from Summary of Events for the Month ending January 30, 1908, Inclosure in No. 99, same to same, p. 102

[60] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, December 31, 1907, No. 92, pp. 91–3

[61] *Ibid.* p. 92. On January 14, 1908, the shah again told Mr Marling that the members of the *anjumans* were "common revolutionaries". *Ibid.* Extract from Summary of Events ending January 30, 1908, Inclosure in No. 99, same to same, Tehran, January 30, 1908. On a subsequent occasion, in September 1908, the shah also spoke to Mr Marling against the *anjumans*, saying that the majlis had been composed of ignorant and designing men whose aim had been to create trouble against himself; and that they had been supported by equally evil and interested *anjumans*; that they had interfered in all kinds of questions quite outside their competence. *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, September 30, 1908, No. 278, p. 196. The shah's view of the *anjumans* was similar to that of M. Isvolsky, who refused "to consider the enjumens of Tehran or the provincial towns as anything but associations of noisy agitators and fanatics whose proceedings have nothing common with a genuine national movement". F.O. 416/41. Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey, St Petersburgh, July 8, 1909, No. 427, Confidential, p. 140

[62] *Cd. 4581*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, December 31, 1908, No. 92, p. 93

Moreover, the effectiveness of the Assembly, which itself had no experience and little knowledge of what its proper functions should be, was thereby decreased; while the executive hesitated to act because it was fearful of offending both the Assembly and the *anjumans*.[63] This was, perhaps, the inevitable result of the attempt to pass without any intermediate experience from an arbitrary irresponsible form of government to a representative responsible system. The absence of any clear demarcation of authority and responsibility between the executive, the National Assembly, and the *anjumans*, "popular" and "provincial", was a contributory factor in the administrative breakdown which began to threaten and was, in part, occasioned by the perennial financial difficulties.

Meanwhile the success of the *anjumans* in providing a focal point for public opinion in support of the constitution was such that their opponents sought to counter this by forming *anjumans* themselves, hoping to confuse the issue by working secretly against the constitution under cover of supposedly nationalist *anjumans*. Among these was the Anjuman-i Futuvvat[64] and the Anjuman-i Islāmiyyeh in Tabriz.[65] Attempts were also made to gain control of existing *anjumans*, as is alleged to have happened in the case with the Anjuman-i Iṣfahān in Tehran in 1908.[66]

Anti-dynastic articles continued to appear in the Press and circumstantial rumours that the shah was preparing another *coup d'état* were current. Popular dissatisfaction with the National Assembly was also mounting; and conditions in the provinces were disturbed.[67] Any hope of reconciliation between the shah and the nationalists was finally dashed when an attempt was made on 28 February 1908 on the life of the shah. The governor of Tehran and the chief of police caused the alleged authors of the plot to be arrested without warrant from the Ministry of Justice. The ministers tendered their resignations but withdrew them within forty-eight hours; and the National Assembly seems to have been prepared to acquiesce in the irregularity of the arrests. The *anjumans*, however, naturally anxious to prevent any infringement by

[63] Cf. *Cd. 4581*. Same to same, Tehran, January 2, 1908, No. 93, p. 96

[64] Kasravī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭiyyeh-i Īrān*, p. 480

[65] Karīm Ṭāhirzādeh Bihzād, *Qiyām-i Āẕarbāyjān dar inqilāb-i mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān* (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 235, 255; and also Amīr Khīzī, *Qiyām-i Āẕarbāyjān va Sattār Khān*, pp. 29–30

[66] Yaḥyā Dawlatābādī, *Ḥayāt-i Yaḥyā* (Tehran, n.d.), ii, 217, 298; and see also p. 270

[67] *Cd. 4581*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, February 26, 1908, No. 106, pp. 109–10

the shah of the new-won liberties, insisted on pushing the matter to an issue and again worsted the shah.[68] This strained their relations still further. Towards the end of May the shah demanded that the newspapers and popular orators should cease to speak against him; while the National Assembly demanded the dismissal of six of the most reactionary of the shah's entourage, who were regarded as chiefly responsible for his constant intrigues against the constitution.[69] The shah at first refused to dismiss them but finally the *anjumans* pressed the point so strongly that the shah agreed on 2 June to their demand.[70]

Marling reporting to Sir Edward Grey on 18 June stated:

> "... There is in Tehran a considerable number of men who expect they know not what benefits from the constitution, and who are firmly convinced that under Muhammad Ali their hopes can never be realized. These men, ignorant as they are, are sincere enough, and among them are found the leaders of the more important Anjumans. And it is the Anjumans who dominate the situation; the larger are honest enough, but very many of the smaller ones have been formed simply to forward their own private interests. Unfortunately all the Anjumans suffer from the vice of meddlesomeness, and as their interference is usually accompanied by threats – which, it is true, a little courage would enable their victims to disregard – Government has become practically impossible. But Persian Ministers, at least those who have been in office in the last eight months, have, to their country's misfortune, lacked even the small dose of courage necessary, with the results that the arrogance of the Anjumans has been encouraged to such a point that they have practically usurped the representative character of the Medjliss. In fact, Persia was fast drifting into a state of government by the semi-secret and wholly irresponsible political Societies of Tehran. It is not that the influence of the Anjumans is wholly bad; on the contrary, they have been, and still are, the one support of the Parliament against the reactionaries, but having realized their power they have too often abused it; sometimes, but not often in important matters, wittingly but most frequently out of sheer ignorance." [71]

[68] *Cd. 4581.* Same to same, Tehran, April 24, 1908, No. 112, p. 117. Malikzādeh, *Tārīkh-i inqilāb-i mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān*, iii, 213–14

[69] *Cd. 4581.* Same to same, Tehran, June 3, 1908, No. 114, p. 119

[70] *Ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, June 17, 1908, No. 175, p. 139. The following day Amīr Bahādur Jang took *bast* (refuge) at the Russian legation; shortly afterwards, however, he was appointed Minister of War

[71] *Ibid.* Gulahek, June 18, 1908, No. 176, p. 143

Meanwhile some of the *anjumans* in Tehran had begun to raise volunteers for a kind of national militia. The Āẕarbāyjān, Barādarān-i Darvāzeh-i Qazvīn, Shāhābād, and Mujāhidīn Anjumans, the last-named composed mainly of tradesmen, were especially active in this respect and before long some 2,000 men were drilling.[72] Similar movements began in some of the provinces. On 3 June the Russian minister, M. Hartwig, expressed his anxiety to Mr Marling about the safety of the shah, who, he alleged, regarded himself "as practically a doomed man". Accordingly the two representatives called on the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and expressed the grave consequences which might ensue to Persia should anything happen to the shah.[73] Fear of foreign intervention was very real, and various of the deputies decided all thought of armed opposition to the shah must be abandoned. The same day the shah left the city precipitately. A period of uneasiness followed. The *anjumans* appeared to be in doubt as to the wisdom of continuing the struggle; and the National Assembly and the ministers were anxious to avoid bringing matter to a climax. With the arrest of various members of the nationalist movement feeling began to rise among the *anjumans*. Martial law was declared. On 1 June the *anjumans* began to rally to their old meeting place at the Sipahsālār mosque and picketed the Artillery Square. On 12 June the shah sent an officer with thirty soldiers to the Assembly with an ultimatum to the effect that unless those who had assembled in the mosque dispersed within two hours he would disperse them with force. The president of the Assembly and Sayyid Ḥasan Taqīzādeh went to the mosque where some 10,000 men had by this time assembled. At first they refused to disperse but eventually, after each of the *anjumans* had appointed one or two representatives to discuss the matter, they agreed. Their dispersal, however, caused deep dejection in the nationalist movement, which thought that the Assembly had betrayed the cause. The shah made further demands, including the expulsion from Tehran of a number of the nationalist leaders.

A telegraphic report by Mr Marling made shortly after this illustrates the fundamental difference in British and Russian policy towards Persia and their respective appraisals of the situation. This stated:

"A rapid development in the situation here has taken place and the excitement against the Shah is becoming very serious. M. de Hart-

[72] Dawlatābādī, *Ḥayāt-i Yaḥyā*, ii, 202–3

[73] *Cd. 4581*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, June 17, 1908, No. 175, pp. 139–40

wig, who feels great alarm for His Majesty's safety, has suggested to M. Isvolsky at Reval by telegraph that the Russian and British Legations be instructed to make an official representation to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the two Powers are pledged to maintain the present dynasty, and that in the event of its becoming necessary to protect the Shah by force they are prepared to do so.

"The view of the Russian minister is that the present agitation is being engineered by Zil-es-Sultan, and is really fictitious; that Zil is aiming at the Regency and eventually the throne. Further, he thinks that the Ministers and Parliament are quite ready to believe that the Shah will work honestly on constitutional lines and have no real feeling against His Majesty.

"Personally, I am of opinion that the conviction of the Shah's innate hostility to the Constitution is ineradicable in the popular mind. The people are anxious to be rid of him, and the Zil-es-Sultan is accepted by them as offering the best hope for a restoration of order. I must, however, admit that the Zil-es-Sultan is taking every advantage of the opportunity to further his own ends.

"That such a declaration as that proposed by the Russian Minister would stop the agitation in Tehran is, I think, quite possible, but it would be for a time only, and its effect would probably be merely exasperating in the provinces, and I have no faith whatever in the possibility of a permanent reconciliation between the Shah and the people being brought about by it . . .

"After explaining my views to the Russian Minister, I told him that, in my opinion, His Majesty's Government would not hold themselves pledged to support the dynasty, much less an individual Sovereign, by their action in recognizing the successive heirs to the Persian throne." [74]

On receipt of this telegram Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Mr O'Beirne as follows:

"With reference to the telegram of today's date from Tehran Mr Marling's views have my entire concurrence.

"In discussing the situation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs you should inform his Excellency that His Majesty's Government consider it of the greatest importance that the policy of the Governments should be in perfect accord, but that any action is strongly deprecated by us which might have the appearance of

[74] *Cd. 4581.* Same to same, Tehran, June 12, 1908, No. 123, pp. 124–5

intervening in the internal affairs of Persia. His Majesty's Government are therefore unable to agree to make the communication which the Russian Minister has suggested.

"His Majesty's Government ardently desire to witness the restoration of order in Persia, but the only way in which this can be accomplished is by the formation of a Government to which the Persian people will give their full confidence and support. This consummation can only be attained if the situation is allowed to develop without external interference. We are of opinion that, though the situation might be momentarily relieved by a joint declaration that the two Powers intend to maintain the present dynasty or Government, serious difficulties in the future would be thereby created both for ourselves and Russia, and that no solution would be afforded of the problem of Persian government. Any attempt to impose on them any particular form of government will undoubtedly endanger those interests." [75]

On 14 June the bazaars and shops again closed; and on 15 June the head of the Barādarān-i Darvāzeh-i Qazvīn Anjuman was arrested. Telegrams from the provinces meanwhile came in denouncing the shah.[76] On or about the same date the various *anjumans* sent a deputation to the Assembly asking that a rallying point should be assigned to them and were ultimately permitted to use the Sipahsālār mosque on condition they brought no arms with them. Accordingly in the daytime large numbers of persons gathered in the precincts of the Bahāristān and the mosque. At night some hundred armed men, provided by the Anjuman-i Muẓaffarī, kept watch. On 22 June the Russian Minister advised the shah to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the nationalist movement. The shah in reply said "he entertained no hostile feeling towards the Parliament . . . and that he only desired security for himself against the attacks of the press and the threats of the Enjumens, which were instigated by the Zil-es-Sultan".[77] On the following day a party of Cossacks was sent by the shah to arrest eight persons who were in the mosque. Their surrender was refused by the *anjumans*. Fighting broke out.[78] Among the *anjumans* which took part

[75] *Cd. 4581.* Sir Edward Grey to Mr O'Beirne, Foreign Office, June 12, 1908, No. 124, p. 125

[76] The dates in E. G. Browne's account in *The Persian Revolution* do not coincide exactly with those given in Mr Marling's reports to Sir Edward Grey.

[77] *Cd. 4581.* Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, June 22, 1908, No. 131, p. 127

[78] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, June 23, 1908, No. 132, p. 127

were the Shāhābād, Fāṭimiyya, Tashakkur, Ḥamiyyat, Imāmzādeh Yaḥyā, Vafā'iyyeh, Mujāhidīn, Āẕarbāyjān, Muẕaffarī, and Barādarān-i Darvāzeh-i Qazvīn Anjumans and the Majmaʿ-i Insāniyyat.[79]

The nationalists were unable to carry the day on this occasion. Their lack of success compared with the previous winter was probably due in part to divided councils and infiltration into their ranks by their opponents;[80] and in part to the conviction that the death of any Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade in the fighting would bring about Russian intervention, and consequently there was a reluctance to attack these officers.[81] The Assembly and the Sipahsālār mosque were cleared by the shah's forces, the meeting place of the Anjuman-i Āẕarbāyjān destroyed, and a state of siege declared. Some thirty of the nationalist leaders, mainly members of the *anjumans*, were arrested; two were strangled without trial the following morning, 24 June.[82] On that day also the house of Ẓahīr ud-Dawleh, which had served as the headquarters of an *anjuman*, generally known by the same name, was destroyed.[83] This was apparently one of the earliest *anjumans* to have been formed. It was founded with the title Majmaʿi Ukhuvvat by ʿAlī Khān Ẓahīr ud-Dawleh b. Muḥammad Nāṣir Khān, the Īshīqāqāsī-bāshī, who had succeeded Ṣafī ʿAlī Shāh as the leader of a group of Niʿmatullāhī darvishes who had gathered round Ṣafī ʿAlī Shāh as their *pīr*. Although the Majmaʿ-i Ukhuvvat was originally something in the nature of a Sufi fraternity rather than a political society, it appears to have been regarded by Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāh as the first of the "political" *anjumans*, and its premises were destroyed on these grounds.[84]

With the closure of the National Assembly and the proclamation of martial law throughout the country the organization of the nationalist resistance, which culminated in the deposition of Muḥammad ʿAlī and the restoration of the constitution in July, 1909, devolved upon the *anjumans*. They were helped in this by *anjumans* formed by Persian

[79] Dawlatābādī, *Ḥayāt-i Yaḥyā*, ii, 317

[80] *Ibid.*, 270 ff.

[81] Cf. *Cd. 4581*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, July 15, 1908, No. 211, p. 155

[82] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, June 13, 1908, No. 125, p. 125; same to same, June 23, 1908, No. 133, p. 127; same to same, June 24, 1908, No. 136, p. 128; same to same, June 25, 1908, No. 138, p. 128; and same to same, Gulahek, July 15, 1908, No. 212, p. 160

[83] *Ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, July 15, 1908, No. 211, p. 156

[84] Muʿayyir al-Mamālik, "Rijāl-i ʿAṣr-i Nāṣirī" in *Yaghmā*, vol. 9, No. 7 (1956), pp. 326 ff. The society appears to have been subsequently reformed

communities abroad, especially the Anjuman-i Sa'ādat in Constantinople, which was the channel through which the Anjuman-i Ayālatī of Tabriz established contact with the outside world – so far as it succeeded in doing so – during the siege of Tabriz.[85]

A proclamation was issued after the closure of the Assembly announcing that new elections would be held in three months and a Senate formed.[86] It very soon became clear, however, that the shah had no intention of respecting his promises. Mr Marling had, in fact, already expressed the view to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in answer to an enquiry from the latter, that if elections for the new Assembly were postponed for three months, "His Majesty's Government would not consider the pledges to respect the Constitution given me by the shah had been fulfilled."[87] On 8 September a joint memorandum was handed to the shah by the British and Russian Oriental Secretaries. It read as follows:

> "As His Imperial Majesty the Shah has made known his intention of shortly publishing the new Regulations concerning the approaching elections, the British Chargé d'Affaires has the honour, in conformity with the instructions from his Government, and without in any way wishing to intervene in the internal affairs of Persia, to point out that it would be very desirable and opportune, in the interests of the definite pacification of the country, and of trade and general prosperity, that His Imperial Majesty the Shah would be pleased to announce that his decision to maintain the Constitution which he has granted to his Empire is irrevocable, and that the Assembly for which the election of Deputies is now about to proceed will meet at Tehran on the 1st [14th] November [equivalent to the 19th Shavval] of this year. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is further instructed to draw the serious attention of His Majesty the Shah to the gravity of the situation at Tabriz, and to warn His Majesty that the whole Responsibility for the security of British subjects in that town will be laid on the Persian Government. Under these circumstances he

[85] E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, p. 245, Karīm Ṭāhirzādeh Bihzād, *Qiyām-i Āẕarbāyān dar inqilāb-i mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān*, pp. 361, 394; and Kasravī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭiyyeh-i Īrān*, pp. 724, 730, 796. An *anjuman* formed by members of the Persian colony in Ashkabad is alleged to have been in contact with the *anjumans* of Rasht and Mashhad. See A. M. Matveyev, "Materialy k Istorii Iranskogo Endzhumena v Ashkhabade (1907–11 gg)", in *Trudy Sredneaziatskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta im. V.I. Lenina*. Vypusk lxxvii (Tashkent, 1956)

[86] *Cd. 4581*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, June 26, 1908, No. 144, p. 131

[87] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, June 27, 1908, No. 147, p. 132

considers it advisable that His Imperial Majesty's decision to proceed to the elections and to open Parliament on the 1st [14th] November should be communicated to and made public at Tabreez." [88]

On 24 September 1908 the shah issued a rescript to the prime minister announcing the convocation of a new *majlis*. Tabriz was, however, to be excluded from the effects of this decree until order had been restored there. This document was probably intentionally obscurely worded. It opened with the following words:

"AFTER the dissolution of the Medjliss, which step the Government took in order to preserve order in the realm and check mischief-makers, Anjumans, and irreligious persons, who were the cause of disturbance among the people, we promised that, on the restoration of order, the suppression of the revolutionary disorders and Anjumans, the establishment of security, and the tranquillizing of the people, to summon a Medjliss, the laws of which shall be in accordance with the nature of the country and the Holy Law of the Prophet, and which shall protect and spread justice, in order that we may preserve in peace the whole people and all classes of our subjects, who are intrusted by God to our care, suppress the evildoers, and defend the holy truth of Islam, which is the first of our duties and beliefs . . . and we decree that a Medjliss, as defined above, composed of religious and proper persons, will, by the help of God and the favour of the 12th Imam, be convoked by us for the 19th Shavval [14 November]. By means of this Medjliss, conform to the Sher' and justice, the people will be preserved in peace, the laws of Islam will be protected and put into execution, all traces of disorder, insecurity, Anjumans, shall disappear . . ." [89]

This rescript was regarded generally as a mockery.[90] The British and Russian representatives made an identical verbal communication to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the following effect:

"The recent Rescript having given rise to erroneous interpretations, it is much to be desired, in the Shah's own interest, that he should publish a separate Decree clearly showing that it was in no way his intention to exclude one province from the rights which His Majesty

[88] *Cd. 4581*. Inclosure in No. 250, same to same, Tehran, September 10, 1908, pp. 185–6

[89] *Ibid.* Inclosure in No. 281, Sir Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, October 8, 1908, p. 200

[90] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, October 9, 1908, No. 258, p. 190

has accorded to his people, but that he had hoped that the persons fighting under Sattar Khan would lay down their arms so as to facilitate the re-establishment of the constitutional régime.

"It would, moreover, be useful, in view of the near approach of the 27th October, to publish the electoral laws mentioned in the Rescript as early as possible, in order to enable the elections to be held for the date fixed [the 14th November].

"It would also be desirable, inasmuch as many of those in arms are desperate, that the shah should announce his intention to amnesty those now fighting provided they submit." [91]

The shah remained intransigent; and on 11 and 12 November respectively the Russian and British representatives again urged on the shah in private audience to carry out the promises he had given to the Persian people.[92] On 19 November, however, the shah, on the pretext of a demonstration against the constitution which, organized by his entourage, had taken place on 7 November, issued a rescript, which was published on 22 November. It stated uncompromisingly that the shah had abandoned any idea of convoking a *majlis* as the *ʿulamā* had declared such an institution was contrary to Islam.[93] The two representatives immediately presented a joint memorandum expressing their surprise and regret that the shah, in violation of his pledges, should have come to such a regrettable decision, and that he followed the advice of evil councillors.[94]

As a result of these representations the shah ordered the suppression of the rescript. He nevertheless continued to be evasive of his promises

[91] *Cd. 4581.* Same to same, Tehran, October 11, 1908, No. 262, p. 191

[92] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, November 12, 1908, No. 304, p. 206; and *Cd. 4733,* same to same, Tehran, November 15, 1908, No. 9, pp. 3–5. At the close of his description of his audience with the shah, Sir George Barclay stated:

"The idea which the Shah wished me to carry away with me, viz., that his position was that of a Sovereign desirous to rule as a constitutional Monarch, and that he was only deterred from doing so by the reluctance of the bulk of his people to accept him in that capacity, is of course grotesque. The greater part of the population outside of the capital and a few of the larger towns are probably indifferent, but the large majority of the more or less educated classes are certainly in favour of a constitutional Government. The merchants particularly and those with an honest stake in the country see in it their only chance of security from the extortions to which they are now exposed at the hands of the Shah's irresponsible advisers"

[93] *Cd. 4581.* Same to same, Tehran, November 22, 1908, No. 314, p. 209; and *Cd. 4733,* Inclosure 1 in No. 17, same to same, Tehran, November 25, 1908, p. 8

[94] *Cd. 4581.* Same to same, Tehran, November 22, 1908, No. 313, pp. 208–9; and *Cd. 4733,* Inclosure 2 in No. 17, same to same, Tehran, November 25, 1908, p. 9

and merely announced the institution of a Council of State. This was composed of his own nominees, who were for the most part of reactionary views, and they were to be entrusted with the framing of an electoral law. On 14 December the representatives of Great Britain and Russia communicated to the shah a joint memorandum in which they pointed out that the institution of the Council of Notables could not in any way be regarded as a fulfilment of his promises and asking when he proposed to convoke the promised Assembly. The memorandum concluded with these words:

> "In making this inquiry of His Imperial Majesty, the two Representatives beg to repeat their conviction that the convocation of an elective Assembly and the Proclamation of an amnesty offer the only hope of a termination of the present deplorable situation in the country." [95]

This and other representations failed to have any satisfactory result. The situation in Tehran deteriorated; and frequent arrests towards the end of the month gave rise to a feeling of panic among the nationalists. The bazaars were closed as a demonstration. Sir George Barclay reporting these events to Sir Edward Grey closed his despatch as follows:

> "The interests of public order thus make it highly desirable that the Shah should yield without delay, but, apart from this, there is another possibly imminent development which it seems to me very desirable to forestall. I am inclined to think that the agitation in the past few days has served to crystallize the aspirations of the Nationalist party, and that at no distant date we may find ourselves face to face with a definite demand for the restoration of the old constitutional régime without modification. So far-reaching a demand would add to the difficulties of reconciliation between the Shah and his people." [96]

As soon as Muḥammad ʿAlī had closed the National Assembly in June 1908 he sent instructions to the provinces to close all the *anjumans* in the provinces also.[97] Immediate and effective resistance came from Tabriz only. Fighting broke out almost as soon as the news of the *coup d'état* arrived. In Tabriz the Anjuman-i Ayālatī was dissolved by the government and its premises looted. It was subsequently reformed;[98]

[95] *Cd. 4733.* Same to same, Tehran, December 4, 1908, No. 20, p. 12; and same to same, Tehran, December 15, 1908, No. 55, pp. 23–5

[96] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, December 29, 1908, No. 56, p. 27

[97] Kasravī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭiyyeh-i Īrān*, p. 672

[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 709–10

and during the suspension of the National Assembly in Tehran it assumed the leadership of the national movement and was recognized by the nationalists as representing the National Assembly.[99] It presented on 23 August to the newly arrived governor-general a petition and formulated its demands, which were briefly that, while remaining loyal subjects of the shah as long as he maintained the constitution, they would not disarm until the Assembly was opened and its members recalled; that the leaders of the Royalist quarter should be arrested and punished after trial; and that the affairs of the province of Azarbayjan should be under the supervision of the Tabriz local assembly until the National Assembly reassembled.[100] The government was not prepared to accept their demands. Eventually the Anjuman and its supporters succeeded in expelling the government troops from the greater part of the town; the latter thereafter blockaded the roads into Tabriz. The siege of Tabriz was eventually raised by Russian troops, who opened the Julfa road in April 1909 to let through food supplies to relieve the shortage in the city, which by then had become critical. Throughout the siege the British and Russian Consuls-General dealt with the Anjuman which took over the administration of the city. When the Julfa road was opened they were authorized to give assurances to the Anjuman that when tranquillity and security had been re-established the Russian forces would leave Persian territory without delay or condition.[101] During the latter part of the siege the conduct of the Anjuman, which had at the beginning been competent and effective, appears to have deteriorated. Both Sattār Khān and Bāqir Khān, the leaders of the nationalist resistance in Tabriz, lost much of their early popularity and reputation for integrity.[102]

[99] Thus in February 1909 the mujtahids of Karbala protesting against the rumour that Great Britain and Russia had given the shah a loan stated "the Shah has no right to receive a loan, authority for which rested with the National Assembly, which was now represented by the National Assembly at Tabriz". *Cd. 4733*. Monthly Summary, Inclosure in No. 110, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, February 25, 1909, p. 61

[100] *Cd. 4581*. Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, September 10, 1908, No. 251, p. 186

[101] F.O. 416/41. Consul-General Wratislaw and M. Miller to Tabreez Anjuman, April 25, 1909, Inclosure No. 7 in No. 45, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, May 24, 1909, pp. 23–4

[102] See *ibid.* Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay, Tabriz, May 2, 1909, Inclosure in No. 45, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, May 24, 1909, p. 21. He wrote:

"... The Tabreez nationalists, who behaved well in prosperity have certainly not shone in adversity, and their conduct during the last month or two has been of a

On May 5, 1909, the shah, after repeated representations and advice from the British and Russian ministers to come to terms with the nationalists and implement the constitution, finally issued a rescript promising a limited constitution (see below). The proclamation of this was well received by the nationalists in Tabriz, who though they at first professed themselves anxious to receive guarantees for the execution of these promises, on being told by the British and Russian Consuls-Generalt hat it was incumbent upon them to work for a reconciliation, were reassured. They promised to send delegates to quieten Western Azarbayjan and subsequently telegraphed to Rasht and Isfahan counselling a conciliatory attitude.[103] The Anjuman-i Ayālatī continued to carry on the administration; but its authority had been weakened by the siege of the preceding ten months, and it no longer commanded the spontaneous and united support of the people as it had in 1908 when Muḥammad ʿAlī suspended the constitution. Its task was, no doubt, greatly complicated by the presence of the Russian military authorities, who treated Tabriz as a conquered city and interfered in local affairs. They arrested several Russian subjects and one of the active members of the Anjuman. The British Consul-General reporting this stated:

> "The Russian general, in reply to my questions as to the reason of the arrest of the member of the Anjuman, stated that it was on account of disparaging remarks which he had made regarding the Czar and his Government but it seems to me rather to be ascribed to the active part he had played in nationalist politics. The Persian leaders of this party consequently feel a rather natural anxiety as to their own security." [104]

Sattār Khān, Bāqir Khān, and others subsequently took refuge in the Turkish Consulate-General.[105] On 14 July 1909 the Anjuman-i Ayālatī protested to the House of Commons against Russian intervention in Persia, the bringing of troops to Tabriz, and Russian support in Mashhad

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nature to cause deep disappointment to their warmest admirers. The Anjuman completely lost their heads, were seldom of the same mind for two days together, and being themselves always sufficiently fed, showed complete callousness towards the sufferings of their poorer fellow-citizens . . ."

[103] *Cd. 5120.* Extract from Monthly Summary of Events, Inclosure in No. 41, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, 20 May, 1909, p. 17

[104] F.O. 416/40. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, June 1, 1909, No. 563, p. 250

[105] See further Amīr Khīzī, *Qiyām-i Āẕarbāyjān va Sattār Khān* for an account of subsequent events in Azarbayjan

of reactionaries in order to prevent the movement to Tehran of the nationalists.[106] On 11 September they sent a telegram to Sir Edward Grey protesting at the illegal actions of the Russian military forces in Tabriz in spite of the assurances given by the Russian Legation to the Persian Government and the British and Russian Consuls-General to the Anjuman, alleging that the Russians had sent a Cossack expedition to Qaraja Dagh and that the Russian consul in Qazvin interfered in local affairs, and asking for assistance.[107] There were meanwhile considerable numbers of *fidā'īs* roaming the province, over whom the Anjuman-i Ayālatī no longer exercised control. In these circumstances, the Anjuman, which had been the focal point of the popular movement after the closure of the National Assembly, was no longer able to maintain its position and the initiative passed to the *anjumans* of Isfahan and Rasht; and from them to the *fidā'īs* under the Sipahdār-i A'ẓam, Muḥammad Valī Khān and the Bakhtīārīs under Sardār As'ad.

Somewhat tenuous links had meanwhile been maintained between the *anjumans* in Tehran and the provincial cities and with *anjumans* abroad, especially the Anjuman-i Sa'ādat in Constantinople. After the Russian occupation of Tabriz these connections were strengthened; and the fact that Muḥammad 'Alī was to an increasing extent believed to be supported by Russia meant that the opposition of the nationalist movement and the *anjumans* to the misgovernment and tyranny of the shah and the court party tended to express itself more and more in terms of a nationalist or patriotic movement. The conviction that the shah was a Russian puppet counted for much in the almost universal hatred felt for him.[108] There had always been resentment at Russian influence over the shah; but it was heightened by the Russian presence in Azarbayjan, so that the nationalist movement in its next phase became largely an anti-Russian movement in defence of Persia against Russian intervention and embraced a wider section of the population than that represented by the *anjumans*, though they still formed the core of the movement.

On the bombardment of the National Assembly in 1908 and the seizure of the nationalist leaders, meetings of protest were held in Isfahan outside the Chihil Sutūn, where the Anjuman-i Ayālatī and the Ittiḥādiyya-i 'Ulamā held their meetings. Among the new governors

[106] F.O. 416/41. No. 173, p. 87

[107] *Ibid.* No. 599, p. 353

[108] Cf. *ibid.*, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, August 10, 1909, No. 519, p. 304

sent to the various provinces after the suspension of the constitution with orders to destroy the nationalist movement was Iqbāl ud-Dawleh Kāshī, who was sent to Isfahan accompanied by some two hundred soldiers. The activities of the nationalists were restricted; the number of the *anjumans*, however, increased, and they began to meet in secret in various quarters of the city and a central *anjuman* was set up to co-ordinate their activities. The latter decided to summon the leaders of the neighbouring districts of Sedeh, Gaz, and Burkhwar to join them in the defence of the constitution. Contact was also established with Sardār As'ad, the Bakhtīārī leader, who had recently returned to Persia from Europe. The government meanwhile determined to seize the leaders of the central *anjuman*, who were therefore obliged to scatter. They then formed a secret committee and made preparations to attack the government forces. Some four hundred men from the town and surrounding countryside were collected and armed; but the leaders of the *anjuman*, considering their number insufficient, sent some of their members to the Chahar Mahall to appeal to the Bakhtīārī khans for help. The latter, although they were at first prepared to join the struggle against the government, hesitated to commit themselves to open opposition to the shah because, split as they were by internal factions, they apparently feared dissension in their midst should fighting actually break out. However, after further negotiations with the secret committee they finally agreed to come to the aid of the people of Isfahan; and assembled their forces at Shalamzar. Meanwhile, the religious leaders in Najaf and Karbala had issued a *fatwā* to the effect that the National Assembly ought to be convened. Hostility continued to rise against Muḥammad 'Alī.

The promulgation of the rescript of 24 September 1908 had caused the Bakhtīārīs to reconsider their decision to march against the government. The secret committee, more realistically, considered the rescript to be merely a pretext to enable Muḥammad 'Alī to proceed with his plans to crush the nationalist movement. The *'ulamā* of Najaf, when the shah procrastinated and finally issued a rescript stating that he would not convene a *majlis* (see above p. 70), sent a telegram to the shah to the effect that his "conduct wounds the heart of the believer, and is an offence against the absent Imam" and that they would leave "no stone unturned to obtain a representative government". The message ended "God has cursed the tyrants; you are victorious for the moment, but you may not remain so".[109]

[109] F.O. 416/41. Monthly Summary of Events in Persia, Inclosure in No. 315, same to same, Tehran, November 4, 1908, p. 210

Contact had by this time been established between the secret committee and the nationalists in Tehran. The Bakhtiāris under Ṣamṣām us-Salṭāneh and Ẓarghām us-Salṭaneh, who had composed their differences, agreed to attack Isfahan provided that (i) the members of the secret committee and the notables of the town would undertake to give at all times whatever help was necessary to the Bakhtiārī horse, (ii) funds would be allocated for the rations and pay of the Bakhtiārī horse, and (iii) a number of the notables of Isfahan would join the Bakhtiāris outside the town and enter the town with them. A fortnight later Ṣamṣām us-Salṭaneh with a few horse came to Chahar Burji, some ten miles from Isfahan, where some members of the secret committee met him and made an agreement. Some days later a Bakhtiārī force under Ẓarghām us-Salṭaneh entered Bagh-i Abrishum; and the *mujāhidīn* in the city armed themselves on the orders of the secret committee. Government forces had meanwhile taken up strategic positions in the town. The Bakhtiāris advanced to Dastgird. The bazaars closed and the shopkeepers and members of the guilds assembled in the mosques and urged Iqbāl ud-Dawleh to march out to meet the Bakhtiāris so that bloodshed might be avoided in the town. This he refused to do, and government forces instead sought to install themselves in the minarets of the Masjid-i Shāh but were forestalled by a group of *mujāhidīn*. The following day (1 January 1909) a number of the secret committee went out to the Bakhtiārī camp and drew up a plan of campaign with the Bakhtiārī leaders. On 2 January part of the Bakhtiārī force entered the town from various points, the *mujāhidīn* having secretly taken up their positions in different parts of the town. Fighting broke out between the government forces on the one side and the *mujāhidīn* and the advance guard of the Bakhtiāris on the other. The government forces were put to flight; and Iqbāl ud-Dawleh took refuge in the British Consulate. The remainder of the Bakhtiārī forces subsequently entered the town.[110]

Rumours that an agreement for an Anglo-Russian loan to Persia was about to be concluded were in circulation about this time and drew protests from the provincial *anjumans* of Azarbayjan and Isfahan, and from nationalists in the capital. A declaration dated February 7, 1909, submitted to Sir George Barclay by the nationalist party in Tehran, pointed out that the nation would not consider itself liable and would not assume the smallest responsibility for any loan or financial subsidy, direct or indirect, granted by a foreign government, by financial or

[110] Nūrullāh Dānishvar ʿAlavī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭeh-i Īrān* (Tehran, 1956–7), pp. 14 ff.

commercial houses, or individuals to the Imperial government, and would not recognize its obligation to fulfil the conditions agreed upon of any concession granted during the dissolution of the National Assembly.[111]

News meanwhile reached Isfahan that the Sipahdār-i Aʿẓam, Muḥammad Valī Khān, who had been in command of the government troops outside Tabriz and had gone over to the nationalists, had assembled a force of *mujāhidīn* in Gilan and Tunakabun, and in February had organized a provisional government in Rasht.[112] On 20 February the Rasht provincial *anjuman* addressed to the five principal foreign representatives in Tehran a telegram protesting that they had no quarrel with the shah, and declaring their determination to put an end to the existing situation, which they attributed to the evil policy of the shah's entourage, and to recover their national rights.[113] In Isfahan resentment against the government continued to rise.

The resistance of Tabriz had meanwhile enabled the popular movement to reorganize itself in other districts as well as Isfahan. Various of the provincial *anjumans* as well as the "popular" *anjumans* were in due course reformed. The conviction that the country was being handed over to the Russians had gained strength especially in the south, and consequently the *anjumans* were hostile to both the shah and Russia. In Bushire the provincial *anjuman* and the "popular" *anjumans*, which had been quietly dissolved by the governor after the *coup d'état* in 1908,[114] later reformed. The British Consul-General reported on 5 July 1909 that he had received a communication from the local *anjuman*, signed by

[111] *Cd. 4733*. Declaration by Nationalist Party of Tehran, Inclosure in No. 109, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, February 23, 1909, pp. 58–9

[112] Some doubt seems to have existed as to the motives of the Sipahdār in joining the nationalist movement. Mr Churchill in a memorandum wrote: "... Sipahdar is no nationalist ... he, however, detested Mohamed Ali personally in the want of confidence displayed towards him ... He is a man of quite exceptional qualities and means for a Persian. He is outspoken and sometimes quite embarassingly frank. But he of course has characteristic Persian duplicity, and throughout his stay at Kazvin he was secretly in treaty with Mohamed Ali, through the Russian Legation, with a view to the possibility of being obliged to abandon his following and throw himself at Mohamed Ali's mercy under Russian protection." F.O. 416/41. Inclosure in No. 672, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, August 31, 1909, p. 398. Formerly in 1906 the Sipahdār had apparently openly expressed his contempt for the reform movement (F.O. 416/30, p. 32)

[113] *Cd. 4733*. Same to same, Tehran, February 23, 1909, No. 109, p. 57

[114] *Cd. 4581*. Extract from Monthly Summary, Inclosure in No. 213, Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, July 15, 1908, p. 163

five leading members of the religious classes and five of the principal merchants, to the following effect:

> "Having regard to untoward incidents elsewhere it has become necessary that anjumans should forthwith assume control over Government Departments, including customs, whose receipts should be deposited into the Imperial Bank in the name of the nation, with the cognisance of selected members of anjuman. Anjuman undertakes to recognize British Government's claim on customs [for the servicing of the 1901 loan] on production of documents and arranges for payment to consul-general of such share of interest and principal as falls ratably to Bushire and Bunder Abbas. No mention is made of Lingah, but I presume it will be included. They also undertake all obligations towards British, such as honourable treatment of British consulate and officials, and protection of lives and properties of British subjects will be scrupulously observed. In conclusion they ask generally for co-operation of British authority in preservation of rights of Persian nation, and particularly for concurrence in proposed arrangements.[115]

The provincial *anjuman* of Kirmanshah, which had been elected before the *coup d'état* of 1908 resumed its sittings about June 1909.[116] In Hamadan a provincial assembly was established in January 1909.[117] The Mashhad provincial *anjuman* was reconstituted on 8 April of the same year. The Deputy-Governor was imprisoned by it but released two days later on taking the oath of fidelity to it. The nationalists in Mashhad were meanwhile reinforced by, among others, a number of Caucasians; and as in Azarbayjan the *fidā'īs* began to act independently of the *anjuman*, which was unable to control them.[118] In Shiraz the provincial *anjuman* was reconstituted towards the end of March 1909; Shiraz again went a slightly different way from other cities and although the alleged object of the body set up was the attainment of the national rights as provided in the constitution it was hopelessly split by tribal, local, and religious factions, and had no

[115] *F.O.* 416/41 Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, July 8, 1909, No. 96, p. 63

[116] *Ibid.* Monthly Summary, Inclosure in No. 57, same to same, Gulahek, June 18, 1909, No. 57, p. 39

[117] *Cd. 4733.* Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, January 27, 1909, No. 80, p. 48

[118] F.O. 416/40. Monthly Summary, Inclosure No. 4 in No. 397, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, April 21, 1909, p. 173; and same to same, Gulahek, June 24, 1909, No. 745, p. 374

"middle class" or "popular" bias as the Tabriz provincial *anjuman* had had.[119]

On 22 April 1909 the British and Russian envoys with their dragomans had an audience with the shah at which a note was read to him. This stated:

> "It is now nearly four months since the Representatives of His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty the Czar last advised your Majesty jointly to fulfil the pledges so repeatedly given to your people and to the two Representatives to re-establish constitutional government in Persia."

The note then recalled the persistent violation of the pledges given by the shah and the disastrous situation to him and Persia and injurious to the nationals of the two neighbouring Powers "whose sole desire is to see Persia emerge from the present deplorable crisis an independent, well-governed and prosperous nation", and made the following recommendations: (i) the prime minister, Mushīr us-Salṭaneh, and Amīr Bahādur Jang should be removed from their offices and the latter also from any office in the palace; (ii) the constitutional regime should be re-established; (iii) a cabinet of persons worthy of confidence should be appointed with the addition of a Council of Empire formed by enlightened persons belonging to different parties, the latter to promulgate a new electoral law; and if the shah chose persons not inspiring confidence no money advances [by the two Powers] would be made; (iv) a general amnesty for political offences should be granted; (v) a date for elections and the convocation of the National Assembly should be announced; and (vi) after these steps had been taken the Russian Government would make an advance to the Persian Government of £100,000 for the expenses necessitated by the introduction of reforms and the British Government would make a similar advance as soon as the elected Assembly had adopted this advance. A larger loan would if necessary form the object of a subsequent exchange of views between the two governments and the Persian Government.[120] On 29 April the

[119] F.O. 416/40. Monthly Summary, Inclosure No. 4 in No. 397, same to same, Tehran, April 21, 1909, pp. 176–7; F.O. 416/41. Monthly Summary, Inclosure No. 8 in No. 524, same to same, Gulahek, August 13, 1909, p. 317; and *Cd. 5120*, extract from Monthly Summary, Inclosure in No. 41, same to same, Tehran, May 20, p. 19

[120] F.O. 416/40. Inclosure in No. 399, same to same, Tehran, April 22, 1909, pp. 179–81. Subsequently there was a good deal of negotiation and disagreement between Great Britain and Russia over the amount of the loan and the way in which it should be paid

two legations learnt that the shah had dismissed the prime minister and Amīr Bahādur Jang from their posts in the cabinet and appointed his uncle and father-in-law, the Nā'ib us-Salṭaneh, prime minister with the portfolio of war. Sir George Barclay reporting this stated:

> "the Na'ib as-Saltaneh is a reactionary of the most stubborn type . . . after consultation with my Russian colleague we agreed to inform the shah in writing, through Saad-ed-Dawleh, that Naib-es-Sultaneh's presence in the cabinet was altogether unacceptable."

On 30 April Sa'd ud-Dawleh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was dismissed. On 5 May Muḥammad 'Alī issued a rescript promising a limited constitution. This was well received in Tabriz, but fell flat at Isfahan and other places, whence it elicited the declaration that the nationalists would be satisfied with nothing less than the old constitution. At Qazvin, which by this time had been taken by the *fidā'īs* from Rasht, it also failed to have an effect. The reason for the issue of the rescript at this point was mainly the shah's fear that the *fidā'īs* would advance on the capital from Qazvin and the Bakhtīārīs from Isfahan. There were further discussions on 7 May between the British and Russian representatives and delegates from the shah on points of detail concerning the programme of reform of 22 April. The shah prevaricated over the question of the general amnesty and the terms of the financial assistance; and attempted to avoid reinstating Sa'd ud-Dawleh. The two foreign representatives threatened to report to their governments that the shah had rejected "the advice of the two powers".[121] Eventually on 9 May Sa'd ud-Dawleh was asked to form a cabinet. On the 10th a decree re-establishing constitutional government and restoring the old constitution and a decree granting a general amnesty were published.[122]

The Bakhtīārī forces had planned to march on Tehran on 21 April. However, Sardār As'ad had not reached Isfahan by that date; and the inability of the khans to agree among themselves, coupled with their unsuccessful attempt to raise funds, prevented any move being made. Sardār As'ad reached Isfahan on 6 May and "with the assistance of 7,000 tumans plundered from a royal caravan and 9,000 tumans, the proceeds of a forced loan from three leading merchants of Isfahan",

[121] *Cd. 5120.* Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, May 5, 1909, No. 25, p. 7

[122] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, May 11, 1909, No. 40, pp. 13–14. This was amplified by a fuller "rescript" dated 20 May 1909. *Ibid.* Inclosure in No. 86, same to same, Gulahek, May 23, 1909, p. 37

the khans set out on 11th with 3,000 men to a camp two miles outside Isfahan.[123] Meanwhile on 4 May a party of nationalists from Rasht had entered Qazvin, and on 11 May the Sipahdār arrived from Rasht, by which time reinforcements from Rasht had also arrived. Pressure was put upon the Sipahdār by an official of the Russian Legation to abandon his intention to march on Tehran.[124] The Sipahdār was accompanied by a number of Russian revolutionaries from the Caucasus and he replied to the communication made to him that the revolutionaries who were requested to lay down their arms were beyond his control; and that he did not wish to be assassinated and suggested that, as they were Russian subjects, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires might like to talk to them.[125] Difficulties of communication between the different centres of revolt and the lack of unity between the nationalist leaders in Tehran meanwhile prevented the emergence of a unified control of the nationalist movement and to some extent accounted for the slowness of the advance of the nationalist forces on Tehran. About this time, however, a committee was formed in Tehran, and they presented a list of desiderata supplementary to what the shah had promised to grant on the advice of Britain and Russia; this list had the imprimatur of the Sipahdār and Tabriz.[126]

On 30 May the Isfahan provincial *anjuman* requested the Bakhtīārī khans to recall their forces, owing to a report that the royalist force at Kashan was to march on Isfahan. Two hundred Bakhtīārī horsemen were accordingly recalled and between 31 May and 5 June 200–300 men of the royalist force under Amīr Mufakhkham straggled into Isfahan. On 9 June, a report having been received from Tabriz that the shah had accepted European control of his country, the *anjuman* telegraphed the diplomatic corps in Tehran protesting against any agreement made by Persia with the Powers while the *majlis* was not sitting.[127] On the same day some 200 Bakhtīārī horse reached Qumm. On 16 Sardār As'ad called on Mr Grahame, the British Consul-General in

[123] F.O. 416/40. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, May 20, 1909, No. 609, p. 283

[124] *Cd. 5120*. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, May 11, 1909, No. 2, p. 1; and same to same, May 20, 1909, No. 45, p. 6

[125] F.O. 416/40. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, May 17, 1909, No. 465, pp. 204–5

[126] *Cd. 5120*. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Tehran, May 20, 1909, No. 45, pp. 24–6

[127] F.O. 416/41. Memorandum by Major Stokes respecting the Bakhtiaris and the Constitution, Inclosure in No. 345, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, July 16, 1909, pp. 199 ff.

Isfahan, to announce his intention of leaving for Tehran, ostensibly with a view to insisting on the constitution being properly put into force by a cabinet composed of ministers of liberal views.[128] He then set out for Qumm with some seven hundred men, five hundred Bakhtīārīs being already in Qumm.

The British and Russian envoys, having as they thought obtained the agreement of the shah to a programme of reforms, meanwhile exerted the most strenuous efforts to induce the nationalists to abandon their advance on the capital. The latter had less faith in the goodwill of the shah and eventually persisted in their course. Sir George Barclay on receiving the news that Sardār Asʿad had set out for Qumm sent a telegram to Mr Grahame as follows:

> "I am amazed to hear that Sardar Assad proposes to advance on the capital in order to exact that the constitution be put into force, and I request you to inform him of the above.
>
> "The report appears to me to be almost incredible as so far no one has offered any obstruction to the carrying out of the measures recommended by the Two Powers with a view to the restoration of parliamentary government.
>
> "At the present moment any demonstration such as is reported . . . would be most ill-timed . . .
>
> "I am requesting M Sabline to send similar instruction to your Russian colleague." [129]

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed instructions to Sir George Barclay on 23 June that:

> "Anything in the nature of intervention in the internal affairs of Persia must be avoided, but, short of this, efforts should be made to persuade Sardar to abandon his advance on Tehran, and you should endeavour to explain to him the real nature of the programme of reforms proposed by the two Governments.[130]

The British and Russian Consuls-General accordingly set out severally from Isfahan for Qumm. Grahame reached Qumm on 25 June; Sardār Asʿad arrived the following day. The two consuls-general had a long interview with him, urging that the two legations regarded his march

[128] F.O. 416/40. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, June 17, 1909, No. 690, p. 353

[129] *Ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, June 17, 1909, No. 691, p. 354

[130] *Cd. 5120.* Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay, Foreign Office, June 23, 1909, No. 64, p. 31

on Qumm as ill-timed and as complicating the situation. They pointed out that if he disregarded their advice they would consider it was with the deliberate intention of increasing existing difficulties, and that they would hold him personally responsible for the consequences. The constitution they pointed out had been restored and preliminary work for the convocation of the Assembly was proceeding on the lines recommended by the two Powers. They made it plain that the programme of the two Powers involved no curtailment of Persian independence. The gist of Sardār Asʿad's reply was:

> "that the legations were grossly deceived, and that all that was being done was a sham. He said, however, but not in a very convincing manner, that he would not advance beyond Kum, but would remain at or near there until the Assembly met . . . He was about to formulate certain demands, which were not his but those of Tabriz, Rasht, Meshed, and other places, and which he hoped we would obtain for him." [131]

On 28 June Mr Grahame received a visit from the Sardār who said that he could never expect forgiveness from the shah and that fear of intervention by Russia alone prevented him from deposing the shah, and that in any case he proposed to cripple him. He also said that he was in communication with the Sipahdār and had received a telegram from the latter reporting that he was advancing on the capital. The demands which Sardār Asʿad had said he was formulating were not forthcoming by 29 June and so the two consuls-general set out from Qumm for Isfahan; but on that morning Grahame was approached by an intermediary, who said he would give Sardār Asʿad's demands to him provided he would not communicate them to the Russians. Grahame, however, refused to be party to this.[132]

Meanwhile in Tehran both the shah and the reactionaries on the one hand and the nationalists on the other were in a state of panic, the former in terror of the arrival of the revolutionaries from Qazvin and the Bakhtiārīs and the latter in fear of some desperate stroke directed against them from the palace. On 30 June Murtaẓā Qulī Khān and 300 Bakhtiārīs, the advance guard of Sardār Asʿad's force, left for Tehran. On 1 July Sardār Asʿad set out himself for Tehran with 600 horse; and 300 Bakhtiārīs also left Isfahan for Tehran. The shah's troops meanwhile left Kashan for Tehran. Dissensions broke out between Ṣamṣām us-Salṭaneh and

[131] F.O. 416/40. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, telegraphic, Tehran, June 27, 1909, No. 775, pp. 384–5

[132] *Ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, June 29, 1909, No. 790, p. 391

Zarghām us-Salṭaneh, who were still in the neighbourhood of Isfahan. Zarghām us-Salṭaneh accordingly withdrew to some five miles from Isfahan but later started for Tehran. When it was learnt that a party of 900 *fidā'īs* from Qazvin had reached within forty miles of the capital, panic seized the cabinet. Sir George Barclay, reporting this, stated:

> "[they] now expect us to advance money and save them from their quandary. I think Mr. Sabline realizes that the terms of our programme preclude him from giving money until after the promulgation of the electoral law, and then only in accordance with some financial programme to be agreed upon. . . . Should His Majesty call on us for further help, our reply will be to the effect that things would never have reached this crisis if he had paid attention to our advice at the end of last year, and that we had left nothing undone either at Kum or Kasvin in our efforts to induce the fedai not to advance on the capital." [133]

On 1 July Sir George Barclay reported that the foreign legations had received a telegram from the "constitutionalists" of Qazvin, the gist of which was that they were marching on the capital with a view to settling accounts with certain members of the cabinet, who had in their opinion been guilty of inviting foreign Powers to intervene. They protested their loyalty to the shah, and denied that their object was bloodshed. They said:

> "that although a foreign Power has intervened in Tabreez and Meshed, and has its officers at the capital and at Kenedj [*sic*], the constitutionalists have from the very beginning of the revolution cared for the security of foreign interests. If complications should arise the responsibility must rest with the Power that intervenes." [134]

Meanwhile the Sipahdār transmitted to the British and Russian representatives the demands of the nationalists. These were (i) that he and Sardār As'ad, each accompanied by 150 men, should be allowed to enter Tehran to debate the points mentioned below, viz.: (ii) the neighbouring Powers should withdraw their forces from Persian soil; (iii) the cabinet should be selected by the local assemblies until the National Assembly met; (iv) such persons as the people distrusted or regarded as traitors should be expelled; (v) such persons as without having formerly been in the army had lately been carrying arms should be deprived of them; (vi) the army should be under the command and

[133] F.O. 416/40. Same to same, Gulahek, June 28, 1909, No. 789, p. 390
[134] F.O. 416/41. Same to same, Gulahek, July 1, 1909, No. 7, p. 4

at the orders of the Minister for War; (vii) the Minister of Telegraphs should be dismissed (he had interfered with the transmission of telegraphs from one nationalist centre to another); and (viii) provincial governors should not be elected unless the local assemblies approved their nomination. The two representatives brought his demands to the notice of their governments, and informed him that unless he told them that he would be content with the acceptance of Nos. iv and vii it would be useless for them to present them to the shah, as the two above-mentioned were the only ones they could urge the shah to accept.[135] A telegram was subsequently received by foreign legations in Tehran from the Sipahdār stating that:

> "if the court, on the advice of the [British and Russian] representatives, accepts the people's demands for constitutional government, and takes steps to carry them into effect, his followers will remain loyal to the shah but that if the nation is forced to take strong action owing to the delay in taking the measures indicated, it will be justified before the world." [136]

The nationalist leaders were meanwhile in close touch with the Anjuman-i Sa'ādat in Constantinople; and were receiving urgent advice to bring matters to a speedy conclusion and to prevent foreign intervention.[137]

On 9 July the forces of the Sipahdār, about 1,000 strong, left Karaj, marching in a south-easterly direction towards Rubat Karim, where Sardār As'ad was by this time encamped with about 1,200 Bakhtiārīs. On 10 and 11 July there was some fighting about fourteen miles to the west of the town in which the Sipahdār and Sardār As'ad's forces were engaged with the royalist forces.[138] On 12 July the combined nationalist force marched between the opposing Cossacks and irregulars, who were posted at Shahabad, Ahmadabad, Yaftabad and Tehran. They succeeded in getting through unnoticed, and at 6 a.m. on 13 July the whole nationalist force entered Tehran by the Yusufabad gate, which was not held against them, and was apparently opened to them by the *mujāhidīn* inside the city.[139] On the following day the royalist forces

[135] F.O. 416/41. Same to same, Gulahek, July 5, 1909, No. 71, pp. 56–7

[136] *Ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, July 8, 1909, No. 99, p. 64

[137] Cf. *ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, July 10, 1909, No. 120, p. 69, and same to same, Gulahek, July 12, 1909, No. 341, p. 188

[138] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, July 12, 1909, No. 131, p. 73

[139] *Ibid.* Memorandum by Mr Churchill, July 16, 1909, Inclosure 1 in No. 427, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, July 23, 1909, pp. 253–5. See also Nūrullāh Dānishvar 'Alavī, *Tārīkh-i mashrūṭeh-i Īrān*, pp. 14 ff.

began to bombard the town.[140] The British and Russian representatives represented jointly to the shah the desirability of ceasing the bombardment and an armistice to open negotiations. The shah refused.[141] On 15 July royalist resistance was practically at an end and negotiations began between Liakhov, the commander of the Cossack Brigade, and the nationalists for the surrender of the Cossacks.[142] On the 16 July the shah took refuge in the Russian Legation and all fighting ceased.[143]

An extraordinary Grand Council, composed of the leaders of the *fidā'īs*, the religious classes, princes, notables, and a number of deputies of the former National Assembly, was convoked. On the same day, it decided, by a majority vote, upon the deposition of Muḥammad ʿAlī and appointed his son, Aḥmad Mīrzā, in his stead, the regency to be given temporarily to ʿAẓud ul-Mulk, the head of the Qājār tribe. A proclamation to this effect was issued on 17 July by the Sipahdār, as Minister of War, and Sardār Asʿad, as Minister of the Interior.[144] After negotiations over the question of a pension for Muḥammad ʿAlī, he eventually left Persia for Russia on 29 September.[145] Pending elections for the new National Assembly, government was virtually in the hands of a committee of twenty-five, elected for the guidance of the ministers by the extraordinary Grand Council. This was superseded towards the middle of September by a commission of forty members. At the end of the month the Sipahdār assumed the office of president of the council of ministers, which had been kept vacant in the hope Nāṣir ul-Mulk would agree to return from Europe and accept it.[146] Elections were meanwhile held and on 15 November the new Assembly was opened.[147] Thus, largely as a result of the efforts of the *anjumans*, who had kept the forces of resistance alive during the suspension of the constitution, the nationalists succeeded in obtaining the restoration of the constitution. And in the final instance they accomplished their aims in the face of Russian and British policy which sought to restrain

[140] F.O. 416/41. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, July 14, 1909, No. 151, p. 79

[141] Same to same, Gulahek, July 14, 1909, No. 152, p. 79

[142] *Ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, July 15, 1909, No. 174, p. 88

[143] *Ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, July 16, 1909, No. 190, p. 91

[144] *Cd. 5120.* Inclosures 2 and 3 in No. 199, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, July 23, 1909, pp. 104–5

[145] *Ibid.* Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, July 18, 1909, No. 139, p. 64; and Memorandum by Acting Vice-Consul Cowan, Inclosure in No. 262, same to same, Tehran, October 15, 1909, p. 151

[146] *Ibid.* Same to same, Gulahek, September 13, 1909, No. 228, p. 126; and same to same, Tehran, October 7, 1909, No. 248, p. 141

[147] *Ibid.* Same to same, Tehran, November 17, 1909, No. 256, p. 152

them from pushing matters to a conclusion. Britain's inclination had, at an earlier period, been to refrain from all interference and leave the stronger side to make its will prevail,[148] but in the end she had hoped, with Russia, to impose a programme of reform on Muḥammad ʿAlī, and thereby to avoid the disintegration of the Persian state, ignoring the fact that the shah and the court party, whatever their protestations, had no intention of implementing such a programme. Sir George Barclay, in a revealing despatch to Sir Edward Grey, shows that he was aware of the weakness of British policy, a policy imposed to some extent, no doubt, by the same limitations which had led Grey to conclude the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. He wrote:

"... The country has thus succeeded in ridding the throne of Muhammad Ali. Although, for reasons of *armour-propre*, some slight feeling of regret is natural that our programme of reforms failed of its object, one cannot but recognize that a constitutional régime based independently of the Two Powers, and inaugurated by the dethronement of a detested and worthless Sovereign, stands a very different chance from one obtained for the country by outside pressure which stopped short of demanding the thing most needed, a change of sovereign. The resolution shown by the nationalist forces, who persisted to the end, notwithstanding the fear of foreign intervention, as well as the moderation of which they have given proof by refraining from all unnecessary bloodshed, and by merely transferring the throne to the next in succession, have surprised many with long experience of Persia and were it not that the chaotic condition of most of the provinces forbids one to hope, one might even say that they are of good augury for the future.

"On the whole, then, putting aside considerations of *armour-propre*, I am disposed to rejoice at the failure of our programme. There was a time when it seemed assured of such measure of success as would have been involved by the meeting of an assembly under Muhammad Ali, but there was never but a very faint hope that, with so false and intriguing Sovereign a constitutional régime could have worked more satisfactorily than that upset by the coup d'état of last year. All that could reasonably be hoped of it was that it would be better than Muhammad Ali's unfettered rule. Muhammad Ali is now deposed, and the field is open for a second and more promising experiment in parliamentary government." [149]

[148] Cf. *Cd. 4581*. No. 323; and *Cd. 4733*. Nos. 86 and 286

[149] F.O. 416/41. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Gulahek, July 23, 1909, No. 427, pp. 252–3

With the restoration of the constitution the activities of the "popular" *anjumans* declined. The intellectuals, who were the only group among their members who could, perhaps, have given them a political ideology or programme, were drawn off into political parties, many of those who had formerly been active members of the *anjumans* joining either the I'tidāliyyūn or the Democrat party. The majority of the members of the *anjumans*, however, had belonged to the religious classes, the small merchants, and craft guilds; and once the cause for which the *anjumans* had come into existence was achieved – at least temporarily – there was no common social, intellectual, or political activity to give meaning or purpose to a continuance of their association. Thus, like many of the quasi-messianic movements of the past, they proved a transitory phenomenon. The complicated pattern of intrigue, counter-intrigue, and foreign intervention, which had been the order of the day for many years was accentuated after 1909; Russian activities were openly directed against the constitutional movement and the independence of the country. Moreover, the contending parties inside Persia were no longer clearly divided; and the issues between them were sometimes obscured. Already on the morrow of the nationalist victory in 1909 groups of *fidā'īs* were spreading disorder throughout northern Persia and Tehran, and even when the government succeeded in disarming these in August 1910 there was still a complete lack of confidence in the government on the part of the population; the nationalist victory had failed to resolve the tensions in Persian society. Further, the *anjumans* already before the victory of 1909 had been weakened by infiltration. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Nā'īnī made a plea in March or April 1909, i.e. before the restoration of the constitution, for their reform in his work entitled *Ḥukūmat*.[150] He alleged infiltration by the supporters of the despotism into the *anjumans*. He pleaded for *anjumans* whose function would be to prevent the promotion of selfish and personal aims; and also for co-operation for the furtherance of the cause of Islam, the defence of humanity, and the achievement of progress.[151] In 1911 when renewed attempts to strangle the constitution became open and the belief spread that a campaign was on foot to restore the rule of Muḥammad ʿAlī and sell the country to Russia, the *anjumans* again became sporadically active. Various acts of violence, including the attempted assassination of Mushīr us-Salṭaneh, who had once been prime minister to Muḥammad ʿAlī, were attributed to their activities.[152] At this time there were apparently also

[150] Ed. Sayyid Maḥmūd Ṭāliqānī (Tehran, n.d.) [151] Pp. 134–5

[152] Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (London, 1912), pp. 172–3, 280

women's secret societies.[153] Acute financial difficulties, frequent internal disorders, in some cases fomented by Russia, the intrigues of elements hostile to the constitution, often openly encouraged by Russia, active intervention by Russia in North Persia and the presence of considerable numbers of Russian troops in the country, and apparent British acquiescence in Russian behaviour, had by this time greatly weakened the position of the nationalists. The patriotic fervour and the will to resist oppression, which had been a marked feature of the early history of the nationalist movement, and of which the *anjumans* had been the centre, was lacking. When the constitution was again suspended in 1911 on account of the opposition of the National Assembly to the Russian ultimatum demanding the dismissal of Mr Morgan Shuster, the treasurer-general, the cumulative effect of internal disorders, the infiltration of hostile elements into the nationalist movement, and, above all, Russian pressure, discouraged, if it did not make virtually impossible, the emergence of a popular and united movement of protest. Militant action was, therefore, virtually precluded. On the other hand the "popular" *anjumans* were not organized, nor were their members competent, to provide a theory of political conduct within the framework of which their relations with the government on the one side and the people on the other could be regulated in peace-time circumstances. Thus, the "popular" *anjumans*, having no longer a function to perform, disappeared from the political scene.

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[153] *Ibid.* p. 186. See also Malikzādeh, *Tārīkh-i Inqilāb-i mashrūṭiyyat*, vii, 93–4

THE SALAFIYYA MOVEMENT IN MOROCCO: THE RELIGIOUS BASES OF THE MOROCCAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

By Jamil Abun-Nasr

SHORTLY AFTER the First World War the Salafiyya group in Morocco became active in the political life of the country; and when in the 1930's a Moroccan nationalism along European lines appeared, it had as its leaders men who had been active members of the Salafiyya circle and retained their allegiance to the Salafi ideas which had formed the starting points of their social and political attitudes. The Moroccan nationalist movement and its struggle against the French until independence was achieved in 1956 have been studied and commented upon by European and American scholars working in the field.[1] Though aware of the importance of the religious foundations of Moroccan nationalism, these scholars have not given the Salafiyya religious movement before its appearance in the limelight of political life its due importance. The present paper deals with some aspects of the original Salafiyya religious movement.

The political and social attitudes of the Moroccan nationalists which crystallized in the period between 1930 (the date of the Berber *dahir* or law) and 1956, were superstructures based on the ideas of the Salafiyya group. The Moroccan Salafis, like their counterparts in Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century, upheld the religious tradition of *al-Salaf al-Salih* (the good or pious ancestors), and recognized the Qur'an and the *Sunna* of the Prophet as the only acceptable bases of religious and social legislation. That the Salafiyya group in Morocco could develop into a politico-social movement might be explained in terms of the nature of

[1] The history of Moroccan political life after the Protectorate has been studied by several non-Moroccan scholars. Some of the better-known books on the subject are: R. Landau, *The Moroccan drama 1900–1955* (London, 1956), F. Taillard, *Le nationalisme marocain* (Paris, 1947), and D. E. Ashford, *Political change in Morocco* (Princeton, 1961)

Islam itself, as well as of the following facts about the Moroccan scene at the beginning of the twentieth century: in Morocco at this time political questions were still reducible into religious ones: the French army of invasion, which imposed the Protectorate on the country in 1912, was viewed as a Christian army aiming to suppress Islam and replace it by Christianity, and not merely a colonizing one seeking material profit and glory for France. The co-operation of Muslims with the French was therefore judged equivalent to apostasy (*ridda*) and not merely political treason.[2] The French policy of introducing the culture and way of life of France on a wide scale into those countries of which the French took political control increased the susceptibilities of the Muslims in Morocco (as in other parts of the Maghrib), and added to their concern about their traditional way of life which they identified with their religion, in the same way that they associated French culture with Christian and not secular Europe. Furthermore, the co-operation of the Sufi orders with the French during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the three countries of the Maghrib, especially the Tijaniyya, Darqawiyya and Tayyibiyya (also known as Wazzaniyya or Tuhamiyya), compromised these orders in the eyes of the Muslim population. When the Moroccan Sultanate was divested of real political power by the French after 1912, and as the Sufi orders' subservience to the French cause became well known, the Salafis – who had already emerged as an important religious group in Morocco and had attacked the Sufi orders on theological grounds – became the natural champions of the rights and the cultural heritage of the Muslims in Morocco against the encroachments of the "infidels".

Islam in the Maghrib became tinged with Sufi influences in the eleventh century A.D., when the ideas of the leading Sufis in the eastern parts of the Muslim lands started to percolate into the Maghrib. The Sufi orders, some of which originated in the area itself, came to play important social and political roles in the life of its inhabitants. They became accepted by the Muslims in the area to such a degree that the distinction which had traditionally been drawn between Orthodox Islam and Sufism seems to have been blurred to the bulk of the Maghribi Muslims. The Sufi orders in North West Africa did not discard

[2] 'Allal al-Fasi, when speaking of the subservience of the chiefs of the Kittaniyya and Darqawiyya orders in Morocco to the French cause ('Abdul-Hayy al-Kittani and Habib al-Filali respectively), refers to them as *murtadds* (those who lapsed from the faith) and not *kha'ins*, as the Arabic political vocabulary would describe traitors. Whenever he uses the latter word, he invariably uses with it the former. See for example *Hadith al-mashriq fi 'l-maghrib* (Cairo, 1956), p. 20

those elements in their beliefs and rituals which were incompatible with Orthodox Islam, but the majority of the Muslims in the area became oblivious of the discordant elements in the two systems. They came in fact to consider it religiously commendable to submit to the discipline of a Sufi order besides being conversant with the traditional Islamic subjects of learning; and it became customary to start eulogies on men of religion by describing them as having combined knowledge of the *Shari'a* with what they called the *haqiqa* (the esoteric truth of the Sufis). There also appeared the aphorism that "he who does not have a *shaikh* (meaning a Sufi *shaikh*) the devil becomes his *shaikh*", which also points to the co-existence between the Sufi way and the orthodox form of official Islam.

Besides the spread of the influence of the Sufi orders, an important aspect of Islam in the Maghrib during the past four centuries has been the deterioration of religious scholarship. A period of decline in religious studies in the Maghrib set in as from the fourteenth century, which coincided with the extension of the influence of the Sufi orders. Two instances of this decline interest us here, namely that Muslim jurisprudence came to be taught only in summaries in the leading mosque-universities in the area, and *tafsir* (the exegesis of the Qur'an) disappeared as a subject of study from the curriculum of the Qarawiyin University, the most important centre of Islamic studies in the Maghrib. Throughout North and Equatorial Africa, *al-Mukhtasar*, a manual of Muslim jurisprudence according to the Malikite rite prepared by the fourteenth-century Egyptian canon lawyer Khalil b. Ishaq al-Jundi, became the standard textbook for teaching jurisprudence in the Maghrib, thus replacing the more detailed books composed by the founders of the four rites of jurisprudence and the six canonical collections of Muslim traditions compiled during the eighth and ninth centuries.

The fundamentalism of the Salafis led them to condemn those beliefs and practices of the Sufi orders for which they could not find textual bases in the Qur'an or the prophetic traditions; and their desire to reorganize society according to the sacred law made them concerned about the stagnant state of religious studies. In consequence of this, the Salafi reformers in Morocco paid special attention to expurgating the Faith from Sufi influences, and to the revival of religious studies.

The first instance of what might be considered a Salafi tendency in Morocco dealt with the problem of the poverty of religious learning, as exemplified by the widespread use of *al-Mukhtasar* as a textbook of jurisprudence. The Alawite Sultan Muhammad b. 'Abdullah (1757–1790), whom the leaders of the Salafiyya movement in Morocco at the

beginning of the present century considered the main precursor of their movement in the country, tried to replace *al-Mukhtasar* by more adequate books for teaching jurisprudence. He himself was an accomplished religious scholar, and spent a great part of this time studying the books of Prophetic traditions. It was through his great influence that interest in these books was revived in Morocco. He brought to Morocco from the eastern parts of the Arab Muslim countries copies of the *Musnads* of the great *imams* of the schools of Muslim jurisprudence and the major books of Muslim traditions and devoted a part of his time to their study, summoning to him every Friday after the evening prayer the leading traditionists in the country to discuss with them questions arising from his studies.[3]

Muhammad b. ʿAbdullah's desire to revive interest in the original sources of Muslim jurisprudence, and his anxiety to have Muslims accept as the basis of the law only authentic Prophetic traditions, led him to undertake the task of collating the traditions in the six canonical books of Prophetic traditions in one volume which he finished in 1784 entitled *al-Futuhut al-ilahiyya fi ahadith Khair al-bariyya al-lati tushfa bi ha al-qulub al-Sadiyya*. He arranged these traditions according to the extent of the agreement among these authorities about their authenticity, giving first those traditions on which the six agreed, then those upon which five of them agreed, and so on. As an added precaution he rejected those traditions which were not connected in sound *sanads*[4] to one of the Prophet's companions.[5] Muhammad b. ʿAbdullah's method may not constitute an infallible means of securing the authenticity of the traditions, but it shows his concern about establishing the beliefs of Muslims firmly upon the *sunna* of the Prophet.

Out of the four schools of Muslim jurisprudence, Sultan Muhammad b. ʿAbdullah preferred the strictest, the Hanbali, which is the only rite recognized by the puritanical fourteenth-century theologian Ibn Taimiyyah and by the Wahhabis. In the preamble (*khutba*) of his book *al-Futuhat* he says, in the accepted fashion of introducing books in the Muslim world at the time: "Muhammad b. ʿAbdullah, the Maliki by rite and the *Hanbali by faith* says. . . ." In a special section at the end of the book he explains what he meant by this statement, showing clearly his predilection for Ahmad b. Hanbal. He says that the latter's rite enables the Muslims to avoid submitting to the allurement of such

[3] Abdul-Rahman b. Zaidan, *Ithaf a'lam an-nas bi jamal akhbar hadirat Maknas* (Rabat, 1929–33), vol. III, pp. 183–4

[4] Authorities relating the traditions of the Prophet

[5] Ibn Zaidan, *op. cit.*, III, p. 358

illegal innovations in the faith as scholasticism (*'ilm al-kalam*). He says also in this section:

> "The way of the Hanbalis in their belief is easy to attain, is above false imagination and superstition, [and] is consistent with the beliefs of the doctors of the law in the time of *al-Salaf al-Salih*. May God help us live as they [the Hanbalis] live firm in belief, and enable us die as they do in faith." [6]

Muhammad b. 'Abdullah also discouraged the use of *al-Mukhtasar* in the teaching of jurisprudence, and preferred the older and more detailed books on the subject. In a decree dealing with the reform of instruction in the Qarawiyin, he ordered that *al-Mukhtasar* should not be used in teaching jurisprudence without detailed commentaries on it which he himself specified.[7]

Mawlay Sulaiman (1792–1822), Muhammad b. 'Abdullah's son who succeeded to the throne after the short reign of his brother Sidi al-Yazid, reversed his father's policy with regard to *al-Mukhtasar* and extolled its merits.[8] But at the same time he attacked the Sufi orders and their excesses, an action which made the later Salafis in Morocco look upon him also as one of the forerunners of their movement. One of Ibn Sa'ud's letters after his conquest of the Muslim holy places in 1806 containing an exposition of the theological bases of the Wahhabi movement reached Morocco about the year 1810. The Sultan seems to have looked with favour upon the Wahhabiyya; and in 1812 he sent his son Ibrahim to Mecca with a group of Moroccan scholars to perform the pilgrimage and discuss theological questions with the Sa'udis. The exchanges of opinion seem to have taken place in a friendly atmosphere, and agreement was reached between the Wahhabis and the Moroccan delegation on the main points raised. The Moroccans accepted the Wahhabi attitude regarding the interpretation of the Qur'anic passages dealing with Almighty God's qualities, which emphasized the necessity of accepting their obvious and literal meaning (*al-zahir*). If it is stated in the Qur'an that God "sat Himself upon the Throne",[9] a good Muslim, the Wahhabis like the later Salafis asserted, should not ask such questions as to what is the essence of the Divine Being who sits on the

[6] Ibn Zaidan, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 358–9

[7] 'Abdul-Rahman b. Zaidan, *al-Durar al-fakhira bi ma'a thir muluk al-'Alawiyin bi Fas al-Zahira* (Rabat, 1937), pp. 60–1

[8] Ahmad b. Khalid al-Nasiri, *Kitab al-istqsa' li akhbar duwal al-maghrib al-aqsa* (Casablanca, 1954–6), vol. VIII, p. 67

[9] The Qur'an, X–3, XIII–2, XXV–59, XXXII–4 and LVII–4

throne, and why and how He sat. He should only believe in the occurrence of the act of sitting without discussing the implications of this belief. This attitude was to form the cornerstone of the theological approach of the Salafiyya movement in Egypt as elsewhere. The Moroccan delegation also pronounced itself satisfied with the Sa'udi explanation regarding their attitude on the question of visiting the tombs of *walis*. The Moroccans had understood that the Sa'udis prohibited Muslims from visiting the shrines of all saints and of the Prophet's tomb without condition, and when it was explained to them that they forbade from visiting the shrines of saints only Muslims who did not perform the visit in accordance with the rules which they prescribed, and which were designed to prevent it from becoming an act of worship, the Moroccans concurred with them on the desirability of this precaution.[10] Mawlay Sulaiman himself later forbade the Moroccan populace to visit the tombs of saints. He also wrote a treatise in which he criticized the Sufi orders, warned the Muslims against the illegal innovations which they introduced and stated the rules which should govern visits to the shrines of saints.[11] The Sultan also delivered a speech in which he denounced the practice which some of the Sufi orders had of holding festivals (*mawasim*) on the birthdays of the founders.[12]

Sultan Muhammad b. 'Abdullah's endeavours to revive interest in the original sources of Muslim jurisprudence, and therefore his advocacy of a return to the early formative periods of Islamic history – which is the characteristic point of emphasis in the Salafiyya movement – and Mawlay Sulaiman's attack on the Sufi orders – which is another important part of the reformist programme of the later Salafis – remained isolated from the development of the Salafiyya movement in Morocco during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. They are important only in as much as they encouraged the later Salafis in the way of life to which they became converted through other means, and since the example of these two highly esteemed sultans served as a useful supplementary argument which the Salafis could use in their polemics with the advocates of mediaeval Islam in Morocco. The intellectual position of the neo-Salafiyya, as

[10] Ahmad b. Khalid al-Nasiri, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 120–1

[11] *Ibid.*, VIII, p. 124

[12] This speech was printed in 1933 by one of the active spokesmen of the Salafiyya in Morocco, Muhammad Ibrahim al-Kittani. It was distributed in the country so as to rally support to the petition which had just been submitted to Sultan Muhammad b. Yusuf by the professors and students of the Qarawiyin University in Fez calling upon him to interdict the festivals of the 'Isawiyya and Hamadsha orders.

the movement which appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century has been conveniently called by its leaders, was formed by the influence of the reformers of the eastern parts of the Arab Muslim world, especially Muhammad ʿAbduh.

At the end of the nineteenth century the ideas of the advocates of Salafiyya in Egypt started to spread in Morocco. A learned Moroccan called ʿAbdullah b. Idris al-Sanusi (from the Berber tribe of Banu Sanus), who was a lecturer at the Qarawiyin University, was one of the earliest persons to introduce these ideas into Morocco. In the 1870's he went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and on his return he was appointed by the Sultan, Mawlay al-Hasan (1873–94), as a member of the royal learned council[13] to attend the sessions on al-Bukhari's *Sahih*. In the meetings of the council al-Sanusi expressed the ideas which he carried with him from Egypt, advocating especially the acceptance of the literal and most obvious meanings of the scriptures and the strict observance of the *sunna* of the Prophet. He also argued in favour of the rejection of *taʾwil*[14] especially in the Qur'anic passages and Prophetic traditions dealing with the qualities of Almighty God. Al-Sanusi's views, especially his criticism of *taʾwil*, did not meet with the approval of the other scholars in the council among whom were two influential personalities of learning: Ahmad b. al-Talib b. Sudah, author of several books on the Prophetic traditions and Sufism and several times a judge, and ʿAbdullah al-Kamil al-ʾAmrani al-Hasani, who enjoyed great prestige through being the maternal grandson of the Sultan Mawlay Sulaiman and the son-in-law of another Sultan, ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbdul-Rahman. Both these scholars were members of Sufi orders and upholders of Sufi practices and beliefs.[15] Al-Sanusi's critics accused him of subscribing to the views of the Muʿtazilites and of introducing illegal innovations (*bidaʿ*) and of denying the existence of sainthood (*wilaya*). Their attacks were very vehement, and the Sultan did not interfere to restrain them, although he seems to have been rather sympathetic towards al-Sanusi since he did not persecute him as he would have done had the defenders of mediaeval Islam been able to win him over to their point of view. Al-Sanusi soon found the atmosphere of Fez dis-

[13] The Sultans of Morocco held in the royal palace a council of the prominent scholars in the country to discuss important religious and legal questions, or merely to study the Prophetic traditions and Muslim jurisprudence. The Sultan himself attended the council and often conducted its proceedings.

[14] Meaning the material interpretation of the Qur'an which deals with its content, as distinct from *tafsir* which means the external philological exegesis.

[15] ʿAbdul-Hafiz al-Fasi, *Riyad al-Janna aw al-mudhish al-mutrib* (Fez, A.H. 1350), II, pp. 77–80

agreeable and emigrated. He travelled to Syria and Turkey, lectured in Damascus and Istanbul and returned to Morocco only after the death of Mawlay al-Hasan and the accession of Mawlay ʿAbdul-ʿAziz. The new sultan treated him well, and helped him settle in Tangier. Al-Sanusi travelled with Sultan ʿAbdul-ʿAziz after his abdication to Egypt and Syria; and when in 1910 al-Sanusi returned from this trip he remained in Tangier until his death on 7 October 1931.[16]

Not long after the setback which the Salafiyya in Morocco suffered in the defeat of al-Sanusi's attempt to propagate the ideas which he had imported from the east, the country had another champion of these ideas in the person of Abu Shuʿaib al-Dukkali (1878–1937). Born at al-Sadiqat, a locality about fifty miles from Casablanca, al-Dukkali came from a family which belonged to the strong Moroccan Sufi order, the Darqawiyya. In A.H. 1314 (A.D. 1896–7) he emigrated to Egypt to study at the Azhar. At this time the curriculum of this university had already been revised by Muhammad ʿAbduh, and the latter's religious discourses were being published in the *Manar* and were the subject of commentary and discussion in Cairo. Whether or not al-Dukkali had any personal contacts with ʿAbduh is not known; but his sojourn in Cairo brought him into touch with the intellectual atmosphere created by the Egyptian reformer. As a student Abu Shuʿaib was outstanding, and when the Amir of Mecca, Sharif ʿAwn al-Rafiq (d. 1905) – who himself was favourably disposed towards Salafiyya – asked the Rector of the Azhar to choose a student to conduct religious instruction and preaching in the Muslim holy town, al-Dukkali was chosen for the job. He remained in Mecca until A.H. 1325 (A.D. 1907–8), visiting Morocco twice in the meantime. On his return to Morocco in A.H. 1325 he was treated well by Sultan ʿAbdul-Hafiz (1908–11), and remained the Sultan's guest in Fez for three years. He went once more to Mecca to bring his family back to Morocco, and on his return in 1911 he was appointed *qadi* in the town of Marrakesh; a year later he became Minister of Justice.[17]

Muhammad ʿAbduh himself never visited Morocco although he visited both Tunisia and Algeria; but he seems to have corresponded with several Moroccans and his ideas were well known in the country independently of Abu Shuʿaib's influence. When he wanted to select for publication by the Salafiyya press books written by earlier authors

[16] ʿAbdul-Hafiz al-Fasi, *Riyad al-Janna aw al-mudhish al-mutrib* (Fez, A.H. 1350), II, pp. 81–5 and 94–5

[17] Muhammad Ibrahim al-Kittani, *Talaʾiʿ al-yaqza al-maghribiyya aw Abu Shuʿaib wa ʾl-salafiyya*, MS., the author's personal copy, ff. 12–14

along lines acceptable to the Salafis, he wrote to the Sultan Mawlay ʿAbdul-Hafiz and to Shaikh Idris b. ʿAbdul-Hadi, who is reputed to have been the owner of the largest private library in Morocco, asking advice on the books which he should publish. When a great controversy flared up in 1903 concerning ʿAbduh's *fatwa* which dealt with the question of whether the consumption of the meat of animals slaughtered by Christians was permissible to Muslims, known as the Transvaal *fatwa*, a Moroccan jurist called Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Wazzani (1850–1923), the Malikite *mufti* of Fez, wrote a treatise on the problem. He supported ʿAbduh's attitude regarding the consumption of meat although he denounced him in the same treatise because of his attack on the custom of supplicating God through the intercession of the prophets and saints.[18]

Abu Shuʿaib al-Dukkali's influence as propagator of Salafi ideas in Morocco was much greater than any remote influence which Abduh might have had. Through him Sultan ʿAbdul-Hafiz was won over to the ideas of the Salafis and wrote a book in which he inveighed against the Sufi orders, condemning several of their practices and beliefs as being incompatible with the true Islam, and singling out the Tijaniyya order for a special criticism.[19] His impatience with the Sufi orders became evident when he had the chief of the Kittaniyya order, Muhammad b. ʿAbdul-Kabir al-Kittani, tortured to death after the latter had undertaken serious seditious activity during the rule of ʿAbdul-Hafiz's predecessor – who had pardoned him – and later during ʿAbdul-Hafiz's own reign.[20] Through ʿAbdul-Hafiz's help, Abu Shuʿaib succeeded in adding to the curriculum of the Qarawiyin University the teaching of *tafsir*; this was indispensable if the Salafis were to have resort to *ijtihad* (individual interpretation), the door of which, they believed, contrary to the widely accepted attitude, was not shut. During the three years which al-Dukkali spent in Fez, he himself taught the subject in the Qarawiyin, and while there a group of enthusiastic disciples formed itself around him. It was to one of these disciples, Mawlay al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi, that he handed on the torch of the Salafiyya in Morocco.[21]

Mawlay al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi is now retired from public life although he is still in good health. He is a former member of the Tijaniyya order,

[18] ʿAllal al-Fasi, *al-Harakat al-istiqlaliyya fi'l-maghrib al-ʿarabi* (Cairo, 1948); ʿAbdul-Hafiz al-Fasi, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 48–50; and Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Tarikh al-ustadh al-imam* (Cairo, 1931), I, p. 716

[19] This book is entitled *Kashf al-qinaʿ ʿan i ʿtiqad tawaʾif al-ibtidaʿ*, published in Fez in A.H. 1327/A.D. 1909.

[20] ʿAbdul-Hafiz al-Fasi, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 44–8

[21] Al-Kittani, *op. cit.*, ff. 16–17; and ʿAbdul-Hafiz al-Fasi, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 141–3

whose beliefs he now vehemently criticizes. He was converted to the Salafi point of view through the influence of his master, Abu Shu'aib al-Dukkali, as well as through the influence of his own reading, in which the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah and the articles of the *Manar* left the greatest impact on his mind. During the First World War he was introduced to the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah through *Kitab al-Furqan*; at this time the books of Ibn Taimiyyah were rarely sold or read in Morocco because of his invectives against the Sufi orders which were strongly entrenched in the academic circles of the country. This introduction to Ibn Taimiyyah's ideas induced him to search for other books by him, and on investigation in Fez he discovered that shortly before the war a parcel of books sent from the Salafiyya press in Cairo to a merchant in Fez called Ahmad al-'Amrani, remained undistributed since very few people showed interest in them. Mawlay al-'Arabi al-'Alawi procured these books at a nominal price and found among them Mahmud Shukri al-'Ālusi's *Ghayat al-aman fi 'l-radd 'ala al-Nabhani* and Ibn Taimiyyah's *al-Tawassul wa 'l-wasila*. He distributed these books in Morocco, and through him many in that country came to know the ideas of the fourteenth-century Hanbali theologian. At this time *al-Manar* and *al-'Urwat al-wuthqa* were starting to have some circulation in Fez.[22]

Mawlay al-'Arabi al-'Alawi continues to hold his Salafi views with unswerving conviction, and is still highly venerated by his disciples who are prominent in the politics of Morocco. This pleasant and dignified old gentleman, who is at once a religious scholar and an able political agitator, forms in his life and public career a bridge joining the Salafiyya movement which started with the work of the two religious reformers al-Sanusi and al-Dukkali, on the one hand, with the politico-religious and nationalist Salafi movement which emerged after the First World War, on the other. The task of leading the neo-Salafiyya movement after the First World War fell to a former student of his, 'Allal al-Fasi.

The neo-Salafiyya differs from the old one in that whereas the aims of the old one were primarily religious – to improve the understanding of the precepts of Islam and their application – the neo-Salafiyya aimed at the establishment of a liberal political organization of society with a view to enabling Muslims to lead the good life, part of which was the correct exercise of their religion. The presence of the French in Morocco as rulers since 1912 explains this difference of emphasis. Before the

[22] This information was given to the author by Mawlay al-'Arabi al-'Alawi himself during two working sessions he had with him in Fez in the month of November 1960.

Protectorate, religious and social reform had to come from the ruling class comprising the Sultan and his retinue of scholars and administrators, and had to be in harmony with the established framework of the society. This meant that the reformers had a very limited scope within which to operate: the absolute authority of the Sultan could not be challenged and consequently the establishment of democratic institutions was not conceivable, even if it was claimed that they were based on the Muslim law, as some of the leaders of the neo-Salafiyya claimed for their political programme. The organization of the regime of the Protectorate in such a way as to centralize all power in the hands of the French administrators enabled the neo-Salafis to demand political freedom without forsaking their allegiance to the Muslim head of their community. To a Muslim reformist movement like the neo-Salafiyya it was a welcome situation to be able to attribute the political ills of the country to the detested "infidel"; and although some of the leaders of the Salafiyya in Morocco (especially ʿAllal al-Fasi, as seen from his book *al-Naqd al-dhati*) could see that the responsibility for a great part of the ills of the Moroccan society rested with the Moroccans themselves, this was not the prevalent attitude.

ʿAllal a-Fasi himself defines the politico-religious aims of the neo-Salafiyya movement in the following way: the movement, he says, aims at expurgating the Faith from all superstition, having for its purpose to educate the individual in the true Islamic principles, whose acceptance conduces to the welfare of the community in this life and in the one to come. It aims, therefore, at the reformation of society through the correct Islamic education of the individuals in it. Individual liberty is essential since only through it can communities choose their proper way of life; and organization in political parties and trade unions is also indispensable as a means of expression through which the community can attain its goals by legal and pacific means. According to ʿAllal al-Fasi, it would be essential for the success of the Salafiyya movement that the Muslim countries should associate together in one political entity. The Salafis, he says, wavered for some time between trying to revive the caliphate along modern lines and attempting to create an Eastern league of nations; and finally they decided to work for a form of nationalism which should derive its spirit not from materialism but from religion. The Arabic language should become the common language of all the Muslim countries; through it the Muslim mentality would be unified, and its diverse elements brought together. The *Sharīʿa*, al-Fasi adds, should become the source of all modern legislation in Muslim states, and a modern form of *ijtihad* should be devised

to make this possible. But *ijtihad*, he suggests, should be the prerogative of qualified deputies that the nation would elect and not, therefore, that of the *'ulama'*. But all this, he concludes, cannot be achieved if foreign domination in the country is not brought to an end.[23]

The Sufi orders, which had been attacked by the old Salafiyya movement in Morocco on religious grounds, were attacked by the new one on both the religious and political levels. These orders had been compromised in the eyes of the Muslims in the Maghrib through the co-operation of some of them with the French in Algeria and Tunisia during the nineteenth century. This fact enabled the Salafis to combine their religious and political objectives; it also made it possible for them to attack the French with impunity by directing their diatribes against the Sufi orders, the recognized allies of the French.

During the Rif War (1923–6), the Salafis in Morocco became organized in two main circles: one around Abu Shu'aib al-Dukkali in Rabat, and the other around Mawlay al-'Arabi al-'Alawi in Fez. The two groups co-operated with each other and endeavoured through lectures and articles which they published in Algerian and Tunisian newspapers to make their views heard. The group in Fez was more vociferous and active in its attempt to revive concern about Islamic culture and to counter French influence. The lessons of Mawlay al-'Arabi al-'Alawi in the Qarawiyin attracted a big audience, and were attended by several persons who were later to play important parts in opposing the French: 'Allal al-Fasi, al-Faqih Ghazi, Ibrahim al-Kittani and al-Mukhtar al-Susi, and others. In his lessons he attacked abuses of diverse natures: to show his discontent with the state of religious learning he criticized the use of *al-Mukhtasar* as a textbook for teaching Muslim jurisprudence. At the same time he and his disciples tried to give circulation to some of the books of Salafi tendencies which had reached Morocco from Egypt. Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Musa al-Shatibi's: *Kitab al-i'tisam bi al-kitab wa 'l-sunna* which had been published by the Salafiyya press in three volumes during the years 1913–14, reached Morocco at this time and became the object of commentary and discussion started by the advocates of Salafiyya. 'Allal al-Fasi launched at the same time a severe attack on the Sufi orders through the newspaper *Izhar al-Haqq* which was published in Tangier.[24]

The Salafiyya group directed at the end of the Rif War an attack on the Tijaniyya order, which was most clearly in the service of the French in Algeria, and whose leaders were accused of working for the

[23] 'Allal al-Fasi, *Al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyya*, pp. 156–8

[24] Muhammad Ibrahim al-Kittani, *op. cit.*, ff. 4 and 5

French during the Rif War.[25] The attack at first took the form of a criticism of the doctrines of the Tijaniyya. Mawlay al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi was the centre of the group which started this attack, and he had as a temporary ally the chief of the Kittaniyya order, ʿAbdul-Hayy al-Kittani, who could not be described either as a Salafi or a Moroccan nationalist, but who sought to destroy the position of the Tijaniyya in the country because of the competition between the latter and his order. A chief of the Tijaniyya in the town of Marrakesh, called Muhammad al-Nazifi, in a small book entitled *al-Tib al-fa'ih* written to explain the Tijani litany *Salat al-Fatih*, stated that this prayer was a part of God's eternal speech, thus equating it in its origins with the Qur'an.[26] The book had long been printed and it circulated widely in Morocco, but it was chosen for the occasion merely as the target of the attack on the Tijaniyya and as a part of the Salafi campaign against the Sufi orders in general. The Moroccan Minister of Justice, ʿAbdul-Rahman al-Qarashi, was persuaded to submit to the council of *ʿulama'* of the Qarawiyin University in Fez a request that the council examine the statement made by al-Nazifi regarding *Salat al-Fatih* and express an authoritative opinion as to whether it offended against the religion of Islam or not, and if it did what punishment would be commensurate with the offence. Mawlay al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi took an active part in the deliberations of the council, and it was through him that the extreme attitude of ʿAbdul-Hayy al-Kittani and others who wanted al-Nazifi hanged was curbed. Realizing that a death sentence against al-Nazifi had little chance of being sanctioned by the French authorities, the council decided to produce a more lenient verdict which had a better

[25] ʿAbdul-Karim, the leader of the Rif uprising, accused the heads of the Sufi orders, after the collapse of his movement in 1926, of being themselves greatly responsible for the failure because they refused to co-operate. (See *al-Manar*, vol. 27, 1926, pp. 630–3.) A Tijani adventurer from Tunis called Muhammad al-Manubi al-Qitt carried in 1923 apocryphal letters to Lyautey in Morocco, claiming that he was given them by ʿAbdul-Karim. In 1924 he was asked to deliver a message from the department of Native Affairs in French Morocco to ʿAbdul-Karim, which suggests that the message which he carried to the French authorities in Morocco was taken seriously by the latter. Lyautey discovered the fraud around November 1924, when al-Manubi had already left. (See the documents on Muhammad al-Manubi in the Tunisian Archives, dossiers D.156.2 and D.156.21.) Muhammad al-Manubi was denounced by the leaders of the Tijaniyya in the mother *zawiya* of the order in ʿAin Madi (Algeria); and in the absence of any documentary evidence it is not possible to ascertain the extent of the latter's involvement in the politics of the Rif.

[26] See Muhammad b. ʿAbdul-Wahid al-Nazifi, *al-Tib al-fa' ih wa 'l-wird al-sanih fi salat al-fatih* (Cairo, n.d.), p. 11.

chance of being executed. In a document dated 29th Rajab A.H. 1344 (11th February 1926) they recommended to the Minister of Justice, and through him to the Sultan, that al-Nazifi be strongly reprimanded and his books burnt.[27] No action was taken against al-Nazifi because of the protection of the influential Pasha of Marrakesh, Thami al-Glawi, who himself was a member of the Tijaniyya order. But the Salafis gained support in Morocco as well as in the neighbouring Muslim countries as a result of this *fatwa*. Salafi groups in Algeria and Egypt took up the attack against the Tijaniyya at once, a fact which serves to show the sympathy of the Salafi groups in North Africa for, and the connections which they had with, each other. Immediately after the learned council of the Qarawiyin passed its verdict, *al-Najah* newspaper which appeared in Constantine in Algeria published its text with a laudatory account of the attitude of the council of the Qarawiyin, calling its article: "The zeal of the learned men of Fez for the Faith."[28] *Al-Manar* periodical, the mouthpiece of the Salafiyya group in Egypt, also took up the attack against the Tijaniyya in its number for the 29th Sha'ban A.H. 1344 (17th March 1926). In Algeria the "Association of Algerian Muslim men" (*Jam 'iyyat al-'ulama' al-Muslimin*) reverberated with the echo of this *fatwa* a few years later. This association was founded in 1930 by 'Abdul-Hamid b. Badis (1889–1940) who had close contacts with the leaders of the Salafiyya circle in Morocco. The fifth congress of the Association which was held in the town of Algiers in March 1935 was attended by a deputy of the Salafiyya circle in Morocco, Muhammad Ibrahim al-Kittani; and in the sessions of the congress the speakers, especially the vice-president of the Association, Muhammad al-Bashir al-Ibrahimi, attacked bitterly the Tijaniyya.[29]

The proclamation of the Berber *dahir* on the 16th May 1930 was decisive in the transformation of the Salafiyya movement from an intellectual circle composed mostly of scholars into a popular political movement. In the midst of the agitation which resulted from the

[27] I have searched in Fez and among the paper of 'Abdul-Hayy al-Kittani, now in the Bibliothèque Générale in Rabat, but failed to find it. Mawlay al-'Arabi al-'Alawi, who supplied me with most of the information on the circumstances which led to the issue of the *fatwa*, believes that no copy of its text has been preserved anywhere. There is a mention of the *fatwa* in Mahmud Manashu's book which was written to rebut it: *Majmu' qam' al-ta'assub wa ahwa' a'da' al-Tijani fi' -lmashriq wa 'l-maghrib* (Tunis, 1926), pp. 3–4

[28] Mahmud Manashu, *op. cit.*, p. 3

[29] See *Sijil Mu' tamar Jam 'iyyat al-'Ulama' 'al-Muslimin al-Jazi' iriyyin* (Record of the Congress of the Association of the Muslim learned men of Algeria), published in Contantine, A.H. 1354/A.D. 1935., p. 25.

proclamation of the *dahir* ʿAllal al-Fasi formed a secret society called "al-Zawiyya", which became the nucleus of the National Party and later the Istiqlal Party.[30] The Berber *dahir* placed the administration of justice in Berber areas in the hands of the *Jamaʿa* or customary courts, and provided for the application of the French criminal law among the Berber tribes. This meant that the Berbers were not to be subject to the system of justice as administered in Morocco in the name of the Muslim head of the community. The Pashas (governors) of the towns and tribal *qaʾids* in the country-side had dealt with penal and civil justice, and the *qadis* administered the *Shariʾa* in matters of personal status and inheritance. The Salafiyya group, with their eyes firmly focused on the early periods of Muslim history, considered the promulgation of the law the first practical step towards the conversion of the Berbers back to Christianity. The ethnic and linguistic differences between the Berbers and the other elements of the Moroccan population were not considered by the Salafiyya circle sufficient to justify the promulgation of the *dahir*. This law constituted, according to their point of view, an attempt on the part of the French to resuscitate the period of *Jahiliyya* (the time of ignorance) which Islam is believed by its followers to have abrogated and superseded. To an orthodox Muslim the Berber *dahir* seemed to strike at the foundations of the Muslim society; consequently the reaction of the Salafis was immediate, violent and uncompromising. Immediately after its promulgation they aroused the feelings of the Muslim population by the recitation of the *Latif* prayer, one which is usually reserved for moments of national catastrophe.[31] The reaction of the Muslims outside Morocco was not less virulent. Shakib Arsalan, who opened an office in Geneva in 1930 to defend the cause of Muslims on an international level, visited Tetuan in that year and made contacts with the leaders of the Salafiyya group in the French zone of Morocco. Muslim religious circles in Egypt and elsewhere expressed sympathy with the Moroccans, and referred to the *dahir* as an act of religious imperialism.

The reaction of the Muslims of Morocco to the promulgation of the *dahir* showed the extent to which they still thought in religious terms, and how little they were prepared to tolerate any encroachment on their religion and culture in the name of the protection of minorities. Neither the French authorities, nor the Salafiyya group, was at this stage prepared to see the other party's point of view. But the promul-

[30] ʿAllal al-Fasi, *ʿAqida wa jihad* (Rabat, 1960,) pp. 9–10

[31] Muhammad Ibrahim al-Kittani, *Min mudhakkarati ʿan al-yaqza al-maghribiyya*, MS., the author's private copy, ff. 8–9

gation of the *dahir* and the opposition to it were the beginning of the crystallization of the nationalist movement. Until 1930 the social and political programme of the Salafis was based on traditionally Muslim arguments; the nationalist movement which appeared after this date was a modern nationalist movement in its objectives and tactics, although its leaders presented their political programme inside a religious framework.

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MIDHAT PASHA AND THE LAND SYSTEM OF LOWER IRAQ

By Albertine Jwaideh

(i)

PROBLEMS CONCERNING the tenure of land have lain at the heart of Iraq's disturbed political life for the last hundred years. First the British, then the Iraqi government which they established, and then the revolutionary regime of to-day found themselves the heirs of the land policy of the last Ottoman rulers of the country; but they did not always know, nor was it easy to discover, what exactly that policy had been, and as a result the reforms they introduced were piecemeal and inappropriate. On occasions indeed they even invoked, as a basis for their reforms, supposed Ottoman measures which research in the Turkish archives now shows never to have been taken. The Ottoman land policy which later rulers followed, or thought they were following, itself went back to 1869, when Midhat Pasha, an able and liberal-minded administrator, first applied the Ottoman Land Code in Iraq, with results he did not and could not have foreseen. This essay is a first attempt to analyse his policy and its results.

The land policy of Midhat Pasha was inspired by the spirit of the *Tanzimat*, of those reforms which the Ottoman Sultans had been trying to carry out in their Empire for a generation, largely under pressure from the European Powers. When Sultan ʿAbd al-Majid promulgated the great reform decree of Gülhane on November 3, 1839, he set in motion forces which were to have far-reaching effects throughout the Empire during the remainder of the century. The work of a small group within the entourage of the young Sultan, led by the Grand Vezir Rashid Pasha, the decree envisaged a thorough transformation of the legal and political structure of the Empire. Its aim was to change out-moded laws and regulations, to bring equality to all citizens regardless of race or creed, to improve the administration of justice, to create a regular and fixed system of taxation, and to eliminate corruption in the government service. Laws embodying these and other reforms were to

be framed by the Council of Justice, which was not to be subject to interference by the Sultan.

But it is not enough to decree great changes: the real difficulties begin when one tries to carry them out. Conditions within the Empire were not conducive to an energetic fulfilment of the promises contained in the Gülhane decree, and external events also worked against it. First of all, there was a weakness in the nature of the reforms themselves. They had no firm roots in the Ottoman past, but represented an over-ambitious attempt on the part of a few to engraft on to the structure of the Empire something which was essentially alien and inspired by the ideas of European liberalism. The reforms were liberal, while effective government remained authoritarian: there were no constitutional limits or guarantees, nor could there be in the circumstances. Next, there were difficulties of administering them: the new laws and regulations were difficult to interpret and to apply, and the officials who had to carry them out were poorly paid and poorly equipped to understand them. Moreover, the promulgation of the reforming measures brought together reactionary forces which actively sought to defeat their purposes. This opposition consisted largely of two influential groups: those with vested interests in the old order of things, and those who, owing to ignorance, prejudice, or religious conviction, feared any innovation which might represent a departure from the laws of Islam. In addition, the uniformity of practice postulated by the framers of the *Tanzimat* could not be enforced upon the diverse peoples of the Empire, who belonged to different races, spoke different languages and adhered to different faiths. Finally, the exigencies of international relations did not always conduce to the success of the reforms. As the nineteenth century grew older, the rivalries of the Powers came to play an increasing part in the affairs of the Empire, and gravely to restrict the freedom of action of its rulers. Active interference on the part of foreign ambassadors at times furthered and at others hindered the work of reform; what was perhaps more important, the government became ever more concerned with external affairs and the defence of the Empire and of Islam against the encroachments of Europe.

Nevertheless, some reforms were gradually carried out. The structure of the central and local administration was changed, and the first step taken towards representative government by the establishment of provincial councils in 1851. New legal codes were promulgated, and as a consequence of the Crimean War the clause in the Gülhane decree dealing with equal treatment for minorities was made effective by a new decree issued in 1856; gradually non-Muslims gained rights

previously denied them. Perhaps the most effective measures were those dealing with the ownership and tenure of land.[1] Before 1839 most cultivated land had been considered by Ottoman law to be State land (*miri*), but in fact the rights and functions of the State as owner had been largely taken over by private individuals: in earlier Ottoman days by the so-called "feudatories" who were allowed to collect and keep the tax from a specific area in return for giving military service with a certain number of men; and later by tax-farmers, who had bought the right (often virtually hereditary) to collect the land-tax on behalf of the State, and who derived from this right of collection not only financial profit but also virtual rights of ownership. The decree of 1839 announced that "feudal" tenures would be abolished, and that tax-farmers would be replaced by regular officials to collect the taxes. In 1846 a further step was taken: under a new system known as the *Nizam Tapu*, grants of *miri* land to private individuals could be made by specially appointed agents of the government. In 1858, a Ministry of Land Registration (*Nizarat al-Daftar al-Khaqani*) was set up in Istanbul, with branches in the various provinces of the Empire. It was authorized to issue title-deeds (*tapu sanad*) to those who acquired possession of *miri* land in return for a fee to be paid immediately (*mu'ajjala*). The same year saw the promulgation of the Ottoman Land Code which was henceforth to govern all transactions regarding *miri* land.

When 'Abd al-Majid died in 1861, some of the changes made in his reign were beginning to bear fruit, but the first impulse to reform had subsided. The succession of a new Sultan, 'Abd al-'Aziz, kindled hopes that there would be a new wave of reform; but, although some further measures were carried out, to a great extent the hopes proved vain. The morbidly jealous nature of the new Sultan led him to cling to the capricious exercise of autocratic power, while his undisciplined self-indulgence and love of luxury led to unbridled corruption in the government. Nevertheless, there were those, both in the central government and in the provincial administration, who fought heroically for reform: among them was Midhat Pasha, whose brief tenure of office as governor of Baghdad was to have lasting consequences in the history of Iraq.

(ii)

Muhammad Shafiq, more generally known as Midhat Pasha, was born in Istanbul in A.H. 1238 (1822); he came of a middle-class family.

[1] Cf. Shakir Nasir Haidar Nasir, *Ahkam al-aradi wa Amwal al Ghair al Manqula* (Baghdad, 1941–2), pp. 13, 258; Stanley Fisher, *Ottoman Land Laws* (Oxford, 1919), pp. 2 foll.

and received the education which children of his class usually obtained in the local schools.[2] He entered the government service at an early age and was rapidly promoted in recognition of his talents. By 1851 he had reached the rank of *mutamayyiz*, and held the office of First Secretary to the Grand Council. Soon afterwards he was sent on a special mission to investigate certain irregularities in the administration of the province of Damascus, where a Druze insurrection had broken out: his report placed the responsibility on the head of the local army commander, who was recalled, and the courage and ability which Midhat had shown attracted the attention of the Grand Vezir, Rashid Pasha. He was given a confidential post in the Council of State, and continued to occupy it even when Rashid was replaced by another Grand Vezir. In 1854 he was first given a post which brought out all his abilities. He was sent to pacify the disturbed provinces of Adrianople and the Balkans; he proved quite equal to the task, and in fact planned a complete re-organization of the area, but a change of ministry undermined his position to such an extent that he decided to resign. This event coincided with the death of Rashid Pasha in 1858; the liberal cause suffered a temporary eclipse, but Midhat made use of it to travel in Europe and study certain features of European administration which interested him. His reputation as an administrator was by now so high that he was soon recalled and given high office once again. In 1861 he was appointed governor of the important province of Nish (Servia), where trouble had been brewing for some time and emigration had reached alarming proportions. He embarked on his task in a characteristic way, calling together the notables of the province and striking a bargain with them that, if they would exert themselves for two years to secure the pacification of the district and the end of emigration, he would seek to redress some of their grievances. He fulfilled his side of the bargain with vigour, restoring order, improving roads, making the tax-system more equitable and improving relations between landlords and tenants, and in a short time confidence was restored and the emigrants began to return.

The administrative ingenuity he displayed impressed Fu'ad and ʿAli Pasha, the disciples of Rashid Pasha who were by now in power. In 1864 they summoned him to Istanbul to help in drafting a general law to regulate the government of the provinces (the Law of the Vilayets). The plan involved, among much else, the creation of a new Province

[2] For the life of Midhat, cf. ʿAli Haydar, *Tabsirat wa ʿIbrat* (Istanbul, 1325); Ali Haydar Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903); M. Z. Pakalin, *Midhat Paşa* (Istanbul, 1940); S. Damluji, *Midhat Pasha* (Baghdad, 1952–3)

(*vilayet, wilaya*) of the Danube, to consist of the former provinces of Silistria, Widdin and Nish. Midhat was appointed governor (*wali*), in spite of bitter opposition by the enemies of reform in the capital. In 1865 he embarked on the difficult task of making this new province the first in the Empire to be organized under the new system of local government. The *wilaya* was to be divided into smaller administrative units – *liwas* under *mutasarrifs*, *qadas* under *qa'immaqams*, and *nahiyas* under *mudhirs*; each unit was to have an elected council to assist in the administration of civil and financial matters. The system worked so well in Midhat's province that it was decided to extend it to other provinces of the Empire.

But Midhat tried to do far more than to set up a new administrative machine. He attempted to improve agriculture and communications, and to reform the tax-structure. There were other, more difficult problems to be faced if the Ottoman authority was to be restored. He noticed the flow of young Christian students from his province to the schools and universities of Russia, where they were indoctrinated with pan-Slav ideas, and he saw that this was a potential threat to Ottoman rule. In order to counter it he devised plans for education and for the greater participation of the Christian subjects in the government. His proposals came to nothing, however; the Sultan turned them down, not so much because of opposition from inside the government as because of foreign intervention. The Russian Ambassador, aware that what Midhat was trying to do was to counter Russia's policy of penetration in the Balkans, convinced the Sultan that the creation of local councils would be contrary to the absolute authority of the ruler, and would lead in the end to a claim to independence similar to that being made by the ruler of Egypt. The Ambassador's arguments, and the use of the dangerous word "deputies" to describe the members of the proposed council of the *wilaya*, were enough to convince the Sultan; and at the same time the pan-Slav element in the province embarrassed Midhat by staging a revolt. He put it down with the almost brutal firmness which he could show on occasion.

In 1868, those who were opposed to his reforms succeeded in having him recalled to Istanbul, where he was put at the head of the newly formed Council of State. In this new position he began to replace out-of-date laws by others more suited to the times, but here also his reforms alarmed the conservatives in the Sultan's entourage. It soon became clear to him that his authority in important matters was being overruled by the Grand Vezir, acting on orders from the Sultan, and rather than allow a rift to appear between ʿAli Pasha and himself he

resigned. It happened that at this time the governorship of Baghdad, generally considered a place of exile, fell vacant, and Midhat being out of favour immediately obtained the position. In this way he came to the country where his most lasting work was to be done.

(iii)

In 1869, the bulk of the population of lower Iraq consisted, as it does to-day, of tribesmen belonging to one or other of the Arab tribes which had come originally from the Peninsula.[3] Most of them were settled or half-settled cultivators or marshmen who in the course of time had adopted the Shi'i faith, under the influence of the tradition of Mesopotamia, and had lost their effective links with the Arabian desert. But in spite of these changes the tribal bond was still strong: members of the tribe were bound together both by ties of blood and by the unwritten code of law and morality which was the product of long-established custom and tradition. At the head of each tribe was a prominent member of the ruling house who was acknowledged by all members of the tribe, and was the mediator between them and the government.

The government did not play more than a limited part in the life of the region. When the Ottomans first conquered Iraq, it was important for them mainly as a buffer province on the frontier of the Empire with Shi'i Persia; the first role of the governors who were sent there was to defend the frontier. For this purpose and for purposes of administration they were expected to raise money from the province; but they were also expected to contribute a certain sum to the central treasury in Istanbul. Since Baghdad was considered a place of exile, the governors were usually men who were out of favour, and whose tenure of office was deliberately kept short, so that they would not consolidate their power and seek independence. Their influence hardly extended beyond the walls of the towns, and the authority of the government was scarcely felt in the tribal areas. In these circumstances, the influence of the Arab tribes was supreme; rather than look to the government for protection, they built their own fortifications to defend themselves against each other as well as against the government. When weak they had to pay taxes and other revenues, and in order to avoid this they

[3] On the nature of tribal society in lower Iraq, cf. F. M. Al-Fir'awn, *al-Qada' al-'asha'iri* (Baghdad, 1941); 'A. al-'Azzawi, *'Asha'ir al-'Iraq*, vol. i (Baghdad, 1937); *Reports on the Muntafiq Division, 1917–1921* (Baghdad)

tended to form themselves into larger groups or confederations. The most important of these were the Khaza'il who, together with the 'Afaj and Daghghara groups, held the Middle Euphrates, the Muntafik who occupied the south, and the Albu Muhammad and Bani Lam on the Tigris.

Throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century, such Ottoman authority as existed was in the hands of a group of Mamluks or Georgian freedmen, constantly renewed by new immigration from the Caucasus, and from among whom the Ottoman governors were drawn. In 1831, the central government, now embarked on military and administrative reform, felt strong enough to challenge the power of the Mamluks; Baghdad was occupied, the last of the Mamluk governors, Da'ud Pasha, removed, and there began a new period during which the central government assumed direct control of the administration in Baghdad. Thereafter the governor was sent directly from Istanbul; he was granted his office in return for the payment of an agreed amount to the Treasury as a substitute (*badal*) for the revenue he was expected to raise from the province. In order to secure the greatest profit, those in power in Istanbul changed governors frequently, and the governors in their turn tried to recover their outlay as quickly and efficiently as possible, and to acquire the greatest possible profit for themselves. Each of them had his own methods of raising revenue from his subjects, and as a result the structure of taxation grew ever more complex. But their extortions were held in check by the power of the leaders of the confederations in the tribal areas; every attempt to extend direct Turkish control beyond the towns met with the solid resistance of the tribes.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the balance of power shifted. The disbanding of the Janissaries and destruction of the Mamluks removed the main obstacle in the way of military reform; the Kurdish principalities in the north of Iraq were destroyed and the semi-autonomous, hereditary governors of Mosul deposed. The creation of a telegraph system and the introduction of steamships on the Tigris and Euphrates had a great effect on the minds of the population; and the opening of the Suez Canal, by bringing the Persian Gulf nearer the Mediterranean, led to a great increase in trade with the outside world. Because of such changes the tribal areas lost much of their seclusion, and for the first time it became possible for the government of Baghdad to think of breaking the tribal power and imposing its own authority. But the Turks had no consistent policy for dealing with this problem. All they did was to divide and rule, setting various tribes within a confederation against one another and creating dissension

within the tribes themselves. Their policy met with only a limited success, and created a wall of hostile and defiant tribesmen to the south of Baghdad.

This was the general situation, but the relations between government and tribes were not uniform; they were influenced by the nature of the country and of the confederation concerned. There are three major areas to be considered: ʿAmara, Hilla and Diwaniyya, and the Muntafik. Conditions of land-tenure differed from one to another of these three, and land was the key factor determining relations between tribes and government. As we shall see, Midhat was the first governor of Baghdad fully to understand this and make it the basis of his policy; the period of his predecessors, from the fall of the Mamluks in 1831 to his own arrival in 1869, illustrates by its anarchy the failure of the Turks properly to appraise the problems of the province of Baghdad.

The chief characteristic of the Hilla-Diwaniyya district was its strong tribal organization. The western half of the district faced the desert and its tribal inhabitants were therefore forced to band together to resist pressure from the fully nomadic desert tribes, the beduin. In the eastern half, richly watered by the Daghghara river, a no-less-powerful cohesion grew up in order to defend its wealth against the government. The leaders of the structure were the Khazaʿil shaykhs, the virtual rulers of the Middle Euphrates. The government made more than one attempt to break their power, and twice in the generation before Midhat's rule the Shiʿi sacred city of Kerbela, lying at the heart of this region, was sacked by Turkish *walis*; but on both occasions the result was to set the Euphrates on fire and bring about the recall of the *wali*.

South of this district, and stretching from Samawa to Fao at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, lay the area of the Muntafik confederation. This vast triangle of land, whose apex was Kut on the Tigris, was best known for the fighting qualities of its inhabitants – marsh-Arabs in the Jazaʾir swamps, nomads along the western bank of the Euphrates, and peasant cultivators in southern Mesopotamia. The unifying force here was the Saʿdun family who, by the ability and force of character of its members over several generations, had formed the tribes into a confederation under its own paramount rule. Its domination was recognized not only by all the tribes but by the Ottoman government, which relied on the Saʿduns in the eighteenth century to defend Basra against the Persians and to patrol the west bank of the Euphrates against Wahhabi incursions from central Arabia. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, Persia had dropped her claim to Basra and the danger from the Wahhabis had receded. The Turks were therefore

able to change their policy towards the confederation, but with unfortunate results. They tried to destroy the unity of the Sa'dun family by promoting the claims of rival contestants to the headship, and at the same time they aimed at destroying the link between the Sa'duns and their dependent tribes by making the former collect the land-tax and act in other ways virtually as officials of the government. Thus the Sa'duns ceased to be regarded by the tribes as their defenders against the Ottoman government, and came to be thought of as oppressors. A further attempt to limit their authority was made in 1861 by the *wali* Namiq Pasha, who divided their territory into administrative units (*qadas*) and appointed members of the family as governors of them (*qa'immaqams*) – in other words, as subordinate officials of the government with strictly defined and limited powers in place of their old virtually unrestrained paramountcy. The current Amir or head of the family, Mansur Pasha, was coerced into accepting this policy and was appointed a *qa'immaqam*, but his brother Nasir rallied the tribes and forced Namiq to abolish the post of *qa'immaqam* and restore the paramountcy (*mashyakha*) of the family. Namiq had to do this, but he retaliated by nominating not Nasir but his cousin and rival, Fahad, to the *mashyakha*.

The third main area, 'Amara, was a long tract of rich land lying along the Tigris bordering Persia and inhabited principally by the two tribes of Beni Lam and Albu Muhammad. Here too Namiq tried to break the power of the shaykhs by destroying the traditional system of land-holding. In place of it he introduced annual auctions of leases, in order to create jealousy and rivalry among the shaykhs and so weaken their unity. But the result was near-anarchy, the tribes refused to pay the new land rents, raids and interference with the river traffic increased. Namiq was forced to send in troops and establish a string of garrison towns along the river, of which 'Amara was the first and became the most important.

(iv)

With the possible exception of the brief rule of Gözlüki Pasha (1852–7), Iraq before the coming of Midhat had scarcely been touched by the reforms which were beginning to have such a profound effect elsewhere in the Empire. The appointment of Midhat made a break with the past in more than one way: unlike his predecessors, he was not required to give a *badal* or advance payment when appointed; what was more important, unlike them he tried during his three years in Iraq to

formulate and carry out a constructive programme, and one which was to have profound effects on the whole social system of the country – but effects different from, and in some ways the very opposite of, what he had himself intended.

Midhat entered Baghdad in April 1869, invested with a two-fold power, both civil and military; in an address delivered to the people soon after his arrival, he made what was perhaps a veiled threat by speaking of the wonders of modern invention, in such a way as to remind them of the new resources at the disposal of a government which wished to impose its will.[4] To his task as embodiment of that will he brought formidable qualifications. Apart from his proved ability as an administrator, he had great force of personality and was fearless of any opposition, whether from Istanbul or from the tribes, and was generally known to be of an integrity which was proof against all corruption. As a reformer he was not doctrinaire. He did not come to his task with pre-conceived notions about what should be done, but – as his correspondence with the central government shows – sought first to acquaint himself with the situation and its needs. He showed great resource in adapting the conditions which he found to serve his ends, and in persuading those he ruled to work for him; but, like so many reformers in a hurry, he tended to be autocratic in his methods. But, if he was the best equipped of those appointed to be *walis* of Baghdad, the task which confronted him was no less formidable. The province was in a state of chaos, the administration corrupt, the government unable to maintain order, the tribes in rebellion, trade at its lowest ebb and roads and communications almost non-existent.

His first step was to introduce the new provincial system laid down in the Law of the Vilayets of 1864. The province was divided into smaller units, *liwas*, *qadas*, and *nahiyas*. At the centre, he himself retained effective power, but he created two councils to help him: an Administrative Council to deal with administrative, judicial and civil affairs, and a General Council to deal with matters of finance. He appointed a number of officials responsible for specific tasks, the most important for our purpose being the *mudir al-daftar al-khaqani* in charge of land-registration; in each of the sub-divisions of the province too there were to be appointed officials and an elected administrative council, with Jewish and Christian as well as Muslim members where necessary. In theory at least it would be possible for local grievances to pass from one level of the administration to the next higher one and eventually to reach the Administrative Council of the province and even the Council of State

[4] F.O. 195/949, no. 7, Baghdad, 26 May, 1869

in Istanbul. Midhat did not stay long enough in Baghdad to make the system operate fully, but he did take a step which was of great importance for the future: he came to an agreement with the Muntafik Amir whereby the Muntafik district was converted into a *liwa* of the province.[5] This brought to an end the long-standing independence of the Sa'dun family: he did indeed appoint the Amir, Nasir Pasha, to be *mutasarrif* of the *liwa*, but his real intention was not simply to bind the family more closely to the government, but, when the time should be ripe, to exclude them from all power.

At the same time as he created this new administrative structure, he tried to introduce conscription. This had existed in the Empire as a whole since the Gülhane decree of 1839, but had not so far been introduced into lower Iraq. Attempts to enforce it had led to violent rebellion and the recall of a previous *wali*; but Midhat believed that it could now be enforced in the city of Baghdad at least, and he hoped to use the new conscript force to impose his power over the tribal areas.[6] But he had calculated wrongly: the public announcement that conscription was to be imposed caused a rising in the city the day before it was to begin. Although by prompt action he was able to quell the riot and restore order, he had unwittingly started a chain of events which was to determine in large measure the course of his future actions.

No sooner had calm returned to Baghdad than the Arab tribes were disturbed by the news that soldiers were to be raised throughout the country. The first rumours of an intended rising began to circulate in the Hilla-Diwaniyya district, which was already near to revolt against the rule of its local governor, Shibli Pasha. Shibli's ruthless measures had succeeded in weakening the power and authority of the Khaza'il shaykhs and in enforcing the payment of taxes to the government, almost for the first time, but he had done nothing to check the corruption of the tax-collectors or to improve the condition of the irrigation canals. The tribes were unable to meet the demands of the government and were deeply in debt to it. So they were already near revolt when Midhat came as *wali*. He took immediate steps to remedy their grievances: he appointed his nephew as *qa'immaqam* of Hilla with instruc-

[5] For the conversion of the Muntafik district into a *liwa*, cf. S. Fa'iq, *Ta'rikh al-Muntafiq* (MS., Iraqi Antiquities Library, Baghdad). The author, a government official, himself played an important part in the process. Cf. also F.O. 195/949, no. 11, Baghdad, 15 September, 1869; O.A. *Dakhiliyya* 452, 22 Jumada Akhir, 1286

[6] For the earlier history of conscription in Iraq, cf. O.A. *Dakhiliyya* 510, no. 39, 8 Rajab, 1286. For the attempt to impose conscription in Baghdad, cf. F.O. 195/949, no. 10, Baghdad, 1 September, 1869; 'Ali Haydar, *Tabsirat*, pp. 68–70; *Zawra*, no. 318.

tions to check corruption, to dredge the canals and reinforce their banks, and to collect the revenue due from the country.[7] As was usual when collecting taxes, the *qaimmaqam* was accompanied by a battalion of soldiers, and this brought local feeling to boiling point. Hearing that the government intended to impose its will by force, disaffected shaykhs of the area assembled their tribesmen at ʿAfaj and there surrounded and destroyed the government troops in what came to be known as "the battle of the murder of the *mutasarrif*". Tribesmen flocked to the rebel forces from almost all parts of the region, and Midhat was faced with the danger that all the reforms he wished to introduce would be impossible. He therefore gathered almost the entire military force available in the province, reinforced by tribesmen who were faithful to the government, and marched against the rebels in their fastness among marshes which, being too shallow for the use of gunboats and river craft, afforded them a strong position. He decided to dam the Daghghara river, and by so doing to drain the marsh and expose the tribesmen to the full power of his army. The tribesmen attacked to prevent this, but were completely defeated and their leaders tracked down.

This battle was of crucial importance. It broke the power of the tribesmen of the Middle Euphrates to such an extent that they were never again able to face the full strength of the army, and it freed Midhat of danger from other tribes. On returning to Baghdad he found the Shammar tribes from the north, led by their great shaykh ʿAbd al-Karim, encamped outside the city, and had things gone differently at Daghghara they would no doubt have been emboldened to plunder Baghdad. As it was, the firmness with which Midhat had put down the revolt and the magnanimity of the peace terms which he offered greatly strengthened his hand in dealing with tribal problems for the rest of his term of office in Baghdad.

His success in imposing the authority of the government now made it possible for him to introduce more sweeping changes in the administration and the system of land-tenure. From his arrival in Baghdad he had been studying conditions in the tribal areas, to discover why payment of taxes was always in arrears and revolts were so frequent, and as a result he had become convinced that the existing practices and methods of land-tenure urgently needed changing. The reports he sent to Istanbul showed indeed that he was almost entirely preoccupied with the agrarian problem. It would be wrong to doubt his genuine interest in the welfare of the tribal peoples, but of course he looked at the situation first of all from the point of view of an Ottoman official,

[7] O.A. *Majlis Khass* 1591, 21 Jumada Awwal, 1286

desiring to consolidate Ottoman rule over the area. He recognized that law and order and the carrying out of schemes for the improvement of agriculture would not only make the local peoples prosper but would also produce greater revenues for the government, and he believed that the way to begin was to apply the new Ottoman land code in Iraq. Under the provisions of the code, it would be possible to allocate *miri* land to the actual cultivators of it, and thus to give them a vested interest in it. This would tie them more closely to the land, make for more effective cultivation, induce the semi-nomadic tribes to settle permanently, and make the population of the tribal area more amenable to government control. He was able to convince Istanbul of the wisdom of his policy and was authorized to proceed with it.[8]

(v)

Before 1869 the possession of tribal land in Iraq had not been based on grants or written documents but had been held by tribes from time immemorial, either through conquest or as a result of their settling and cultivating it when it was still unoccupied. In practice therefore ownership was a corporate affair, resting on the ability of the tribe as a whole to hold and defend its lands. The individual fallah held such land as he cultivated by virtue of his membership of the tribe. The method and conditions of tenure were defined by tribal tradition, which varied from one tribe to another, and disputes were settled by the tribal leaders, also in accordance with custom. This was the situation in fact, but not in the view of the Ottoman government and its courts. In their view, tribal land like other land fell within the categories of Islamic legal theory: at the time of the Islamic conquest they had mostly been regarded as privately owned or *mulk* (whether tribute-paying – *kharajiyya* – or tithe-paying – *'ushriyya*), but for one reason or another had nearly all passed into the category of *miri* or state-owned land. But the government, although claiming ownership, was not able to make its claim effective. It could, in favourable circumstances, hope to obtain its legal share in rent or tax (*miri*), but it was not able to determine the choice of tenants, to control the regime of cultivation, or to weaken the domination of tribal custom. In its directives to the governors of the province of Baghdad and in the regulations it formulated for governing the area, the government gave tacit acknowledgment to the realities of tribal custom and practice, but at no time were these customs codified

[8] O.A. *Dakhiliyya* 318, no. 11, 9 Rabi' II, 1286; *Majlis Khass* 1531, 14 Safar, 1286

into written law or explicitly recognized as the law of the land; it was as if the government were jealously preserving the prerogatives of ownership until such time as it might be able to make its claim effective.

Even the government's right to a share of the produce, as rent or tax, was not enjoyed by the government directly. The practice of farming out the right to collect the taxes had resulted in the creation of a privileged group who could enjoy considerable wealth while the actual cultivators of the land were impoverished. One of the advantages Midhat hoped for from his policy of allocating the land directly to the peasants was that the government would thereby come to deal with them directly and would become independent of the class of wealthy intermediaries on whom it had relied. Moreover, the change in the system of land-tenure would make it possible to alter the assessment of taxation. Previously, the government had claimed a share of the produce equivalent to that which it had claimed in earlier times when the land was *mulk*. This was unreasonable, and was not applied uniformly, so that some lands paid as little as one-tenth whereas others paid one-half or more. Midhat proposed to assess the government's share anew on the basis of the means by which the land was watered: lands watered by rivers and canals would pay one-fifth of their produce, while those watered by waterwheels or natural rainfall would be required to pay one-tenth.[9] In Basra, where the whole pattern of agriculture was different because of the predominance of date groves, and where methods of tax assessment had therefore been different, he suggested another system, a revival of the *jarib* system which had been in use in earlier times:[10] the groves should be classified into three categories according to their estimated productivity, and should then be assessed in *jaribs*, a unit of land measurement of little less than an acre. The government's share of the produce would be based on the classification of the grove concerned and the number of *jaribs* it contained.[11]

Midhat's policy thus involved both a more equitable method of taxation and a change in the conditions of tenancy. He began with the first: almost immediately after the suppression of the Daghghara rising he reduced the government's share to one-half what it had been, and made promises of a further reduction if the people would fulfil certain conditions. If they would refrain from further uprisings, pay all revenues without disturbance, forsake their nomadic life, build houses in which to live and settle on plots of land, he would reduce the *miri* share to one-third of the yield; and if those who had built houses and

[9] O.A. *Dakhiliyya* 318, no. 11 [10] *Zawra*, no. 175
[11] O.A. *Maliyya* 55, 14 Muharram, 1325

cultivated the land were prepared to take tenancies on their land under the new Land Code, he would reduce the *miri* share on such lands to one-fifth of the yield. This policy had an immediate effect: tribesmen began to plant trees, cultivate lands and construct villages, and the yield of their lands began to show a marked increase. The peaceful behaviour of the tribesmen astonished those who had known their former state; and after two more years, during which progress was maintained and Midhat made further concessions, he decided the time had come for the government to fulfil its side of the bargain, and to grant tenancies to the farmers.[12]

Under the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, it will be recalled, title deeds (*tapu sanads*) would be granted to those acquiring possession of lands in return for a fee (*mu'ajjala*) to be paid in advance. The Code defined the rights of the *tapu* holder and the conditions under which they could devolve by inheritance or sale, and provided for proper registration of land holdings. So far, it protected the rights of the tenant or cultivator, but it also protected those of the government; for the *tapu* holder (*mallak*) acquired legal possession of the land only, while the final ownership or servitude (*raqaba*) remained vested in the government. Moreover, the right of possessors to plant trees or erect permanent buildings was limited, since in these ways they might acquire a more definite stake in the land. The Law stipulated further that the tenure of *miri* lands was conditional on their cultivation, and that should they be left uncultivated for three or more years all claim to them would be lost.

The Land Code had established an office of land registration for the issue of *tapu sanads*, with an elaborate organization, and had set out in detail the way in which it should function. Midhat secured the appointment of a Land Commission to sit in Iraq for this purpose, and with some modification of the general provisions for the Empire as a whole. For example, he obtained permission from Istanbul to disregard the clause in the Code which prohibited the construction of buildings on *miri* land, since his purpose was to induce the semi-nomadic cultivators to settle, and this involved their building houses to live in. Unfortunately however he had neither the trained staff nor the funds which would have been necessary to make a satisfactory survey and administer the law properly.

He decided to begin his policy of granting tenancies in the Hindiyya district, and in the region of Hilla-Diwaniyya in general. The procedure followed, so far as it can be traced from reports sent to Istanbul

[12] *Zawra*, nos. 191, 241, 338

and from articles in the official newspaper, *al-Zawra*, was for a committee of the Land Commission to be sent through the area concerned to act as a mobile land office; with its headquarters at Hilla, it went round from village to village, making cursory surveys of the neighbourhood and issuing *tapu sanads* on the spot without requiring payment of the *muʿajjala*. When the benefits the people of Hindiyya were receiving became known, a delegation was sent from Samawa to request that they should be extended to them as well, and Samawa then became the next district in which *miri* land was alienated, but here a small *muʿajjala* was required.

Most writers on the subject have asserted that Midhat's policy in the Muntafik district was different from this: that while in other districts he caused *miri* land to be granted to the cultivators, in Muntafik he was responsible for large tracts being granted to the Saʿdun family, in order to break their moral link with their tribal followers and in the belief that Turkish interests would best be served by creating a class of large landowners.[13] But the evidence to be found in official documents of the time proves that this was not so: that his policy in Muntafik reflected the same general ideas as motivated his policy in Hilla-Diwaniyya. Here as there, he tried to use the grant of *tapu sanads* to accomplish other desired ends. He approached the paramount ruler of the Muntafik, Nasir Pasha, with the offer that, if the tribesmen would supply the labour force and part of the capital for the construction of a levée (*bund*) across the Jaza'ir marshes in order to restrain the flow of the river to its channel, the hundreds of fertile acres that would thereby be reclaimed should be given gratuitously by *tapu* to the tribes assisting in the project. Midhat did not remain long enough in Iraq for this project to be completed during his administration, but there is evidence that some *tapu* grants were made in Muntafik during his time.[14]

In another district, that of Basra, a difficult problem was posed by the great capital outlay needed to transform undeveloped land into date groves. Here Midhat offered very liberal terms in order to encourage alienation. Persons taking *tapu sanads* (carrying with them the undertaking to cultivate the land) were to pay only a small sum to the

[13] E.g. A. W. Basha ʿyan, *Zubdat al-tawarikh fi Ahwal Ahl Alʿ Basra* (MS., Basha ʿyan Library, Basra), vol. xv, pp. 177 ff.; I.A. 30/23; *ibid.*, 33/M/7, reg. no. 7, ref. no. 16460, 9 November, 1927; *ibid.*, 33/J/3, ref. no. 16824, 31 July, 1943; *ibid.*, 34/13, reg. no. 9, ref. no. 8167, 14 July, 1925; *Administrative Report on the Muntafiq, 1919*, p. 1

[14] *Zawra*, no. 486; O.A. *Majlis Khass* 2032, 20 December, 1289; *Dakhiliyya* 794, 11 Shawwal, 1290

government during the first ten years, after which they would be charged at the normal rate, according to which of the three categories their land was assigned to.[15] In the district of ʿAmara Midhat did not attempt to change the existing order of things, since he was too busy with the problems of the other districts.

A further reform relating to land, and one which was to have lasting consequences, concerned *ʿuqr* lands. These were lands which had originally been *mulk*, but which owners had not been able to keep in cultivation, for one reason or another, and on which they had not been able to pay the required tax (*kharaj*). In order to encourage the cultivation of such lands, the government had, before the period with which we are dealing, worked out a system whereby it would itself take over the ownership of these lands and give possession of them to others able to bring them into cultivation; but the former owners, in return for relinquishing their rights, were granted a certain share of the produce. When both government and former owners had taken their share, however, little was left to the actual possessors, and this system had therefore led to difficulties. On Midhat's recommendation, the central government appointed a commission to deal with the problem, and finally issued a decree (*farman*) in 1871 on the basis of the commission's findings, to govern the ownership and administration of *ʿuqr* lands.[16]

(vi)

Midhat had other plans as well for economic and social reform. He was particularly concerned with improvements in transport. He established the River Administrative Company which took over the three river steamers already acquired in the time of Namiq Pasha and added to them a number of others: river traffic was extended on the Euphrates, and protected by forts at strategic points on the river and by police boats. At the port of Basra, facilities for ships were improved by the construction of a basin and dockyard, and regular services between Iraq and European ports by way of the newly opened Suez Canal were started. Plans for industrial development were not so successful: a modern water plant was installed for Baghdad and machinery was bought for textile and flour mills, but these projects were not completed during his time. A refinery was planned for the oil of the Khanaqin district, but this too came to nothing. His educational and social re-

[15] O.A. *Maliyya* 55, Basha ʿyan, *Zubdat*, vol. xii, pp. 192 ff.

[16] O.A. *Dakhiliyya* 318; *Majlis Khass* 1531; L.A. 33/5, reg. no. 44; Nasir, *Ahkam al-aradi*, pp. 28 ff.

forms were more effective: a hospital was opened, several elementary, two secondary, and two technical schools were established, and a government printing press was founded, which brought out the first newspaper to appear in Iraq, the official *Zawra*.

It is ironical that, while Midhat was attempting with vigour and not without success to improve the economy of Iraq, his enemies in Istanbul were accusing him of wasting the resources of the province. While ʿAli Pasha was Grand Vezir such accusations were ignored, but when he died and was succeeded by Mahmud Nadim Pasha they began to be taken seriously. Although, as a result of Midhat's vigorous policy, Istanbul received a larger revenue from Baghdad than ever before, the new Grand Vezir cut the allocation for agricultural development in the province, and suggested that the amount deducted should be made up by cutting the salaries of government officials and army officers. Realizing that this measure would ruin his administrative reforms, Midhat urged Istanbul to reconsider it, but to no avail; he then tendered his resignation which was accepted.[17]

Midhat had no further connection with Iraq, and his later career is part of the history of the Ottoman Empire. In 1872 he became Grand Vezir for a short period; four years later he was one of the group of reforming officials who set on foot a movement against the conservative ministers of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz. The Sultan dismissed the ministers and appointed a new government of which Midhat was a member. He took a leading part in the deposition by that government first of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz and then of his successor, Murad, who proved to be mentally unbalanced. In December 1876 the successor of Murad, ʿAbd al-Hamid II, made Midhat Grand Vezir, and promulgated a constitution drawn up by him and his associates. But the new Sultan's sympathy with liberalism was only a show put on to disarm pressure from the reformers and the European Powers. He soon felt strong enough to dismiss and exile Midhat in 1877, and next year to dissolve the Parliament elected under the terms of the constitution. In 1881 Midhat, who had returned to Turkey, was arrested, falsely accused of having murdered ʿAbd al-ʿAziz (who in fact had committed suicide), tried and sentenced to death. Under pressure from Europe the sentence was commuted, and Midhat was banished to the Hejaz, where he was killed by order of the Sultan in 1883.

In some respects, his tenure of office in Baghdad was no more than a brief interlude in Turkish rule there, and government policy returned to

[17] F.O. 195/949, no. 57, Baghdad, 27 November, 1871; *Zawra*, nos. 227, 228, 241; ʿAli Haydar, *Tabsirat*, pp. 126 ff.

what it had been before he came. Many of the gains won during his three years of rule were quickly dissipated. Without his driving force, the industrial projects and schemes for the improvement of agriculture fell by the wayside. The sea-going services were discontinued and the ships sold; the river service on the upper Euphrates was not properly maintained and in time it too was discontinued. But two of his innovations had lasting results. His new system of local administration remained; it did not work effectively during the next forty years or so of Ottoman rule, but it has remained substantially the same ever since, under British rule and then in the independent State of Iraq. The introduction of the Ottoman Land Code also had permanent consequences for the tribal society of the countryside. Unfortunately those consequences were disastrous, and have deeply affected the subsequent history of Iraq.

(vii)

The Ottoman Land Code was the only legal basis on which Midhat could rest in trying to reform the system of land-tenure; but, apart from its own inherent anomalies and contradictions, it did not fit the conditions existing in lower Iraq, having been framed in order to meet conditions in Anatolia and elsewhere. The Code took no cognizance of practices actually obtaining in the Iraqi countryside and of the rights and privileges which the tribal cultivators had enjoyed since before the Ottoman conquest – rights and privileges in which the Turks had acquiesced even though they had never formally acknowledged them, in order to retain the rather tenuous rights which they claimed for themselves. Tribal customs and traditions were thus at variance with enacted law; and the successful application of the law would have required an almost complete revolution in tribal practice – something which the Turks were powerless to effect.[18]

Thus the Land Code was in itself defective, but in addition to this, the minimal requirements for just and effective application of it were never met. This is clearly revealed by the documents in the Ottoman archives relating to the work of the Iraqi Land Commission between the time of Midhat's departure and its discontinuance in 1297 (1880). At no time was provision made for an adequate or technically competent staff to administer the law: the records show wide fluctuations in

[18] Cf. note by Sir Henry Dobbs commenting on Mr Longrigg's note on revenue policy, in I.A. 34/13, reg. no. 29, ref. no. 8330, 17 July, 1926.

the salaries, numbers and distribution of officials, conditions not conducive to security of employment and continuity of administration. Apart from being underpaid, *tapu* officials were lacking in administrative experience, were responsible for administering vast areas about which they had little knowledge, and were frequently changed. Moreover, proper surveys of the land were not made, nor was a reliable land register kept. It is not surprising therefore that bribes were often taken and faulty *sanads* issued.

Sanads were sometimes issued for lands which overlapped, sometimes duplicated in respect of identical properties, and sometimes issued for great areas of land for which the government had neither the right nor the intention to grant tenancies. This resulted in considerable loss of revenue, and was contrary to the government's policy, laid down both in the law and in directives to *tapu* officials, that lands should be allocated to the actual cultivators. The giving and receiving of *sanads* were in any case alien to the tribesmen; they were not interested in the purchase of rights they already possessed and fully expected to continue to enjoy. They were naturally suspicious that, by accepting titles to lands and by settling on them, they would find themselves subject to conscription and no longer able to evade taxation. Their reluctance to obtain *sanads* left the way open for city merchants and others, who could understand the advantages conferred by possession of slips of paper, and who had sufficient funds to acquire them; they tended therefore to buy up the *tapu* rights to vast tracts of land cultivated since time immemorial by the tribes. This development was quite contrary to Midhat's original intent and purpose.[19]

In 1296 (1879) the Ministry of Finance issued a manual of instruction for the guidance of the Iraqi Land Commission about the procedure to be followed in the grant of *miri* land. It was intended to check abuses and corruption in the application of the law, but its conservative nature represented a retreat from the liberal policies of Midhat.[20] It proved inadequate, and the Land Commission showed itself ineffective; accordingly in 1298 (1881) the government issued revised and greatly extended regulations.[21] Since these new regulations terminated the

[19] O.A. *Shura-i Dawla*, 1472, 29 Rabi' I, 1293, 20 Rabi' II, 1293, 18 Dhu' l-Hijja, 1292; *ibid.*, 1673, under year 1294; *Yildiz Rasmi* 1069, 28 Ramadan, 1298, 21 Jumada II, 1298; *ibid.*, 101, 2 Safar, 1299; *ibid.*, 373, 17 Jumada I, 1300; *Majlis Khass* 2188, letter from Nasir Pasha dated 26 Sha'ban, 1291; *ibid.*, 2387, Dhu' l-Hijja, 1292, document dated 27 Muharram, 1293; *Dakhiliyya* 221, 7 Rajab, 1302; *ibid.*, 614, 20 Jumada II, 1304

[20] O.A. *Yildiz Rasmi* 1069

[21] *Ibid.*, 1069; *ibid.*, 373

power of the Land Commission to grant lands without authorization from Istanbul, it has been wrongly assumed that there was an Imperial *irada* (decree) prohibiting the continued grant of land in Iraq.[22] What happened in fact was that the new regulations laid it down that no land could be granted without an *irada* specifically authorizing it.[23] This meant almost interminable delays and complications in the legal proceedings involved in obtaining *tapu* rights, and therefore the practice stopped almost entirely. Nevertheless, there is indisputable proof in the Ottoman archives that some lands were granted in Iraq until at least 1309 (1891–2) or even later.[24]

In regard to *'uqr* lands, although the Commission appointed by Midhat never completed its work, his *farman* remained the regulation governing the administration of such lands. In practice it made matters more complicated and worked to the disadvantage of all concerned. The fallah was required to pay from the produce of his labours the shares of the government, of the original owners and of the actual tenants. The holder of *'uqr* who had enough capital for the development of the land was prevented from using it. Because of the added burden it imposed, this measure, which had been designed to keep land under cultivation, in fact had the opposite effect, with consequent losses in revenue to the government.[25] Nothing more was done about this thorny problem until 1932, when the government of Iraq enacted a law which aimed at the gradual liquidation of *'uqr*;[26] by law no. 60 of February 1960 the revolutionary government completed what the previous government had begun and abolished *'uqr* completely.[27]

(viii)

To understand the full effect on the tribes of Midhat's land policy, as applied by his successors, we must examine the subsequent history of each of the major divisions of lower Iraq in turn, for conditions varied

[22] E.g. E. Dowson, *Enquiry into Land Tenure* (Letchworth, 1931), p. 21; Nasir, *Ahkam al-aradi*, p. 261 n.

[23] O.A. *Yildiz Rasmi* 1069; *ibid.*, 373; *ibid.*, 614, 20 Jumada II, 1304

[24] O.A. *Yildiz Rasmi* 812, 7 Rajab, 1298; *ibid.*, 606, 21 Jumada I, 1298; *ibid.*, 407, 27 Jumada I, 1300; *Dakhiliyya* 726, 30 Rabi' I, 1312; I.A. 33/N/4, reg. no. 24. Cf. also A. Musil, *The Middle Euphrates* (New York, 1927), p. 100.

[25] Nasir, *Ahkam al-aradi*, p. 37; S. Haider, *Land Problems of Iraq* (Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1942, unpublished), p. 191; I.A. 33/7

[26] *al-Waqa' i' al-'iraqiyya*, no. 1142, 14 June, 1932

[27] *Sawt al-ahrar*, no. 356, 18 February, 1960

in each district, and the Turkish reaction to them varied too. ('Amara will not be included in this study. Although many important changes took place there between the departure of Midhat and the end of Ottoman rule, the most notable being the conversion of the greater part of these rich lands into crown lands, in order to swell the private fortunes of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid,[28] nevertheless Midhat cannot be held responsible for these changes, as in this region he made no attempt to introduce anything new.)

In Hilla-Diwaniyya the most important development was the continued decline of the Hilla branch of the Euphrates with its canal system, and the increased flow in the Hindiyya branch. The damming of the Daghghara by Midhat, in his military campaign against the tribes, greatly accelerated this process, and nothing was done to correct it.[29] Moreover, in order to facilitate his ambitious schemes of irrigation, Midhat had constructed a canal (the Kan'aniyya) connecting the Tigris and Euphrates at the level of Baghdad, and this, being neither properly engineered nor maintained, diverted a considerable amount of the Euphrates water into the Tigris; as a consequence, large pestilential marshes were created on the Tigris below Baghdad, while great tracts of productive land on the lower Euphrates went out of cultivation for lack of water.[30] Owing to these unsettled conditions the tribes of the Middle Euphrates were on the move throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century: whole tribes abandoned their lands and moved to new land where water was available.[31] This led to violent conflict between the tribes, and, far from seeking a peaceful solution of this serious problem, the Turkish administration exploited it for their own ends.[32]

[28] O.A. *Yildiz Khususi* 530, 9 Jumada I, 1294, for list of Sanniya lands acquired in 1294; *Dakhiliyya*, 86, 22 Rajab, 1304; *ibid.*, 155, 6 Sha'ban, 1305; *ibid.*, 725, 1 Rabi', 1312; *ibid.*, 1706, 11 Rajab, 1325; I.A. 30/E/19, reg. no. 34, ref. no. 18058, 13 May, 1944

[29] The only mention of any repair by Midhat to the water-system in the area is in O.A. *Majlis Khass* 1591, but it would appear that the project was abandoned after the troubles at Daghghara.

[30] For a comment on the Kan 'aniyya canal, cf. F.O. 195/1243, report on the trade of Baghdad for 1878/79.

[31] I.A. 30/N/4, part II, reg. no. 16, 30 May, 1945; *ibid.*, reg. no. 86, ref. no. 9294, 13 March, 1937; *ibid.*, reg. no. 127, 21 February, 1951; *ibid.*, reg. no. 128, 22 February, 1951; *ibid.*, reg. no. 182, 1 March, 1953; *Reports of Administration of Divisions and Districts, 1918* (Calcutta, n.d.), vol. i, pp. 55–6, 200 ff.

[32] O.A. *Dakhiliyya*, 758, 26 Jumada I, 1308; *ibid.*, 231, 5 Safar, 1312; *Yildiz Rasmi* 3048, 23 Dhu' l-Hijja, 1308

To accomplish its ends the government made use of the *tapu* machinery in the new circumstances created by the movement and conflict of tribes. In so doing, it set out deliberately to undo Midhat's work. His successor, Ra'uf Pasha, began this by withdrawing the *tapu sanads* granted on the rice lands of Hindiyya.[33] Shibli Pasha, during his second term of office as *mutasarrif* of Hilla, carried the process further by taking lands forcibly and arbitrarily from some tribes and giving them to others. For example, when the Daghghara tribe, whose lands had suffered terribly from the diversion of the Euphrates waters, were unable to pay their taxes, not only were they punished and the revenues taken by force, but also the *tapu sanads* granted them in the time of Midhat were declared invalid and the land offered for sale on much stiffer terms.[34] Shibli's policy, which was followed by his successors, was to ally himself with certain tribes against others in order to exact taxes, confiscating the lands of those who resisted him and granting them as a reward to those who helped him.

This policy paid little heed to the long-term consequences, both for the tribesmen and for the government. It lit a fire which enveloped the whole area and which the Turks were powerless to extinguish. The tribes began a long series of bloody wars which had their roots in the land problem. Each time land was taken from one of the tribes and given to another there followed a period of war and recrimination between the tribes concerned, the ejected tribe trying desperately to retake its former land and the new possessors seeking no less tenaciously to retain their hold over it. From the available information it appears that the fighting was almost continuous and general throughout the area. It was not even confined to conflicts between different tribal groups but broke out also inside them, notably among the Daghghara tribes.[35] The Turks were quite unable to cope with these tribal wars, and the general situation deteriorated until law and order ceased to exist, except perhaps in the immediate neighbourhood of the town of Diwaniyya. On one occasion, when tribal fighting broke out near Abu Sukhair in 1910, the government itself had to be moved away so that the officials would be safe from it all.[36]

The confusion created by tribal movements and wars makes it impossible to give a precise picture of the changing modes of land-tenure in this region, nor are there adequate records for a continuous and

[33] O.A. *Dakhiliyya* 614, 20 Jumada I, 1304 [34] *Zaura*, no. 536

[35] *Zaura*, nos. 1030, 1051; W. al-'Atiyya, *al-Diwaniyya* (Najaf, 1954), p. 88; I.A. 33/M/21, reg. no. 3, ref. no. 350, 13 January, 1934

[36] 'Atiyya, *al-Diwaniyya*, p. 89

complete account. But such records as exist reveal confusion and almost every form of abuse. There is evidence that the arbitrary disposition of lands resulted in a decline both in the number of cultivators and in the yield of the land. The practice, which Midhat had abolished, whereby tax-farmers were expected to pay the salaries of officials, was resumed and lent itself to many abuses. It goes without saying that corruption became pervasive. Istanbul became alarmed at all this and sent missions of investigation, but neither the will nor the means to cure the state of affairs was present. Unable to control or police the area, the government concentrated its efforts on extorting whatever it could obtain as its *miri* share.[37]

By 1914, the *tapu* rights granted in the time of Midhat had practically disappeared in this area. Some grants, as we have seen in the case of Hindiyya, were simply confiscated; others were absorbed into the crown domains carved out during this period; where *tapu* still existed, the holders of it were no longer, as Midhat had intended, the actual holders of the soil, but mostly city merchants and government officials and *sanads* were acquired by bribes, and readily mortgaged or sold.[38] But the tribesmen, the actual possessors of the land thus granted away, did not regard the grant of a *sanad* as conferring rights on the owner or depriving them of theirs; in the anarchic conditions prevailing in the Hilla-Diwaniyya district, the holders of *sanads* had the greatest difficulty therefore in collecting their share, and were almost entirely dependent on the government or the use of force to obtain what they could from the tribesmen.

The net result of these unsettled conditions was the break-up of the tribal confederations of the Middle Euphrates; there was, it is true, some tendency for new ones to be formed, but the actions of the government stunted their growth.[39] Nevertheless, among the individual tribes, tribal organization stayed firm, and the power of the shaykhs of tribes appears to have grown stronger as the influence of the paramount shaykhs of confederations declined. Even though this influence had been loose and crude, the Turks were quite unable to find anything to take its place, and in these conditions it was only by means of their collective strength as members of a tribe that the cultivators

[37] *Zawra*, no. 1012; O.A. *Yildiz Rasmi* 42, 25 Muharram, 1304; *Dakhiliyya* 1371, 23 Muharram, 1306; *ibid.*, 2051, 12 Sha'ban, 1323; *ibid.*, 395, 30 Safar, 1316; 'Atiyya, *al-Diwaniyya*, p. 92

[38] *Reports of Administration . . ., 1918*, vol. i, p. 121

[39] Arab Bureau, *Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayet, July 1918* (Calcutta, 1919), p. 84

were able to protect themselves against government officials and *tapu* holders alike. In consequence, both cultivator and government came more and more to be dependent on the good offices of the tribal shaykhs as the wielders of the only effective authority which remained: the tribesmen grew more than ever conscious of the tribe as a unity, and of their lands as a tribal home or *dira*, held collectively by the whole tribe.[40]

(ix)

In the Muntafik region, Ottoman rule after the departure of Midhat falls into two sharply defined periods, divided by an important event in 1881. The earlier period was characterized by the grant of *miri* land, the continued domination of the Sa'dun family, and the efforts of the government to undermine and supplant their authority.[41] The later period saw the formation and development of new practices of land-tenure, and the rapid rise in the importance and power of a new class, the *sarkals*.

In the first period, Midhat's plan to reclaim the rich marshlands of Jaza'ir by the building of embankments was completed with tribal labour and the wealth of the Sa'duns. The government however failed to make good Midhat's promise that land so reclaimed would be allocated gratuitously. In consequence, the embankments were not properly maintained and were soon breached, so that nothing was gained by all the effort.[42] Nevertheless, the grant of tenancies on Muntafik land remained part of the government's policy, perhaps because it offered a new source of revenue for the Treasury: for whereas Midhat had offered *tapu sanads* to the cultivators on favourable terms, the government later directed that *tapu* rights should be sold by auction. The Turks were unable to carry out this policy on their own authority, and were therefore forced to rely on the power of the Sa'duns: they appointed Nasir Pasha to be governor of Basra (turned into a separate

[40] *Reports of Administration . . . , 1918*, vol. i, p. 121

[41] O.A. *Majlis Khass* 2812; *ibid.*, 2897, 9 Jumada I, 1296; *ibid.*, 3118, 13 Jumada I, 1297; *Yildiz Rasmi* 348, 13 Jumada II, 1297; *ibid.*, 127, 13 Safar, 1300; *Yildiz Khususi* 1070, 20 Shawwal, 1298; *ibid.*, 236, 3 Ramadan, 1298; F.O. 78/2846, no. 95, Basra, 15 October, 1878; F.O. 195/1244, no. 259, Basra, 8 September, 1879

[42] *Zawra*, no. 151, 21 Rabi' I, 1288; no. 375, 25 Jumada II, 1290; no. 388, 15 Sha'ban, 1290; no. 483, 28 September, 1290; no. 486, 5 October, 1290; no. 542, 12 Jumada I, 1292; O.A. *Majlis Khass* 2188; *ibid.*, 2032; *Dakhiliyya* 741, 9 Ramadan, 1290; *ibid.*, 794; F.O. 195/949, no. 7, Baghdad, 7 May, 1869

wilaya for this purpose) specifically to carry out this policy.[43] A man of rare ability and foresight, Nasir Pasha accepted the office because he realized that the balance of power was shifting in favour of the Ottoman government, on account of the increased strength of the Army and the advantages conferred by modern inventions. He therefore sought to conserve and consolidate the authority of the Sa'duns by adapting it to the exigencies of the new age. Realizing that those who held the land controlled the destiny of the peoples of Muntafik, he saw in the *tapu* system a means to this end.[44] All the evidence of the Turkish documents is that the greater part of the grant of Muntafik lands took place during the time he was governor of Basra, not (as modern authorities have surmised) in the time of Midhat.[45] But it would be wrong to say that he deliberately set out to steal valuable rights or to exploit the cultivators; from his point of view, his policy was one of preserving the ancient position of the Muntafik confederation under their traditional leaders. There is evidence that he sought a wider distribution of *tapu* ownership, among others besides the Sa'duns, but the resistance to settlement and to the taking of *tapu sanads* was such that he had to resort to force to oblige even members of his family to take them.[46]

As *wali* of Basra, this remarkable man brought a peace and order which was perhaps never equalled at any time during Ottoman rule. But his success was a cause of fear to the authorities in Istanbul. They summoned him to the capital for consultations, and, by promoting him to membership of the Council of State where they knew he would be powerless to effect anything, they terminated his hold over Muntafik. The peace and order of the region quickly dissolved, and the determination of the Turks to eliminate the authority of the Sa'duns became so obvious that in 1881 the family rallied the tribes of the confederation and came out in open rebellion against Ottoman rule.[47]

[43] O.A. *Dakhiliyya* 219, 21 Jumada II, 1292; *ibid.*, 228, 25 Jumada II, 1292; *Zawra*, no. 558; F.O. 78/2518, no. 9, Baghdad, 20 March, 1876

[44] Y. Sarkis, *Mabahith 'iraqiyya* (Baghdad, 1948), pp. 79 ff. For another view, cf. S. H. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (Oxford, 1925), p. 308

[45] O.A. *Majlis Khass* 2812, September 1294; *Yildiz Rasmi* 470, 29 Jumada I, 1296; *Yildiz Khususi* 1013, 7 Dhu' l-Qa'da, 1297; F.O. 78/3015, no. 6, Baghdad, 25 January, 1879; I.A. 33/M/7, reg. no. 7, ref. no. 16460, 9 November, 1927; *ibid.*, 33/J/3, ref. no. 16824, 31 July, 1943; *ibid.*, 34/13, reg. no. 9, ref. no. 8167, 14 July, 1926

[46] I.A. 33/J/3, ref. 16824

[47] O.A. *Yildiz Rasmi* 948, 14 Sha'ban, 1298; *ibid.*, 1053, 22 Ramadan, 1299; *ibid.*, 1042, 18 Ramadan, 1298; *ibid.*, 1044, 19 Ramadan, 1298; *Zawra*, nos. 987–990

The massed forces of the Muntafik tribes and the Ottoman army clashed in the battle of Ra'is in that year. The outcome of the battle was by no means a foregone conclusion. The first waves of the tribal onslaught nearly overpowered the army, but the advantage of fighting with artillery from a prepared position, and the skill of the Turkish commander, secured victory for the Turks in the end. The decisive defeat of the Sa'duns ended their long domination of the Muntafik. They were banished from the area and it was several years before they were allowed to return. In the last years of their rule they had become oppressive, and after their return the tribes were no longer willing to accept their leadership. Sa'dun authority had gone; but the Turks were unable to replace it by their own, and the situation in Muntafik deteriorated until it was as anarchic as that in Hilla-Diwaniyya.[48]

These developments produced what amounted to a social and economic revolution during the period from between 1881 and 1914. The Sa'dun family continued to hold the *tapu sanads* on vast tracts of Muntafik land, but, because of the bad state of public security and the hostile attitude of the tribesmen toward them, they no longer had the effective means to enforce their claims as *mallaks*. They were thus reduced from the status of accepted and responsible tribal leaders to that of mere landlords. Since they were accustomed to think of themselves as possessing a divine right to the allegiance of the tribes, they resented their humiliation and the insubordination of the cultivators, and developed into typical absentee landowners. Moreover, their long period of banishment and their altered circumstances led many of them to sell their *tapu* rights to city merchants who, if anything, were more ruthless in the methods they used to obtain a return on their investment.[49] In order to obtain their share as *mallaks* (*mallakiyya*), they took to engaging intermediaries similar to the tax-farmers whom the Ottoman government had employed. The intermediaries whom they used were not the tribal chiefs, since it was not in the interest of the Sa'duns to rely on them too much and so build up their power; they were the class known as *sarkals*, or chiefs of sections of tribes. These had originated as spokesmen or representatives from among the fallahs, and, although their office became semi-hereditary in the same way as that of

[48] So bad did the position become that at one point in 1907 the government seriously considered reviving the Sa'dun Amirate: cf. O.A. *Dakhiliyya* 245, 10 Safar, 1325; *Report on the Muntafiq, 1917*, pp. 14 ff.

[49] This process has continued down to recent times: for the indebtedness of peasants to town merchants, cf. I.A. 33/8, reg. no. 42, ref. no. 1273, 6 October, 1928; *ibid.*, 34/N, reg. no. 63

the tribal shaykhs, their status was lower and their functions, which consisted largely of supervising cultivation, were economic rather than political. Their importance had increased when in the mid-nineteenth century the Sa'duns had accepted the tax-farm for the Muntafik area, but whereas at that time they had been the last link in the chain of extraction, after 1881 they became increasingly the only agents available to *tapu* holder and government alike. If anything their rise to power made life more difficult for the fallahs, since they were more efficient in extracting the *mallakiyya* and *miri* shares. But they also created grave difficulties for government and landlords on account of their greed and numbers. As they increased in power, the influence of the tribal shaykhs diminished until, in some instances, shaykhs ceased to exercise any real authority and were reduced to poverty. The rise of the *sarkals* therefore hastened the process of disintegration and detribalization.[50]

(x)

Concerning Basra little need be said. At first the *jarib* system introduced by Midhat proved easy to administer and profitable to the Treasury, since, under its liberal terms, cultivation was rapidly extended.[51] Midhat's system remained substantially unaltered until the time of the British occupation, but, because of neglect by later governors, it proved in the end to be disadvantageous to the government and to many of the cultivators. Neither the fixed rate of taxation nor the classification of land was ever revised. Where productivity had increased the date groves were undertaxed, while those where, for one reason or another, the yield had declined, were taxed too heavily, and as a result the area under cultivation decreased. Moreover, the *tapu* system in this district proved open to the same abuses as appeared in other regions.[52]

In all districts then the Ottoman Land Code as introduced by Midhat led to changes, some of them unforeseen and most of them harmful; but one change intended by Midhat did not come about. The clear intention of Midhat and the Ottoman government was to replace

[50] For information about *sarkals*, see I.A. 33/J/6, reg. no. 7, ref. no. 9554, 30 June, 1927 ("Note on the System of Tribal Occupancy Right", by J. B. Glubb); *ibid.*, 33/J/23, reg. no. 189, ref. no. S/322, 17 February, 1936, and reg. no. 245, ref. no. 23334, 25–8 February, 1940

[51] O.A. *Maliyya* 55; 'Ali Haidar, *Tabsirat*, p. 100

[52] *Reports of Administration . . . , 1918*, vol. i, p. 241

tribal laws and customs in regard to the use of land by others believed to be more conducive to agricultural development. In fact, however, occupancy rights and other rights connected with the land continued to be dictated by tribal custom. Whatever happened in other parts of the Empire, in lower Iraq the Land Code neither supplanted tribal custom nor became the effective law of the land. If it had recognized and stabilized existing customary rights, it might gradually have succeeded in changing them, but in fact it did the opposite of this. There was no inducement for tribesmen to acquire by purchase rights which, in their own view, they had always possessed and exercised freely; thus *tapu sanads* were bought not, as Midhat had intended, by tribesmen, but by such families as the Sa'duns or the inhabitants of the cities. There was created a new class of landowners, claiming rights which the tribes regarded as theirs, and having little or no previous connection either with the land they claimed or with its cultivators.[53] But neither they nor the government could enforce their rights through the machinery of Ottoman administration and judiciary,[54] and if they were to make good their claim they had to turn to tribal authorities like the *sarkals*, having an authority completely alien to the Land Code. The enforcement of land law therefore became dependent on the tribal customs which it had been intended to replace. The sub-structure of tribal land practices without legal sanction had to bear an elaborate and economically superfluous superstructure of absentee landlordism which enjoyed the sanction of the law but whose claims the fallahs did not recognize and would not concede except under pressure. The result was confusion, the imposition of yet heavier burdens on the fallahs, and the creation of one of the most complicated systems of land-tenure to be found in the Middle East.

(xi)

Our study must end with the end of Ottoman rule in lower Iraq. No thorough study has yet been made of the problems of land and the tribes since 1914, and a final judgment cannot yet be passed on the policy followed during the British occupation and afterwards. But two suggestions may be put forward tentatively as worthy of a more extended examination.

[53] I.A. 33/J/3, reg. no. 261, ref. nos. 4, 14, 61, 319, 484; *ibid.*, 33/J/1, part III, reg. no. 51, ref. no. 13/12237, 11 September, 1934

[54] I.A. 33/M/7, reg. no. 7, ref. no. 16460; *Report on Muntafiq, 1917*, p. 6; *Report on Muntafiq, 1919*, p. 1

When the British administration took over responsibility for Iraq, it made a genuine attempt to ascertain what was the established practice in regard to land-tenure, and tried to standardize and stabilize it by giving it the force of law. But in consequence of this, customs of only recent and rather dubious origin, like that of the share claimed by the *sarkals* (*sarkala*), became entrenched in law; and even customs of older and firmer origin changed their nature. Shaykhs holding leases became virtual landlords of tribal lands by law, as they had previously been by tribal custom; but whereas, so long as their position was based on tribal custom, they had been responsible to the tribesmen, now their position was guaranteed by the government and they could appeal to it in any dispute with the cultivators. The balance of power was therefore tilted still further against the fallahs, and the landlords (many of whom now moved into the towns and cities and became absentees) amassed great wealth.

The political consequences of this were even more important than the economic. The British to some extent reversed the policy of the Turks by strengthening the hand of the tribal shaykhs, whom they used to exercise control over the area. This led to a concentration of power in the hands of the shaykhs, but meanwhile their relation with their tribesmen had radically changed. Whereas formerly it had been tribal in the fullest sense, now it became mainly economic, a relationship of landlord and tenant. A government which relied on tribal shaykhs became in effect a government which supported the claims of the landlords. This made for conservatism in social policy, and alienated the mass of the people from its rulers. In these circumstances, the overthrow of the government by violence became almost inevitable.

NOTE ON SOURCES

Apart from published reports, historical works, etc., the main sources of this essay are the following:

(i) The Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. These are referred to in the footnotes under the heading "O.A.", followed by the name of the ministry or department concerned (*Dakhiliyya, Maliyya, Shura-i Dawla, Yildiz Rasmi, Yildiz Khususi, Majlis Khass*) and then by the number of the file, with more detailed references where necessary.

(ii) The archives of the Land Settlement Department of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. These are referred to under the heading "L.A.", followed by the file number and, where necessary, the register number and the reference number of the individual document.

(iii) Consular reports from the Foreign Office documents in the Public Record

Office. These are referred to in the usual way under the heading "F.O." followed by the file number and more detailed indications.

(iv) *Al-Zawra*, the official newspaper of the Ottoman province of Baghdad. Inaugurated by Midhat Pasha and published in both Arabic and Turkish, it contained not only the text of government decrees, statements and reports, but also items of news. For the greater part of the period dealt with it was the only newspaper published in Baghdad. It is referred to under the heading "*Zawra*", followed by the number of the issue.

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THE AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN BEIRUT AND BUṬRUS AL-BUSTĀNĪ[1]

By A. L. Tibawi

(i)

AMERICAN INTEREST in foreign missions is a complex historical phenomenon with its roots deep in the religious or evangelical revivals both in old and New England. It is a curious fact that independent missionary societies in both countries embarked on ambitious schemes of foreign missions in distant lands while the home fields were not yet fully cultivated. Thus the major English society sent its missionaries to Africa while the general and religious education of the English lower classes was neither universal nor adequate. Likewise, American missionaries were sent to India while native American Indians as well as large sections of the American people were in real need of more enlightenment.

But such was the missionary zeal in Protestant countries and such was the ecclesiastical set-up that independent missionary societies, and not the Churches themselves, assumed the herculean task of attempting to evangelize the whole world. Any cause, missionary or otherwise, that is born of great enthusiasm is bound to be too ambitious in design and experimental in execution. The Anglo-Saxon missionary societies that came into being during the last decade of the eighteenth and the first decade of the nineteenth centuries found out by trial and error, by the limited financial support of their subscribers and by the political, religious and social realities in the various fields of their operations that theirs was indeed "the day of small things".

In spiritual and educational fields, however, small things often begot great things. This is particularly true of the "Palestine Mission" of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. This Board,

[1] This essay is an advance notice of a research begun in the autumn of 1960 in Harvard University with a view to producing a history of American religious and educational work in Syria in the nineteenth century, parallel to the writer's history of British religious and educational work in Palestine in the nineteenth century, published by the Oxford University Press in 1961. He wishes to express deep gratitude to Sir Hamilton Gibb who made the research possible.

largely Congregational in membership with Presbyterian and Dutch Reformed Churches participation, was established in 1810 with headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts. Their first missionaries to foreign lands were sent to India, and it was only in 1818 that they thought of the Holy Land and the shores of the Mediterranean.[2] However, one of their missionaries to India wrote from Colombo in December 1813 recommending a mission to Western Asia, to the Arabs, Turks and Persians near the Persian Gulf, in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria and Palestine. The recommendation definitely included the "Eastern Christians". The writer concludes: "When I think of these things, I long to be on my way towards Jerusalem." [3]

The Church Missionary Society, however, was the first to act. In 1815 it sent a missionary to reside in Malta with jurisdiction extending all over the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. The presence of such an influential English society in the area was no doubt an encouragement, but the American Board was also urged by the chaplain of the English consulate in Smyrna to send a mission to Western Asia. This fitted in very well with the mood of the time. A feature of the religious awakening in America, like that in Britain, was an interest in the fulfilment of prophecy. Hence the American Board's attention was not unnaturally directed to the Holy Land. The relevant resolution of the Prudential Committee adopted in the meeting held on September 23, 1818, is worthwhile quoting in full: "*Resolved*: that the Rev. Messrs. Levi Parsons and Pliny Fisk be designated for Jerusalem and such other parts of Western Asia as shall be judged most eligible – that they be sent out as soon as shall be found convenient, and that in the meantime they be engaged as agents for the Board at home." [4]

This resolution is the origin of the statement published more than a year later for the information of subscribers of the Board's mission. Fisk and Parsons were touring the country preaching and lecturing to arouse interest and enlist support.[5] The statement in question reads as follows: "If the countries of Southern Asia are highly interesting to Christian

[2] *The Missionary Herald*, XV (1819), 546

[3] American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (henceforth ABCFM), *First Ten Reports*, 1810–20. Letter dated December 20, 1813, from Newell to Worcester, p. 112. (The actual number of reports covered here is obviously eleven.)

[4] *Records of the Prudential Committee* (ABCFM, Congregational House, Boston), I (1810–25), p. 92. These minutes are among the valuable records which the Board retained at their headquarters when they deposited the bulk of their records in Harvard University Library

[5] *ABCFM Archives* (Houghton Library, Harvard Universiy), Series ABC:

benevolence, and have strong claims upon Christian commiseration, on account of the hundreds of millions of human beings immersed in the deepest corruption and wretchedness, the countries of Western Asia, though less populous, are in other respects not less interesting, nor do they present less powerful claims. These were the scenes of those great transactions and events which involved the destinies of mankind of all ages and all nations for time and eternity." [6]

In the autumn of 1819 the Board decided it was time to send the two young missionaries to the Near East. Unlike missionaries from Imperial nations such as Spain and England, the American missionaries followed in the paths of American commercial traffic, not in the wake of conquering armies. The Instructions of the Prudential Committee of the Board are couched in the rhetorical style of the Secretary, Samuel Worcester. They were publicly delivered on October 31, 1819, in the Old South Church in Boston. The Committee directed that the missionaries establish themselves in Jerusalem or Bethlehem, or failing either, in another centre within or without the limits of Palestine. They were aware of the difficulties in respect of Jerusalem, but were persuaded that "the importance of the station will outweigh many difficulties".

The comprehensive scope of the proposed mission in the territorial, racial and religious sense is forcefully expressed. "The two grand inquiries ever present in your minds", wrote Worcester, "will be, *what good can be done, and by what means*? What can be done for the Jews? What for the Pagans? What for Mohammedans? What for Christians? What for the people of Palestine? What for those in Egypt, in Syria, in Persia, in Armenia, and in other countries to which your inquiries may be extended?" That the mission was for the Pagans and Jews may be readily appreciated; but that it was also for the Christians and Muslims may require some elucidation.[7] There is no reason to suppose that the Board was not aware that Islam was the State religion in the Ottoman Empire and that the authorities would not tolerate foreigners attempting to subvert it, even supposing the people were willing to listen to argument. But the aim was not to make a direct assault. The mission was instructed to seek first to convert those who were "Christian in

1.01, vol. II (Book of Letters, 1818–19). See letter dated February 17, 1819, to Parsons, and letter dated March 4, 1819, to Fisk

[6] ABCFM, *First Ten Reports*, 229 (under the year 1819)

[7] On the same day, October 31, 1819, Fisk preached a sermon entitled *The Holy Land, An Interesting Field of Missionary Enterprise*, in which he hoped for "the revival of pure Christianity there". Parsons preached another entitled *The Dereliction and Restoration of the Jews* in which he stressed their "claims upon the Gentile Church". Both sermons were published as pamphlets in Boston in 1819

name" who, when thoroughly reformed, would endeavour to evangelize not only the Muslims but also the Jews and Pagans.[8]

But the Prudential Committee was not over-sanguine regarding the reception awaiting their missionaries. They knew well enough that missionary work among Muslims in the Ottoman Empire was not a practical proposition. Except for monks and guardians of holy places, the Ottoman authorities had hitherto permitted no "Frank", not even a diplomatic representative, to reside in Jerusalem, the third holy city in Islam. The utmost the missionaries could expect was to be allowed to visit the city as foreign tourists or pilgrims. The missionaries also knew that the Jews were a closed community with strict religious discipline that admitted of no innovation within the community, still less of intrusion of foreign ideas from outside, and that as a *millet* in the Ottoman administrative system they were guaranteed internal religious autonomy under their rabbis. The various Christian denominations were likewise organized or recognized, and this fact was well known in Europe and America. With such considerations in mind, Worcester's instructions contain sensible advice to his two missionaries. "You will not think it strange if they (i.e. 'the abetters of those different religions') regard you with something more than suspicion." Accordingly he cautioned them to take all prudent care not to offend against the prevailing laws, opinions, customs and ceremonies, but to do everything to gain them "civility, confidence, favour and respect".

Fisk and Parsons sailed from Boston harbour on November 3, 1819, and landed in Smyrna the following January. There were many considerations that rendered this detour necessary. In the first place, the American merchant ship which carried them eastward was bound for Smyrna where at least one Boston trading concern, the Perkins house, had an agency under American management.[9] Smyrna, in the second place, was the commercial port in the Ottoman Empire with the greatest number of European residents and the seat of their consuls. In 1820 there were English, Russian and Dutch resident consuls in the port. American trade with Smyrna and the hinterland was already considerable. About this time an average of thirteen merchant vessels called every year with cargo valued at about one million dollars.[10] But

[8] *The Missionary Herald*, XV (No. 11 for November, 1819), pp. 545–6

[9] A loyalist member of this family took Smyrna as his residence since the War of Independence, and traded in dried figs and opium with his relatives who remained in Boston. Cf. *The Missionary Herald*, XVII (1821), pp. 76–7

[10] C. O. Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1773–1883* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1912), p. 123

American merchants conducted their business largely through the (English) Levant Company and its consuls. This is the origin of the practice, which continued even after the establishment of American consulates, of placing American merchants, travellers and missionaries under informal English consular protection. The chaplain of the English consulate at Smyrna was himself an enthusiastic supporter of the American mission. Indeed Americans in general are often referred to in the sources as "English", or members of the English *millet*.

But there were other practical considerations which compelled the two missionaries though "bound in spirit unto Jerusalem" [11] to settle in Smyrna, at least temporarily. First, there were the Ottoman restrictions imposed on all "Franks" who were permitted to visit, but not to reside, in Jerusalem. Secondly, there is no evidence that the two young missionaries knew any language other than English, and received any instruction in the history of the Near East other than they gathered from their theological studies. They came with a message, and they were faced with the practical problem of delivering it in the native tongues of the Near East. Thus they were definitely instructed to proceed first to Smyrna "where greater freedom is enjoyed [by foreigners] than in almost any other place within the Ottoman dominions".[12]

The two missionaries lodged with a Swiss family where French, Italian and Greek, and some Turkish, but no English, was spoken. Italian was still very much used in the Near East, but French was gradually taking its place or at least sharing the ground with it. Apart from these two European languages, the missionaries needed some facility in at least three Near Eastern languages, Arabic, Greek and Turkish. There is no evidence that Andover Theological Seminary at the time taught any biblical, classical or modern European languages. So Fisk and Parsons came to the Near East knowing only English and began their struggle, not with evangelizing the people, but with learning to speak their tongues.

In addition they started, in accordance with their instructions, to acquaint themselves with the land and its peoples. They visited, among other places, the sites of the Seven Churches in Asia Minor and spent nearly half a year in the Island of Scio to learn Greek.[13] While travelling

[11] An allusion to Acts xx. 22, the text used for Fisk's sermon in Boston on October 31, 1819, on the eve of his departure

[12] Cf. Fisk's and Parsons' joint report "We feel [in Smyrna] as safe as we should be in Boston": *The Missionary Herald*, XVII (1821), p. 265

[13] R. Anderson, *History of the Missions of the ABCFM to the Oriental Churches* (Boston, 1872), vol. I, p. 11

they distributed Bibles and Psalters supplied in the vernacular by English Bible and missionary societies in London and Malta. In December 1820 Parsons alone set off to Jerusalem,[14] armed with a travel permit from the Ottoman authorities and an introduction to the Procopius of the Greek Orthodox convent in Jerusalem, both procured through English diplomatic or missionary offices.[15] Parsons arrived in Jerusalem on February 17, 1821, and was hailed, without justification, by some missionary sources as "the first Protestant missionary who ever entered that city".[16]

As principal of the Greek Orthodox convent and representative of the Patriarch[17] in Jerusalem, the Procopius received Parsons with kindness and reserved quarters for him in the convent. It is important for a proper appreciation of the later history of Protestant missions in general, and the American mission in particular, to note this friendly first contact with the leading Oriental Church. Parsons' testimony is a clear evidence of this friendly spirit. When he left Jerusalem less than three months after his arrival, he wrote in his diary:[18] "May 8 [1821]. Visited the Bishops and took leave of them. They said, and I believe with sincerity,[19] 'We wish to see you soon again in this city.' " An entry in his joint journal with Fisk under November 29, 1820 clearly states that the purpose was merely "a visit" to the city, not extended or permanent residence. Accordingly there is no basis for the later missionary statement that he was "forced to leave". No authority, civil or ecclesiastical, seems to have influenced his own decision to leave.

The Greek revolt had just broken out, and when Parsons rejoined his

[14] Samuel Worcester had already made discreet hints to the two missionaries to move towards Jerusalem. In a letter dated April 22, 1820 he asked "what provisions [for distribution of Bibles and tracts] before leaving Asia Minor for Palestine would be of importance or convenience? How will you probably go from Smyrna to Jerusalem? Inform me of everything as fully and particularly as you can." *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 1.01, vol. IV (Book of Letters, 1818–20).

[15] James Connor, the C.M.S. missionary, who had been to Jerusalem before Parsons, ruled out the city as a practical missionary station. However, he procured for Parsons a letter of introduction to the Procopius. See *The Missionary Register* (1820), p. 525, and (1821), p. 33. (This is a C.M.S. publication.)

[16] J. Tracy, *History of American Missions to the Heathen* (Worcester, U.S.A., 1840), p. 98

[17] The seat of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem was still in Constantinople

[18] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, vol. I (Letters and Papers received before 1824), under date

[19] The words "and I believe with sincerity" are cut out from the published version of this entry in the diary. Cf. *The Missionary Herald*, XVIII (1822), p. 19

colleague in Smyrna they had to adapt themselves to the changed conditions especially the hazards of travel.[20] Nevertheless they both went to Alexandria where early in 1822 Parsons died. Fisk himself paid three visits to Jerusalem before he too died in 1825. Both of them, like the English missionaries, notably those working for the Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews, were sentimentally committed to a station in Jerusalem. But Fisk's and Parsons' first reports, written obviously under the influence of the chaplain of the English consulate, and before either of them had visited the Holy City, recommended Smyrna as a permanent centre of the mission. Worcester was not impressed. He wrote back urging reconsideration. "Perhaps", he said, "your first impressions may [not] have been altogether correct. . . . After some months in the Levant, a more extended acquaintance, and more mature reflection, your opinions and suggestions may afford us stronger and more satisfactory ground of judging and acting." [21]

(ii)

But the Prudential Committee of the Board accepted other important recommendations. Almost immediately they were settled in Smyrna, Fisk and Parsons recommended the "re-inforcement" of the mission in personnel and equipment. The Board responded in 1822 by appointing Jonas King, then studying Oriental languages in Paris, to replace Parsons, and Daniel Temple to establish a press in Malta in the service of the mission. The reports from the Mediterranean were so encouraging that the Board did not wait for tangible results. In 1823 they appointed two additional missionaries, Isaac Bird and William Goodell. Like the first two missionaries they were also young, but the design for firm settlement in the missionary field was such this time that they were sent out with their wives. The instructions issued to the two new missionaries directed them to stop at Malta to learn languages spoken on the shores of the Mediterranean, but they were left in no doubt that their ultimate destination was Palestine, and that their "particular place of residence" was Jerusalem.[22]

Once more practical consideration on the spot dictated a change of

[20] The task of the missionaries was not served by the outburst of philhellenic feeling in America. For example Edward Everett of Harvard College wrote, *inter alia*, in the *North American Review*, XVII (1823), p. 420, that the Greek revolt against Ottoman rule was "emphatically a war of the crescent against the cross".

[21] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 1.01, vol. V (Book of Letters, 1818–20). See letter dated June 16, 1820, from Worcester to Fisk and Parsons, pp. 155–8

[22] *Tracts* (collection of Sermons) deposited in the Congregational Library, Boston (No. 1652.10), pp. 455 ff.

plan. Bird and Goodell arrived in Beirut in November, 1823, and their colleagues Fisk and King advised them to stay there. Like Smyrna, Beirut was a commercial port with some "Frank" residents. The English consul, Peter Abbott, was from the beginning a staunch supporter of all Protestant missionaries.[23] The Americans were quickly taken under his protection. This consular protection was indispensable on account of the tension occasioned by the Greek revolt. Beirut was preferred to Jerusalem for yet another reason. Protestant missions found themselves in 1823–4 faced with the hostility of important sections of the Eastern Churches, and with administrative measures adopted by the Ottoman authorities. In the circumstances it was safer to be in a sea port than in an inland town.

Much has been written late in the nineteenth century and in the twentieth about the squalid, desolate and dangerous life outside the walls of Beirut which the missionaries had to endure. This is not borne out by the reports of the first missionaries written only three months after arrival. To be sure they complain of insanitary conditions inside the old city, but they have pleasant things to say about their own residence and its surroundings outside the city walls. The plain to the south of Beirut "was covered with olive, palm, orange, lemon, pine and mulberry trees, enriched with vines and enlivened by numerous cottages". In a spacious house[24] on the fringe of this plain outside the walls, Bird and Goodell with their wives made their first home. "From the terrace of the house", wrote Goodell, "we can count, without the walls of the city, no less than two hundred of these cottages, scattered here and there in the fields of mulberry trees." [25]

Like the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews was trying to establish a mission in Jerusalem. In the autumn of 1823 a conference of the missionaries of the two societies, together with the representative of the Church Missionary Society in Malta, was held in Antoura (ʿAin Tūrah) on Mount Lebanon in premises formerly occupied by a Jesuit school. The conference considered, among other subjects, the possibility of a joint station in Jerusalem, using Antoura as a sum-

[23] Cf. William Goodell (edited by D. G. Prime), *Forty Years in the Turkish Empire*, Boston, 1891, p. 85

[24] The rent of this house for six months was $18.50. *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.2, vol. I (Syrian and Nestorian Mission: Treasury Department, 1822–46). See letter dated Beirut January 14, 1824, from [Mrs Ann] Bird to H. Hill

[25] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, vol. II. See letter dated January 24, 1824, to Evarts

mer resort and a training centre. The one English society was solely interested in the conversion of the Jews, and the other had similar aims to those of the American society, in that they were interested in the evangelization of all those who were not Protestant Christians. The missionaries of these societies, handicapped as they initially were by the language barrier, did little more than distribute copies of the Bible and tracts in Arabic and Hebrew and other languages.[26]

It was this apparently innocent activity that started a conflict with some Eastern Churches of far-reaching consequences. Hitherto the source of Bibles in Arabic had been the version printed in Rome in 1671. The copies distributed by Protestant missionaries were reprints of this edition, less the Apocrypha, and this was of course unacceptable to the Maronites. In an encyclical letter[27] issued soon after the conference at Antoura, the Maronite Patriarch banned the use of these Bibles on two counts: (*a*) that seven books, beginning with *The Book of Tobit*, accepted as holy by the Council of Trent are omitted; (*b*) that the text of the published books is "replete with mistakes".[28] The circular refers to the missionaries once as belonging to the English sect,[29] and once as heretics and atheists,[30] and accuses them of buying up the copies printed in Rome, and circulating their own copies instead. Members of the Maronite Church were strictly forbidden to own these copies, or to attend any religious service conducted by the missionaries.[31]

[26] The chief sources of supply of Bibles in Arabic and Hebrew were the British and Foreign Bible Society and the Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews. The American Mission in 1822, and the Church Missionary Society in 1825, each established a small hand press in Malta for the issue of tracts in the languages of the Mediterranean

[27] Quotation in this paper is from a copy bearing no date, found among the unsorted and uncatalogued papers of Eli Smith, American Board missionary in Beirut from 1827 to 1857, preserved at the Houghton Library, Harvard University. From internal evidence the circular was issued in the autumn of 1823

[28] *mashḥūna ghalaṭan*

[29] English-speaking missionaries, whether British subjects or American citizens, continued for a long time to be known in the Levant as belonging to the English *millet*. The Arabic word used for "sect" in the circular is, however, *ṭā'ifah*.

[30] In the circular the arabicized form of heretics (*arātiqah*) is used; for atheist the word (*mulḥid*) is used

[31] Three letters each dated January 31, 1824, were sent by Cardinal Somaglia, dean of the sacred college of the *Propaganda Fide*, addressed to the Maronite Patriarch, the Maronite Bishop at Antoura and the Papal Vicar for Syria and Palestine, denounce the Protestant missionaries as *banditori dell'errore e della corruzione*, and the copies of the Bible they distributed as "corrupted and vitiated". English translations are preserved in *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, III, filed after a letter dated April 22, 1825

The conflict with the Maronite hierarchy was such that the civil authorities feared it might lead to a breach of the peace. The Amīr Bashīr promptly ordered the Protestant missionaries to abandon the premises at Antoura and to retire to Beirut. On higher levels both Rome and Constantinople took action for different reasons. Leo XII issued a Bull confirming the contents of the circulars from the *Propaganda Fide*. A Turkish decree forbade the circulation in the Ottoman Empire of Bibles printed in Europe on the ground that they had caused among the people "apprehension, disputation and disturbance". Despite repeated allegations in missionary literature, there is no evidence that the Catholic and Ottoman moves were connected or that Ottoman action was influenced by Catholic pressure.[32] Indeed, the records of the American Board contain a contemporary document which clearly states that "no molestation whatever is given to Christian teachers in propagating their sentiments . . . [and] no effectual expedient exists to the diffusion of books and tracts".[33] All of which seems to confirm the conclusion that the Ottoman action was as sudden and occasioned by circumstances as the missionary reaction was sudden and occasioned by disappointment. Furthermore, the term "printed in Europe" in the Ottoman decree clearly covers Bibles coming from Rome as well as those coming from Protestant sources.[34]

This was an inauspicious start for the American mission in Beirut, with a tenuous hold on the Holy Land maintained by occasional visits to Jerusalem. In February 1824 Fisk and Bird were arrested in Jerusalem for causing a tumult while distributing Bibles among Armenian pilgrims. They were saved by a liberal *qādī* and the English vice-consul in Jaffa. After a quick look at one copy, the former expressed horror at reading "and the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters",[35] but ruled that so long as the circulation of this kind of literature remained confined to the "infidels" he would not punish the accused. The vice-consul was a member of the Arabic-speaking Damiani family and could effectively plead with the authorities that the two missionaries were under English consular protection.

[32] Cf. *The Missionary Herald*, XXI (1825), pp. 92, 108. See further A. L. Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine 1800–1901* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 10–12

[33] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, I (Palestine Mission: Letters and Papers of the Board received before September 1, 1824). See Memorandum signed by "Wm. Jenks on behalf of the Committee", undated and placed second but last document in the volume. From circumstantial evidence the date is about January 1821.

[34] Cf. *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, II. Letter dated Beirut January 11, 1825 from Bird and Goodell to Evarts

[35] *Genesis* i, 2

Back in Beirut, the American missionaries joined their colleagues and reconsidered their position. Jerusalem was still not a safe centre, and expediency dictated that they do what they could from the bases of Malta and Beirut. A hand press was brought by Daniel Temple, but so much credit has been claimed for it in promoting Arabic literary revival that it is necessary to state here briefly, what it is proposed to examine in detail in a forthcoming study, that this press was wholly preoccupied with strictly religious tracts, that it printed no literature in Arabic before it was moved to Beirut in 1934,[36] and that for three decades in Beirut its character remained substantially unchanged. Furthermore, the Malta tracts were all in Greek, Italian and Armeno-Turkish. We shall refer in another context below to the first Arabic books printed at Beirut.

Distribution of tracts was one of the main occupations of the mission; lack of facility in languages still precluded effective preaching. It seems that one of the first attempts of the mission to place some of the youth of Beirut under their influence was to establish a school where Italian was taught by Bird, who had studied the language for only a few months in Malta on his way to Beirut. Most of the pupils were young men who engaged in commerce or served as interpreters.[37] But the mission started in July 1824 what they call the first missionary school in Syria.[38]

It is important to establish the nature of this first venture in the realms of education. At first seven "Arab children" were gathered in the joint residence of the two married missionaries, fed and clothed and taught by the wives of the missionaries. Considering the language difficulty alone, this arrangement could hardly have been more than nursing neglected children, or children coming from impoverished homes, or

[36] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, vol. III: See undated printed page, after document No. 217, which gives a list of "publications of the American press at Malta from the commencement of its operations, July 1822 to December 31, 1828". The lists are of Greek, Italian and Armeno-Turkish books; no Arabic books of any kind are listed. Cf. Series ABC: 8.6, vol. I. See lists entitled "Printing done at mission presses during 1st half century 1810–60" where Arabic appears only under "printing at Beirut". Cf. further R. Anderson, *History of the Missions of the ABCFM to the Oriental Churches*, I, p. 73. Cf. also A. J. Brown, *A History of the Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.* (New York, n.d., but probably 1937), p. 992

[37] Cf. Letter from Assaad Jacob [= Later Dr. As'ad Ya'qūb Khayyāt, British consul in Jaffa] dated July 1826 (the day is not given) addressed to Evarts: "I tell you I am with Mr. Goodell in his house . . . I learn Italian and English with Mr. Goodell and Mr. Bird." *ABCFM Archives*, Series 16.6, vol. III

[38] Anderson, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 44

homes of those employed by the mission as domestic servants and orderlies. Later in the year, however, the number of children rose to about fifty, and thus an Arab teacher was engaged to teach them in a hired room close to the missionary residence.

It was the Greek Orthodox hierarchy who this time took offence. In a report to the Board dated January 11, 1825 Bird and Goodell announce that the opening of the school provoked the issue of a circular by the Patriarch of Antioch against the school and the schemes of the mission. Although the missionaries were careful to let the children continue to worship in their own church, the hierarchy were suspicious of foreigners of a different sect undertaking to teach children gratuitously. "Many parents", says the report, "were sufficiently intimidated [by the Patriarch's circular] to remove their children." The school survived this crisis, but it was completely destroyed by another in 1826 when Greek corsairs attacked Beirut and wrought havoc in the city and the suburbs.

Other techniques employed by the mission at this stage were the reception of young men at the missionary residence for exploratory "softening", and the employment of language instructors, William Goodell, who was learning Armenian, established relations with two Armenian bishops who were in trouble with their Church because they had married contrary to its statutes. He employed one of them as a teacher and interpreter and kept the other about the mission. Jonas King met a young Maronite, As'ad Shidyāq, and engaged him as private teacher of Arabic. The relationship proved very tragic. King had contracted to serve for three years, and before he left Syria in 1825 he wrote a polemic[39] against the Latin Church which Shidyāq was asked to translate into Arabic, with the result, so the story goes, that he became a Protestant. Shidyāq was called to order by the Maronite Patriarch, and in the end was imprisoned by him and died in prison.[40] King's polemic started a bitter controversy,[41] and thus, contrary to Worcester's advice to Parsons and Fisk, the mission had to discharge its task in an atmo-

[39] *Wadā' Yūnus Kīn ilā Aḥbābihī fī Filasṭīn wa Sūriyya* (? Malta, 1825); the English original was printed as "Farewell Letter of Jonas King" in *The Oriental Church and the Latin* (New York, 1865), pp. 5–33

[40] The story of As'ad Shidyāq the 'Syrian Protestant martyr' is a favourite theme in missionary literature. See for example *The Missionary Herald*, XXIII (1827), pp. 71–6, 97–101, 129–36; 169–77. In Arabic the earliest is *Khabariyyat As'ad Shidyāq* (Malta, 1833)

[41] The Maronite Archbishop of Beirut, Biṭrus Abū Karam, wrote *Risālah 'Ā'iliyyah* in reply to King's epistle. The Archbishop's reply was published by the *Propaganda Fide*, in Rome, 1830. The American mission replied with *Thalāthatu 'Ashrata Risālah* (Malta, 1834)

sphere of animosity and strife. Already the mission was speaking in their reports of "our enemies".[42]

The departure of King and the death of Fisk in 1825, together with encouraging reports from Malta and Beirut, prompted the American Board to send in the following year an assistant to help with the press, and Eli Smith to strengthen the mission at Beirut. Smith proved to be one of the shining stars of the mission. His influence on its thought and action for nearly three decades was profound. With a sound educational training at Yale and Andover Theological Seminary he was able to master the spoken and written Arabic to a remarkable degree. He established and maintained personal relations, or regular correspondence, with many of the Christian Arab literary figures of his time. His relationship with, and influence over the early life of Buṭrus Al-Bustānī, will form one of the main subjects of the second part of this paper. However, it is necessary before we concentrate on this theme to trace the history of the mission up to the date when that relationship was established about the end of the Egyptian occupation.

(iii)

Weathering the storm of ecclesiastical opposition and recovering from the disruption of the short Greek incursion, the mission quietly rallied its forces. The school in Beirut was reopened. An experiment of aiding native schools and thus bringing them under the influence of the mission was quietly begun.[43] A few Armenians and native Arab Christians continued to hover round the mission. Nor were the Jews of Beirut forgotten. At first they refused to have any contact with the mission. But gradually they were induced to accept copies of the Bible in Hebrew, only to preserve the Old Testament and cut out the New Testament and sell it "in the bazaar for waste paper". However, the mission succeeded, amidst opposition, in opening a school for Jewish children.[44] "A wide and effectual door", wrote Goodell triumphantly

[42] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, vol. II. See report dated Beirut January 11, 1825, from Bird and Goodell to secretary Jeremiah Evarts, Boston

[43] Document No. 217, "Schedule of Schools in Syria 1826", appears with no covering letter in *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, III, and lists nine "aided" schools in Beirut and on the mountains with just over 300 pupils in attendance. The total aid for six months from January to June 1826 was $167.76. "In all the schools" the schedule reads "there have occasionally attended about 30 girls for whom teachers received double, and in two cases, quadruple price"

[44] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, II. See letter dated May 15, 1826, from Goodell to Anderson

in 1826, "does indeed seem to be opening to us, and work more than we can do to be ready prepared for our hands." [45] In that year indeed converts from other Churches were duly received "to our communion and fellowship" in the mission church, largely through his efforts.

As'ad Shidyāq may be considered the earliest convert of some significance. But Goodell's report adds the names of new converts: the two Armenians Gregory Wortabet and Dionysius Carabet with their wives, and the Roman Catholic wife of the English consul, Peter Abbott. Other candidates for conversion mentioned by Goodell were an Anglican lady on a temporary visit to Beirut from England, the Greek Orthodox teacher of the mission school, Ṭannūs Al-Ḥaddād, the Maronite Fāris Shidyāq (brother of As'ad) who was however moved to Malta for safety, and the Greek Catholic superintendent of schools in connection with the mission, Yūsuf Laflūfah.[46] "This admission of converts", wrote a high official of the Board, "into a church, without regard to their previous ecclesiastical relations was a practical ignoring of the old church organisation in the region. It was so understood, and the spirit of oppression and persecution was roused to the utmost." [47]

It is in this context that we should interpret subsequent correspondence in which the mission bitterly complained of the reaction of the ecclesiastical authorities and of the attitude of the Ottoman local government. Speaking of the former, Goodell wrote, "Our enemies continue to devise all evil devices against us." By "enemies" he meant the Eastern Churches, or at least their ecclesiastical authorities. The feud must have become so dangerous that the missionaries had to appeal to the civil governor of Beirut. He is reported to have angrily told them that if they compromised themselves by aggressive action and were in consequence exposed to violence he would not protect them. The missionaries were still new to the ways of a Turkish pasha. He was in effect giving advice, not denying protection to which the Americans were entitled as members of the English *millet*.[48] The second half of 1826 and the first half of 1827 must have been very difficult. "I now venture", wrote Goodell, "to sit by a window in the evening, a thing

[45] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, II. Letter dated September 29, 1826, to Evarts

[46] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, III (Letters and Reports of the Board – Palestine Mission 1827–31). See letter dated Beirut, January 2, 1827, from Bird and Goodell to Evarts. Goodell also established a close relationship with an Armenian Bishop, Ya'qūb Agha (Abcarius)

[47] R. Anderson, *History*, vol. I, p. 47

[48] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, II. See letter dated March 6, 1827, from Goodell to Evarts

which for a considerable time I did not deem it prudent to do. I have at times during the last ten months suffered exceedingly." [49]

In the midst of such difficulties a more crippling blow struck the mission as a whole. Following the destruction of the Turco-Egyptian fleet at Navarino in October 1827,[50] the relations between England and Turkey, already cool because of the former's sympathy with the Greek rebels, became very strained. For months afterwards there were rumours of impending war between Turkey and Britain. This situation had caused a stagnation in trade, and the mission could obtain no money for its bills. The Amīr Bashīr, moreover, made it clear to the missionaries that in the event of war he would protect no "Franks". In April, 1828, Russia declared war on Turkey. And when the English consul himself[51] left Beirut all the mission removed on May 2, 1828, to the safety of Malta. With them they took the two Armenian converts and their wives. The mission was thus "suspended".

At Malta the three missionaries from Beirut joined their two colleagues in Malta in an effort to improve the work of the press. Goodell with his two Armenian converts worked on producing a translation of the New Testament into Armeno-Turkish. Smith, whose studies of Arabic on Mount Lebanon had been interrupted by the scramble out of Beirut, was asked to supervise the press which hitherto had concentrated on Italian, Greek and Armenian. He had acquired very little knowledge of Italian, but had "no knowledge at all" of the other two languages. And yet he began to study the important problem of preparing Greek and Armenian textbooks for reading and arithmetic, apart from the conventional religious and missionary tracts. His remarks concerning Arabic books, however, are of particular significance, coming as they do at the beginning of American interest in the Arabic language as a missionary instrument. The Arabs had their own schools and possessed a learning of their own. This fact was, in Smith's judgment, "a foundation to build upon".[52] Fāris Shidyāq was marked for

[49] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, II. See letter dated May 3, 1827, to Evarts

[50] For the circumstances see W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors* (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 97 ff.

[51] This was still Peter Abbott, the friend of the missionaries. He witnessed while in office the passing of the control of English consulates in the Ottoman Empire from the Levant Company, which was liquidated in 1825, to the British government

[52] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.6, III. See letter dated Malta October 8, 1829, stated to be written by Smith, but signed also by Goodell and Bird and addressed to the Prudential Committee

use under the direction of Smith. In 1830 the press received an Arabic fount from London.

Meanwhile the Prudential Committee had had the whole field of their mission to the Eastern Mediterranean under re-consideration since the withdrawal from Beirut. With the possibility of missionary work in Greece in mind, assistant secretary Rufus Anderson was sent to the Near East to investigate. Anderson's visit made him a strong supporter of American missions to the Eastern Churches in the Ottoman Empire and Greece. In the Empire the centres marked for "occupation" were Constantinople, Smyrna, Malta, Beirut and Jerusalem. Political events which he naturally did not foresee when he was in Malta in 1829 were such that, far from relinquishing Beirut, and with it Jerusalem, the American Board decided to resume as well as to strengthen its work. Not only had the danger of war become remote, but also the relations between Turkey and Britain had been improved, and the English consul returned to Beirut. The United States, which had been since the turn of the century anxious to conclude a commercial treaty with Turkey, succeeded in doing so in May 1830.[53] In the autumn of the following year Muḥammad ʿAlī invaded Syria and established an administration that stamped out lawlessness and adopted a policy of indulgence towards foreign enterprise, commercial and missionary included.

Not that missionary work was restricted by the Turkish administration. So long as no Muslims were involved, and so long as missionary work did not create sectarian disorder among the non-Muslims, the authorities were indifferent. This is indeed the collective opinion of the mission expressed in 1829 in a memorandum drawn up by Eli Smith at Anderson's request and subscribed to by the other missionaries while all were in Malta. "The Muslim authorities", reads the memorandum in part, "[are] professedly and actually indifferent to jealousies, controversies and proselytism of their Christian subjects except as instigated by the latter themselves to interfere . . ." [54]

[53] W. M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the U.S.A. and Other Powers, 1776–1909* (Washington, 1910), vol. II, pp. 1318–48, "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded May 7, 1830"; see also H. Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the U.S.A.* (Washington, 1933), vol. III, pp. 541–98, where the original Turkish is reproduced in facsimile, with English and French translations

[54] Much has been made by all Protestant missionaries working among Eastern Christians and the Jews of a *fatwā* issued by the Ḥanafi Shaikh, Sulaimān Al-Manṣuri, following a riot in 1175/1762 in Aleppo. The occasion was a dispute between the Greek Orthodox and the Roman Catholics over the secession of some members of the former communion who joined the latter, an event which

Two years' absence from a field cultivated with much difficulty is a long time. The results of more than five years' effort were practically obliterated. The work had to be done all over again, except perhaps with those few individuals, Armenians and Arabs, whose livelihood had become dependent upon the mission. In May 1830 Bird with a new missionary, George Whiting, arrived in Beirut (Goodell was transferred to Constantinople, and Smith with another member of the American mission in that city were sent to survey missionary prospects in Armenia). Promptly the Maronite and Greek Catholic hierarchy renewed their threats to excommunicate any member of their churches who might be tempted to come near the mission. The Greek Orthodox were, by comparison, friendly and the mission was at this stage virtually restricted to them. Nothing is said about the Jews. A report written at the end of the year states that the school for Arab children in Beirut had been re-opened, but no other. The chief obstacles were two: the "almost universal opposition by the ecclesiastic" and the "want of suitable teachers".[55]

Exile and adversity had mellowed the mission. Its polemics against the Maronite Church, though still in circulation, were not pursued in the early pugnacious way. Indeed, wiser counsels seem to have prevailed with the authorities in Boston and the missionaries in the field. The Board's monthly describes the suggestions to their missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, drawn up by Goodell and enjoining caution and restraint in controversy, as judicious, and cites the tragic case of As'ad Shidyāq as a warning against a premature offensive upon entrenched doctrines and practices.[56] Goodell had obviously learnt the lesson of his experience in Beirut. "Our temptation", he wrote, "to engage early in controversy is in these countries very great, and it requires strength, wisdom and much grace to resist it." [57]

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required the intervention of the Ottoman governor to restore order. The gist of the *fatwā* is that in Islamic law there is no distinction between one type of "infidels" and another, so that a Christian may turn Jewish or vice versa, or an Eastern Christian embrace the religion of the "Franks", without infringing thereby the Sultan's recognition of the head of the aggrieved *millet*. A copy of this *fatwā* was found among Eli Smith's unsorted and uncatalogued papers. The *fatwā* is published in Ḥaidar Aḥmad Shihābi, *Al-Ghurar Al-Ḥisān fi Akhbār Abnā' Az-Zamān* (edited by A. J. Rustum and F. A. Bustānī, Beirut, 1933), part 1, pp. 57–9

[55] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. .01 "Syria 1831–1837". See letter dated May 31, 1830, from Whiting to Evarts

[56] *The Missionary Herald* XXVI (1830), p. 18

[57] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.5, vol. II, "Hints and Cautions to Missionaries Destined to the Mediterranean". See note dated Constantinople December 2, 1834

The Egyptian occupation of Syria during the fourth decade of the nineteenth century has often been represented as favourable to the cause of foreign missions. This must not be understood to mean that the Egyptian authorities were directly promoting missionary work. In this matter their attitude differed very little from that of the Ottoman authorities. Both viewed with indifference the jealousies and conversions of their Christian (and Jewish) subjects. The difference was in the success of the Egyptians in maintaining effective security. This opened the country to more traders and travellers than ever before. The missionaries, both American and English, took advantage of this situation. The Americans re-established themselves in Beirut, and attempted to occupy Jerusalem as a missionary station, simultaneously with a similar attempt by the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews. Both at last succeeded in establishing precarious footholds in the Holy City.

Reinforcements to meet this development were quite adequate. Between 1830 and 1839 at least seven recruits were sent out to man the Beirut and Jerusalem stations, including one qualified physician, Asa Dodge, two women teachers, Betsey Tilden and Rebecca Williams, and a missionary, William Thomson, who was to exercise a great influence on the development of the missions. The experiment with schools was resumed immediately the mission returned to Beirut. Six "aided" schools were revived, and members of the missions themselves opened two schools. One was the "English School", so-called because it taught through the medium of English. It was opened in the autumn of 1833, with ten young men to train as teachers for the mission schools. The other was the "Female School", opened also about the same time with an average attendance of 8 pupils who were taught reading, sewing and knitting.[58] The six aided "Native Schools" were under native teachers, and with a total of over a hundred pupils taught principally reading through the use of Bible stories, the Psalter and the New Testament. This time it was the Orthodox Church that took offence; most of the pupils came from homes under the pastoral

[58] E. W. Hooker, *Memoir of Mrs Sarah L. Huntington Smith* (New York, 1840), pp. 373–4. A note by Eli Smith states that the school was started by Mrs Thomson and Mrs Dodge largely as a morning sewing class. They were assisted by Mrs Smith when she arrived early in 1834, and when they were transferred to Jerusalem, Mrs Smith took charge assisted by other members of the mission until Miss Rebecca Williams took over in 1835. Thus Mrs Smith was not, according to the contemporary evidence of her husband, the founder of the school as is stated by G. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), p. 37, and by S. Penrose, *That They May Have Life* (New York, 1941), 6

care of that Church. "Last Sabbath", wrote the mission, "an excommunication was threatened by the Greek Bishop against all those who should send their children to our schools." [59]

The mission was not deterred.[60] In 1835 Rebecca Williams took charge of the "Female School" assisted by the wives of the missionaries, and William Thomson was put in charge of what the annual report of the mission calls the "Boarding School"; this was no more than boarding facilities at the mission house for six boys of the "English School". A few girls were similarly selected from the "Female School" and admitted into missionary families where they received a "solid Christian education" and training in domestic management. The experimental nature of these ventures is apparent from the fact that teaching through the sole medium of English was abandoned. "The studies", according to a resolution by the mission, "shall be so ordered as to give to any schollar [*sic*] a good Arabic education and knowledge of the elementary sciences, and an acquaintance with the English, and if possible some other languages." [61] These two schools are the origin of what was later to become the "Male Seminary" and the "Female Seminary".

The mission had from its inception constituted itself as a Church into which converts were admitted. By 1839 a chapel for preaching in Arabic was opened in Beirut. Hitherto the mission had had to struggle with difficulties in the field of its operation. But its expanding schemes of educational work now had to fit in with a philosophy propounded by Secretary Anderson, and accepted by the Prudential Committee as a guide for policy. Its essential point is that the missionary's primary task was preaching the Word through the living voice. While education was recognized as a convenient method of inculcating a knowledge of the Gospel, preaching must have the first place in the order of priorities.[62] The missionaries on the spot had found it virtually impossible, in the teeth of ecclesiastical opposition. to preach in public. Their only convenient and safe method was to bring under their direct influence

[59] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. .01 (Syria, 1831–7). See letter dated Bhamdun August 14, 1834, from Whiting and Dodge to Anderson

[60] About this time the American mission started its first of several flirtations with the Druzes. Annoyed by Ibrāhim Pasha's measures to conscript their young men into the army, they tried to adhere to the English *millet*, represented as they thought by the Americans who took the Druze overtures quite seriously. There is, however, no space in this paper to go into this matter

[61] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. .01. See the Annual Report dated December 31, 1835 signed by Smith and Thomson and addressed to the Secretaries of the Board at Boston

[62] R. Anderson, *Missionary Schools* (ABCFM Pamphlet, 1838), pp. 19–21

adults and children, who could be taught patiently and effectively the Protestant faith. But they had to please their employers who supplied the funds that made missionary work possible. Thus a compromise was necessary, and the Beirut Boarding Male School or Seminary was regarded as a future theological school with the aim of producing native ministers, preachers and teachers. The Female School or Seminary was, to a lesser extent, regarded at least as a suitable ground for providing the former with pious wives.[63]

But the missionary's path was not always covered with obstacles. The establishment of an American legation in Constantinople in 1831 was followed by the appointment of consuls in various places. In 1834 the entire mission signed a petition to their head office urging their intervention to secure the appointment of an American consul in Jerusalem who should be "prudent and pious" and who would be prepared to aid "the missionary cause".[64] A few months after the appointment of the first American consul in Beirut in 1836, the entire mission again submitted a petition urging the "necessity of consular protection for Americans residing or trading in Syria and Egypt".[65] Consular agents, who were native friends of the missionaries, were accordingly appointed in various centres, and the missionaries could if they felt inclined dispense with their dependence on English consular protection.[66]

(iv)

Such were the fortunes of the mission in the autumn of 1840 when, through the intervention of the major Powers, Ibrāhīm Pasha was driven out of Syria. Through their schools and the printing press the

[63] Since this paper is concerned primarily with Beirut, suffice it to say that the Jerusalem station was held precariously for some ten years from roughly 1834 to 1844. Among those who occupied the station for short or long periods mention may be made here of William Thomson, Asa Dodge, George Whiting and Betsey Tilden. Here too schools were found to be the most effective method. Such schools were in fact established in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Ar-Ramlah. The station was relinquished after the establishment of an Anglican Bishop in the Holy City and at a time when the Americans were having another flirtation, on Mount Lebanon, with the Druzes

[64] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. .01. See letter dated Beirut December 22, 1834, from Bird, Smith, Thomson, Whiting and Dodge to Anderson

[65] *National Archives* (Washington), Department of State, Record Group No. 59, Beirut, vol. I. See petition dated November 30, 1836, from Whiting and others

[66] Eli Smith who maintained extensive correspondence with such agents used his influence in their behalf when the Minister found their number in excess of

mission were able to establish some influence over a number of teachers, copyists, translators, colporteurs, and, with hopes for the future, a larger number of pupils and a few young men and women. Among these were men who acquired fame in the literary history of Syria. Apart from the two Shidyāq brothers mention may be made here of Nāsīf Al-Yāzijī, Mīkhā'il Mishāqah,[67] and Buṭrus Al-Bustānī. Every one of them was, in one way or the other, influenced by the mission, and had close connections with it. The one member of the mission who seems to have foreseen more clearly perhaps than his colleagues the usefulness of literary connections was Eli Smith. It is no part of the purpose of this paper to discuss his relations with all of these personalities; it is proposed to study Smith's relations with Buṭrus Al-Bustānī only.

Buṭrus, son of Būluṣ, son of ʿAbdullāh, Al-Bustānī was born in 1819 in the village of Dubbiyah and was educated in the Maronite Seminary at ʿAin Warqah where he studied theology, logic, philosophy, Arabic, Syriac, Latin and Italian. It is often stated that he was employed by the British army as an interpreter in the autumn of 1840.[68] But there is no evidence that he had begun to learn English before that time. There is good evidence, however, that in November 1840 he was employed as teacher in the Male Seminary in Beirut.[69] Simultaneously he taught Arabic to, and learnt English from, Eli Smith and other members of the American mission.[70] Bustānī's religious, educational and literary development, as influenced by the mission in general and by Eli Smith in particular, will now be studied largely on the basis of unpublished Arabic letters he wrote to Smith, and partly on the basis of the unpublished English records of the American Board and the American consulate.

The earliest mention of his conversion to Protestantism is to his credit.

American needs and ordered their dismissal. See *Minutes of the Prudential Committee*, V, p. 305

[67] This is the current transliteration; strictly it should be 'Mushāqah', derived from the profession of the family which was carding silk; cf. *Muḥīṭ Al-Muḥīṭ*, vol. II, p. 1980; *Extraits des Mémoires de Miḥāīl Mišāqah*, edited by A. J. Rustum and S. Abou Chacra (Beirut, 1955), page "*Jim*"

[68] Cf. Jurji Zaidān, *Tarājim Mashāhir Ash-Sharq* (Cairo, 1922), vol. II, p. 27. This work is rather vague, and even misleading, on the first contact between Bustānī and the American mission

[69] *A Brief Chronicle of the Syria Mission* (1819–1901), p. 7. (Mimeograph copy in the private possession of Mrs Bayard Dodge, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A. whose kindness it is a pleasant duty to acknowledge.)

[70] Cf. the statement Bustānī made in a public lecture some twenty years later, *Khuṭbah fi Ādāb Al-Lughah Al-ʿArabiyya* (Beirut, 1859), pp. 36–7, that he spent ten years at ʿAin Warqah "learning and teaching"

In a critical review of the work of the mission after two decades of labour, a member of the mission, a graduate of Yale and Andover Theological Seminary, thus wrote of him: "The young man from ʿAin Warqah whom we are now training as a translator . . . has become gradually, and from his own reflections, a firm Protestant, and manifests a tender conscience." [71] Less than four years after his first contact with the mission he so impressed Anderson during his second visit to Syria in 1844 that he recommended the mission to prepare him to enter the ministry. Anderson states that Bustānī told him that he was anxious "to be preaching to the people".[72]

But Smith had anticipated Anderson; for four years he had already been carefully instructing Buṭrus in the Protestant faith. Their earliest joint literary cooperation on these lines is very interesting. Smith wrote a treatise in English delineating the Protestant beliefs which Bustāni translated into Arabic, and which was published in Beirut in 1843.[73] This seems to have been the first of Bustānī's varied and numerous literary works. The treatise is obviously written for the very few intelligent and educated native Protestants, like Bustānī, and not for the general public or even to pupils in the mission schools.[74]

Thus Bustānī was led on the way of writing while teaching. Indeed he learnt to tackle several tasks successfully at the same time. He must have perceived that the ministry was too limited a scope for his talents. Furthermore "material" considerations seem to have discouraged him. A preacher, and a native preacher at that, earned much less than, for example, a translator or even a copyist. Bustāni managed easily to be a teacher in a school, a private tutor in Arabic, a translator, and an occasional preacher, and worker in connection with the printing press. A few years later, Eli Smith confessed to Anderson of his disappointment that Bustānī after all did not wish to become a minister. "I long ago cherished the hope", he wrote, "that Buṭrus Bistāny[75] would

[71] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.5, vol. III (loose papers kept in an envelope). See letter marked 'confidential' dated June 1, 1842, from Wolcott to Anderson

[72] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 2.1.1, vol. III (Letters-Foreign). See letter dated April 23, 1844, to the "Syrian Mission". In another letter Anderson writes: "My affectionate remembrance, if you please, to Buṭrus."

[73] *Kitāb Al-Bāb Al-Maftuḥ fi Aʿmāl Ar-Rūh* (Beirut, 1843)

[74] Bustānī also translated or improved existing missionary translations of Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* under the Arabic title of *Siyāḥat Masiḥi*, D'Aubigne's *History of Redemption* under the Arabic title of *Tārīkh Al-Fidāʾ*, and other works.

[75] This is not a slip on the part of Smith. Buṭrus himself thus wrote his name in Latin characters, and many missionary records spell his name after this fashion.

enter the ministry. Before your visit I had begun to give him instruction in theology, and when immediately after that . . . he refused to be considered as a candidate, I still urged him to continue the study, hoping he might change his mind." [76]

But Bustānī was still useful to the mission. When in 1844 a considerable number of the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Haṣbayya decided, not entirely on spiritual grounds, to secede from their Church and applied to the American mission for religious instruction in the Protestant faith, Bustānī, together with another native convert, Ilyās Fawwāz, was sent to the village to prepare for a visit by Smith and Whiting.[77] The local disorder that ensued, and the larger Druze–Maronite disturbance in Mount Lebanon, figure prominently in the Arabic letters which Bustānī wrote to Smith who had in the meantime gone to the United States on leave. In a letter covering two pages Bustānī perceives in the civil strife a providential "opening for the propagation of the gospel and a hastening of the approach of the day of the discomfiture of false worships". He informs his teacher that he preached twice a week to a few listeners and expounded a chapter of St John every Sunday afternoon.[78] As to Haṣbayya, "I am prepared", he wrote, "to go there, and preach to the people on the first possible opportunity."

The new Protestants in Haṣbayya had sent several distress messages to the mission in Beirut, but none of the Americans or of their native assistants was prepared to run the risk of going there. Bustānī makes this clear in a covering letter, enclosing five others from Haṣbayya, addressed to Smith. "The best course", he writes, "is for Fāris Ad-Dabaghī to open the school and instruct the children, and for the adults to meet for prayer as hitherto, till an opportunity presents itself for one of us to go to them."[79] Bustānī, who was now married to one of the first girls educated in missionary families and in the Female School in Beirut,[80], was virtually acting for Smith and keeping him informed of

[76] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. V. See letter dated June 17, 1851 to Anderson

[77] *The Missionary Herald*, XLI (1845), pp. 14–15

[78] Letter dated Bhamdūn July 9, 1845. This and the other letters quoted below are disfigured with grammatical mistakes and colloquialisms. (As Bustānī's Arabic letters to Eli Smith were found by the writer in uncatalogued and unsorted bundles kept in cardboard boxes in the Houghton Library, Harvard University, they are simply referred to by their dates without further identification.)

[79] Letter dated Bhamdūn, August 9, 1845

[80] Bustānī's wife, Rachel, received most of her domestic training at the hands of Mrs Eli Smith. A missionary source described her, with obvious exaggeration, as "the first girl taught to read in Syria". See *The Foreign Missionary* (Presbyterian), XLIII (1884–5), p. 290

the native affairs of the mission and the conditions in the country in general.

Meanwhile the mission decided in 1842 to "suspend" the Male Seminary in Beirut. Those boys who had acquired some knowledge of English at it were enticed away as interpreters by the British forces and became "demoralized and denationalized". Foreign speech and habits, imperfectly acquired, had disastrous consequences on the character and tastes of the boys. The mission's expectations, in this matter, were completely disappointed. During Anderson's visit to Beirut in 1844 it was decided, however, to reopen the Seminary, not in Beirut but in the new missionary station on the mountains at ʿAbieh, away from the corruptive influence of a city. The aim was now more than ever to train native ministers. Civil war, however, delayed the opening of the seminary till the autumn of 1846. Cornelius Van Dyck, a medical missionary recruited in 1840 was put in charge, and Bustānī was chosen for his assistant. They had eight boys to start with who were required to board, dress and live according to the native style.[81] However, teaching did not prevent Bustānī from continuing to engage in other activities. Indeed, it was an opportunity for him to embark on the production of textbooks, and his first attempt was an elementary arithmetic book. Smith, who himself had written an elementary arithmetic for the mission schools, unselfishly helped Bustānī to utilize his material, to adapt it and prepare it for the press.[82]

Another textbook produced by Bustānī was an elementary Arabic grammar. This book, too, was an adaptation of another author's product. The *Propaganda Fide* had in 1836 published such a book written by the Maronite prelate, Jibrīl Farḥāt Al-Ḥalabī.[83] Bustānī's work was professedly a revised issue of Farḥāt's book, allegedly based on defective manuscript copies, but no mention whatsoever is made of the printed book. With a short preface and explanatory notes, Bustānī's edition contains less than ten additional pages on prosody by Nāṣif Al-Yāzijī.[84] The preface is interesting in one particular. A book intended for use in

[81] *The Missionary Herald*, XLIII (1847), pp. 83–4; Zaidān, *Mashāhīr*, vol. II, p. 26 is not correct in saying that Van Dyck "decided to found the seminary at ʿAbieh". He was no more than an agent of the mission carrying out its policy

[82] *Kitāb Kashf Al-Ḥijab fī ʿIlm Al-Ḥisāb* (Beirut, 1848); an offshoot of this work was on book-keeping entitled *Kitāb Raudat At-Tājir fī Mask Ad-Dafātir* (Beirut, 1851)

[83] *Kitāb Baḥth Al-Maṭālib wa Ḥath Al-Ṭālib* (Malta, 1836)

[84] *Kitāb Misbāḥ At-Ṭālib fī Bahth Al-Maṭālib* (Beirut, 1854); an adaptation of this work under the title of *Bulūgh Al-Arab fī Naḥw Al-Arab* was never published; it was simply Bustānī's teaching notes

missionary schools would be expected to quote the Bible, not the Qur'ān. After a sentence praising God, the preface opens with two verses from the latter. "Praise be to God, the high, the most gracious! Who taught by the Pen; taught Man what he knew not."

But that is only a beginning of Bustānī's widening horizons. He embraced the Protestant faith, but he never allowed the Protestant missionaries to have complete control over his sympathies which grew wider with increased knowledge and experience. He was already on the way to literary fame. At the age of twenty-six he was a principal instrument in forming an Arabic literary society which he called *majma' at-tahdhīb*. Its fourteen members included the native Protestant converts, only two American missionaries, Dr. Cornelius Van Dyck and Dr. Henry De Forest, and Nāṣīf Al-Yāzijī who was employed by the mission but never became a Protestant. The secretary of the society himself and the most active of its members was Bustānī. It held its first meeting either late in December 1845 or early in January 1846, when the subject discussed was "whether it was lawful to hold slaves?" The first article of its constitution declares the aim to be "the cultivation of the mind and the acquisition of useful knowledge". Bustānī's letter[85] announcing the formation of the society, listing the names of its members and detailing its rules and regulations, expresses the hope that it would serve the evangelical cause.[86] This society deserves more careful study than it has so far received.[87]

The society was not a creation of the mission, but in so far as it brought together American missionaries and intelligent native elements

[85] Letter dated January 10, 1846, to Smith, then in the U.S.A.

[86] In a report entitled *Malta Protestant College* (London, 1854) drawn up by the lay member of an English committee which in 1849 visited, among other places, Beirut, it is stated erroneously (vol. I, p. 229) that "this society was established by the American missionaries". Members of the English committee were invited to attend a meeting of the society on June 2, 1849, during which the subject of discussion was "patriotism", a subject which was to occupy much of Bustānī's time

[87] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), p. 51, is very muddled about the name, date, aims and membership of this society. For the revised constitution see *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, II, (1848), pp. 379 ff. It begins with these words: "This gathering (*maḥfal*) shall be called a Syrian society for the acquisition of arts and sciences" = (*li'ktisāb al-'ulūm wa' l-funūn*). The second article states that the society has "nothing to do with politics or religious controversy". Its members, according to the third article, were native, corresponding and honorary, in this order. The constitution was transmitted to the Z.D.M.G. by Eli Smith who wrote that the initiative came from native youth and that the mission "promised what assistance we could render"

it was a useful point of contact. If Bustānī's cooperation with the mission was not always as close as they desired, his collaboration with Smith was for life. From 1848 to Smith's death it embraced a most important task. For a long time, Protestant missions in the Mediterranean region were experimenting with various issues of the Bible in Arabic. At last the American mission took the ambitious decision to produce their own translation from the original Hebrew and Greek. The task was entrusted to Smith who not unnaturally turned to his pupil and friend for assistance. Accordingly Bustānī was transferred to Beirut.[88]

Both had to acquire a working knowledge of Hebrew and Greek. But it is no detraction from the value of their work to say that any examination of random parts of the American translation, and its comparison with the then existing or previous translations, will not fail to reveal that the task was not all that difficult. Often enough, mere verbal changes were all that was necessary. Indeed, Smith himself laid it down, in a progress report written in 1854, as one of the principles governing his work "not to depart without sufficient cause from the phraseology consecrated by long usage in the current translations". In 1848 a beginning was made on Genesis. But Smith made it a labour of love, and he spared no effort to produce a superior version. His system was as follows: Bustānī would produce a first draft which Smith would check and revise with him. Then with Nāsīf Al-Yāzijī, who knew only Arabic, Smith without Bustānī would go over the revised draft, largely to eliminate words or idioms inadmissible by classical standards, without diminishing the meaning as Smith understood it. The draft would then be printed and circulated to scholars, ecclesiastics and friends in Syria and all over the Christian world. The first printed draft was circulated in 1851.

There are among Smith's papers letters from the priest of the Samaritans in Nābulus[89] and from a Druze notable,[90] both dealing with the translation of the Book of Genesis. While the former says very briefly he had "compared" (with what he does not say), and expresses no opinion at all, the latter, with commendable sense, shaky grammar and erratic orthography, pleaded he knew neither Hebrew nor Greek, and could

[88] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. IV. See document No. 21, a letter dated March 20, 1848, from Smith and six others to Anderson

[89] See joint letter dated July 29, 1853, from ʿImrān (the Samaritan priest) and ʿAudah ʿAzzām (the native Protestant and honorary British consular agent in Nābulus)

[90] Letter dated Dhu'l Qaʿdah 3, 1267, from Yūsuf ʿAbdul-Malik

not therefore say whether the translation was faithful to the original or not. But he compared Smith's draft with the Rome edition and found verbal variations but no change in meaning. On closer examination, however, and with the aid of the lexicon *Aṣ-Ṣaḥāḥ*, he was of the opinion that the American was an improvement over the Roman translation. This is clearly a linguistic verdict, from one moreover whose linguistic attainments as revealed in his polite letter were not considerable.[91]

(v)

Hard on his playing a major role in launching the literary society, Bustānī turned to an equally important matter, the organization of an independent native church in Beirut. It was Anderson's policy[92] that the mission should, as soon as possible, establish native churches under the pastoral care of native ministers. Theory, however, often does not work easily in practice. The American missionaries in Beirut had from the beginning constituted themselves as a church to which native converts were admitted. They were not yet prepared to grant independence to their "immature" native brethren. Apart from lack of competent native pastors, the small native Protestant community was dependent for its material existence on the mission. It was not self-supporting, and the idea of raising money from local sources for an independent church was still alien to their thinking.[93]

But news of the successful organization of native Protestant churches of seceding Armenians and their recognition by the Ottoman authorities through British diplomatic offices must have prompted Bustānī to act. He himself was already restless and dissatisfied with his conditions of service and pay. When the handful of native Protestants held their meeting at ʿAbeih in July 1847, he was their chairman and moving spirit. The outcome of the meeting was a lengthy letter addressed to the

[91] It is not proposed to follow the history of the translation here. After the death of Smith in 1857, Van Dyck assisted by Shaikh Yūsuf Al-Asīr completed the task in 1865. Neither Bustānī nor Yāzijī seem to have been employed to work on this stage of the project. (Bustānī's total fees for his part in the translation amounted to 50,000 Piastres (= $1,923), according to an entry in one of Anderson's notebooks. *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 30, vol. XVI, p. 5)

[92] R. Anderson, *History of the Missions of the ABCFM to the Oriental Churches*, vol. I, 260

[93] In 1850 the twelve male members of the native church were all employed by the mission, and the four female members "resided in the families of the missionaries". Cf. *The Missionary Herald*, XLVI (1850), pp. 256–7

American missionaries from "your children in the Lord". Not only a recognition of the principle of separate and independent church was sought, but as if anticipating an affirmative response, rules and regulations of "The Evangelical Church of Beirut" were appended to the letter.[94] Bustānī was by far the most intelligent and highly educated of the signatories, and it may be safely assumed that the letter and the rules and regulations were all the product of his own mind. The petition was successful and a church with nineteen members was organized in the spring of 1848 under two native deacons, Ṭannūs Al-Ḥaddād and Ilyās Fawwāz, two of the earliest converts.[95] Bustānī himself was not interested in holding any clerical office.

Thus within about seven years of his first connection with the mission, Bustānī had established himself as the chief Native Protestant spokesman. His work with Smith on the translation of the Bible necessitated his giving up teaching for the time being, but he continued his occasional work with the press, and through Smith's influence secured the post of dragoman at the American consulate. According to Smith, Bustānī's income from his various jobs had now been doubled.[96] Nevertheless he continued to describe himself as *al-muʿallim*, a term which at the time did not simply mean "teacher", but also an expert in his craft whether it was teaching or otherwise. Bustānī was no doubt acquiring a variety of skills that befitted him for the role of an expert. But his development was painfully slow as the following account will show.

Not the least of his acquired accomplishments was a taste for public lecturing, translating and editing. One of the lectures of this period was on the education of women. No doubt Bustānī's experience of family life among members of the American mission and his marriage to a girl who was educated in an American family and in the Female Seminary of the mission played their part in shaping his ideas on the

[94] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. IV. See document No. 23, an undated letter, but written shortly after the meeting held on July 10, 1847, which adopted the resolution contained therein

[95] Anderson poured cold water on Bustānī's plan to raise funds in America in support of the native church. In a letter dated May 27, 1848, addressed to the "Syria Mission" he says: "If our brother Buṭrus has ever had the thought of getting an independent support from this country, he should relinquish it altogether. None [in America] who regard the true welfare of religion in Syria will countenance any cause that tends to divide the strength and impair the peace of the mission and its operations." See *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 2.1.1, vol. XI

[96] *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. IV. See document No. 199, a letter dated June 17, 1851 from Smith to Anderson

subject. After some rational argument and a historical introduction, the lecture advocates that females should receive education in religious knowledge, domestic science, mothercraft, arithmetic, history, geography, the mother tongue and possibly also foreign languages.[97]

As a helper of the mission church and as a member of the native church he was still preaching in Beirut and elsewhere. But his letters to Smith began to reveal an increasing tendency towards more "lay" activities. Couched in most respectful terms in the early days, some of these letters tended later on to be no more than formally correct. In one such letter,[98] Bustānī bluntly serves notice of his wish to give up responsibility for the *minbar*[99] and Sunday preaching at Beirut and Kafr Shīmā "since we have some business which prevents us from continuing this service". The same letter gives a clue as to the reason for his vexation. "If you have the time", he asks, "we would like to know in clear language and in details the reasons which compelled the mission to return a negative answer to the [native] church."

The nature of the matter in dispute may be deduced from the circumstances. It would appear to have been connected with the desire for more independence on the part of the native church, a desire which was probably not backed with tangible offers of native material support. Be that as it may, Bustānī was sincere in saying he had other business. His work on the translation of the Bible was a leisurely business spread over many years. It occupied no more than a fraction of his time, and demanded much less effort than he was capable of applying to any work. Simultaneously, therefore, with the task of translation, he began literary production, not necessarily restricted as it had so far been to textbooks.

But he was still far from being original. Taken in chronological order the first work was a simple edition of the history of Lebanon by a native historian.[100] The second was a lecture on Arabic literature, ancient and modern, which is remarkable for its genuine spirit of patriotism.[101] Bustānī expresses surprise that the Arabs did not translate Homer and Virgil, and dwells on the glory of the past history, and suggests means to promote revival. He saw salvation in more schools,

[97] Arabic text was published in F. A. Bustānī, *Rawāʿ*, No. 22, pp. 1–24. The style of the lecture shows Bustānī struggling to achieve clarity and smoothness. In places, the Arabic is clumsy and betrays traces of possible translation from an original in a foreign language

[98] Letter dated October 5, 1854

[99] Note the use of an Islamic term for the Christian "pulpit"

[100] Ṭannūs Shidyāq, *Kitāb Akẖbār Al-Aʿyān fi Jabal Lubnān* (Beirut, 1859)

[101] *Khutbah fi Ādāb Al-Lughah Al-ʿArabiyyah* (Beirut, 1859)

libraries, journals and printing presses. The lecture which covers some forty printed pages concludes with praise of Sultan ʿAbdul-Majīd for "granting liberty and establishing schools". From now on Bustānī's books are prefaced or concluded with flattering terms to the ruling sultan, the governor of the province or the Pasha of Egypt. He was obviously seeking official favour and patronage.

Another work of this experimental period was a new edition of the collected poems of a leading poet of the Abbasid age with simple short notes but without introduction.[102] The edition begins with the Koranic "In the name of the Merciful and Compassionate God" and ends with a note giving the date of preparing the transcript for the press first in A.H. and then in A.D. Such small matters are indicative of the working of Bustānī's mind. He had by now become independent of the mission, and showed ample evidence of his disapproval of their necessarily sectarian approach. Indeed, there is evidence in the next production that he was, in half veiled terms, challenging the missionary view of their pet subject, "The Martyr of Syria". In issuing a new version of the story,[103] he claims he derived his facts from the victim's own writing or the writings of members of his original community. However, his version differs very little from the outline of the story already published by the mission. But there is a material difference in the spirit with which the facts were presented.

The purpose of Bustānī's book, according to its introduction, was not to condemn those who maltreated Asʿad Shidyāq, or to pass judgment in any way. Those who wrote before, says Bustānī, derived their information from "interested" sources. His aim was to establish the true facts without bias, and to discount certain unfounded assertions which ascribed to Shidyāq's persecutors "actions which they did not commit, and aims which they never conceived", and to him "characteristics, action and aims which ill accord with truth". Without actually saying so, these words amount to an indictment of the mission and the version of the story which they had circulated for more than thirty years. Here is further evidence of Bustānī's growing intellectual independence and standing apart from the mission.

The death of Smith in January 1857 put an end to Bustānī's major

[102] *Dīwān Al-Mutanabbī* (Beirut, 1860); this was among the first-fruits of the association, noted below (pp. 168–9)

[103] *Qissat Asʿad Shidyāq Bākūrat Sūriyya* (Beirut, 1860). Perhaps the earliest missionary version of the story in Arabic was the one printed anonymously at Malta in 1833 under the title of *Khabariyyat Asʿad Ash-Shidyāq* (some fifty pages of small size)

connection with the mission. His work on the translation of the Bible was discontinued.[104] Such occasional work as he did for the press was no longer attractive to him, for he was now engaged in literary production on his own account while holding the office of dragoman at the American consulate. But the above account of his connection with the mission leaves little doubt of his great debt to the mission in general and to Eli Smith in particular. It was through them that he discovered his *métier*, and it was they who launched him on his early adaptation and editing of other works before he was emboldened by success to try his hand at more original works. Moreover, it was the mission's patronage that secured him the influential post of dragoman.

Bustānī filled the post of dragoman with such distinction that in 1857 he came to be the effective consul. The circumstances are of special interest as further evidence of the influence of the mission. In the spring of 1857 the American consul in Beirut went on long leave. Before his departure he received a petition signed by all the American missionaries urging him not to deposit the seals of his office "with any subject of the Sultan". They specifically recommended Noel Moore, the British consul, to act as American consul *ad interim*.[105]

That ruled out Bustānī. It is a matter of conjecture whether the mission's action was directed against him, since he was no doubt the only eligible Ottoman subject, and one who had patriotic propensities and local interests not wholly in agreement with the policy and methods of the mission.[106] But Moore's oversight of the consulate was so nominal that Bustānī was left in virtual control for over a year, from April 4, 1857, to July 22, 1858. According to the new consul "the official correspondence of this consulate" was conducted during this

[104] The statement in Yūsuf Sarkis, *Muʿjam Al-Maṭbūʿāt al ʿArabiyya wal-Muʿarrabah* (Cairo 1346/1928), p. 557, and in Georg Graf, *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur* (Rome, 1951), vol. IV, p. 326 that Bustānī helped Van Dyck with the translation is inaccurate. Cf. p. 163, note 91 above. Cf. further the obituary notice of Bustānī written by members of his family, *Dāʾirat Al-Maʿārif*, vol. VII, (1883), p. 590 where it is stated that Van Dyck completed the translation but no mention is made of his receiving assistance from Bustānī

[105] *National Archives* (Washington), Department of State, Record Group No. 59, Beirut, vol. III. See letter dated January 6, 1858, from Noel Moore, acting American consul, to Lewis Cass, U.S.A. Minister in Constantinople with enclosures

[106] Although he owed his position in the consulate to the mission, he was on occasion reluctant to fulfil their wishes. In a letter dated October 25, 1855, to Eli Smith he politely rejects a recommendation from a junior member of the mission for the employment of a native applicant, and asks for supporting recommendations from *native* notables

period in Arabic only.[107] By custom Moore expected to be paid by the Americans for his services. Bustānī, who was of course on the regular payroll, carried out the business of the consulate and paid all the expenses out of his own pocket. When claims were made by Moore and Bustānī, it transpired that the latter had borrowed money "at a high rate of interest" to pay salaries and to defray expenses. As usual with such claims, the papers went forward and backward between Beirut, Constantinople and Washington, where the State Department and the Treasury each contributed its share to increase the muddle and delay. Bustānī's claim, which amounted to $967.52 (= Piastres 23,222.2), was thus still outstanding in the spring of 1859.[108] In any case, three years later he relinquished the post of dragoman in favour of his son, Salīm.

It is doubtful that Bustānī was informed of the mission's representations to the departing consul. Since the death of Smith his relations with the mission were friendly but not intimate. The period of active collaboration with the mission came to an end about 1860. Common spiritual interest in the native church, however, helped to maintain some relationship and sympathy. When on the eve of the civil war in Syria, the American Board decided to introduce economies in the expenditure of the Syria mission, the native Church Council at the instigation of Bustānī arranged for a token contribution of 1,000 Piastres (= $40) to be sent to Anderson from the members. In addition, Bustānī, who owed much of his prosperity to the mission, showed his gratitude by a personal contribution of $200.[109]

Bustānī's increased prosperity was matched by marked activity in the literary sphere. In the opening months of 1860 there was established in Beirut an association (*sharikah*) composed among others of Ḥusain Bayhum as president, Buṭrus Bustānī as managing secretary, Khālid Abū An-Naṣr, Salīm Bustrus, Saʿd Ḥimadah, Khalīl Khūri and others. The association was called *Al-ʿUmdah Al-Adabiyyah li Ishhār Al-Kutub Al-ʿArabiyyah*. It is clearly a literary society for the publication of

[107] *National Archives* (Washington), Department of State, Record Group 59, Beirut, vol. III. See despatch dated August 1, 1858 from Augustus Johnson to Secretary of State

[108] *Ibid.* See despatch dated March 29, 1859 from Johnson to Lewis Cass, enclosing a letter in English from Bustānī

[109] English letter dated January 25, 1860 from Bustāni to Anderson, and Arabic letter dated April 13, 1860 from members of the Evangelical church in Beirut to Anderson. These two letters are better appreciated if read in conjunction with Anderson's letter to the Syria mission dated February 17, 1860. *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 2.1.1, vol. XXVI (Letters – Foreign)

Arabic books, which in the words of a contemporary source symbolized union among members of various communities.[110]

(vi)

"Civil war has actually commenced in all its fury." Thus wrote Henry Jessup to the American Board at the beginning of June 1860. One of the most versatile missionaries in Syria, Jessup never concealed his contempt of the "nominal" Christians of the country and of the Ottoman authorities. Winding up his report of the course of the war he wrote: "In view of the fact that the Greek and the Papal ecclesiastics have been stirring their people to a war of extermination against the Druzes, it would seem as though the reverses and defeats are a just punishment." [111]

Reverses and defeats, however, were not confined to either side in the combat. The whole political and social order in the country was rudely upset. Nor did the American mission escape damage. Not only had the missionaries to withdraw from their mountain stations, one of which at Dair Al-Qamar was almost completely destroyed, but their main occupation of preaching and teaching, and even printing, had to be suspended. The Americans sustained losses estimated in an official despatch at $60,000,[112] but all the members of the mission were safely evacuated to Beirut where most of them took part in assisting the Anglo-American committee set up for relief. The missionary compound in Beirut was overcrowded with American families and with many more native Protestant refugees. Civil war in Syria and financial difficulties in Boston played havoc with the operation of the mission.

In the midst of this colossal disaster, Bustānī was torn between conflicting loyalties. There is no question of the sincerity of his conversion to the Protestant faith; but he could scarcely help feeling sympathy in his heart for the suffering of his former community or of his compatriots in general. While holding office in a foreign consulate he could not openly take sides. He seems to have confined himself to doing what he could through the relief committee.[113] But neither the national

[110] *Hadīqat Al-Akhbār* No. 112, 11/23 February 1860, p. 3

[111] *The Missionary Herald*, LVI (1860), pp. 241, 243

[112] *National Archives* (Washington), Department of State, Record Group No. 59 (Beirut), vol. IV. See despatch dated March 9, 1861 from Johnson to the Secretary of State

[113] A printed circular dated August 23, 1860, and signed by Noel Moore, President of the Anglo-American Committee, states that "the basis of the committee [was] wholly unsectarian". A copy of this circular (document No. 102) is preserved in the *ABCFM Archives*, Series ABC: 16.8.1, vol. VI, pt. 1 (1860–70)

calamity, nor his assistance with relief, seem to have interfered with his literary interests. Thus he was able soon after the restoration of order to publish an illustrated translation of the first part of *The Life and Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*,[114] and another elementary textbook on Arabic grammar,[115] a simplification of his earlier book noted above.

Bustānī did not, however, while away his time, amidst the wreckage, merely translating Defoe and restating the elements of grammar for beginners. The events of 1860 introduced an upheaval in his thinking matched only by that caused by his conversion to Protestantism. He had already shown his capacity to rise above sectarian loyalties. Now he had gone a step farther and decided that allegiance to the *waṭan* (fatherland) must supersede all other allegiances. As it unfolded itself in his writings, the doctrine of the "love of the fatherland" embraced two elements: (*a*) support of Ottoman legitimacy, (*b*) spread of literary enlightenment. And he practised what he preached. The publication of his grammar book just mentioned was the occasion for expressing his loyalty to the Ottoman rulers of the country. The book was completed, Bustānī writes, "in the Caliphate[116] of His Majesty our greatest King, the Sultan of the two lands and the *Khaqan* of the two seas, Sultan ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz . . . May God establish his state with glory and prosperity, and perpetuate his power and victory." It is dedicated, in equally flattering terms, to the grand vizier, Fuād Pasha, who had a hand in the pacification of Lebanon and Syria after the civil war. Nor did the author forget the Pasha of the province of Ṣaida or the governor of Lebanon, for each received compliments suitable to his station in life.[117]

All this must not be mistaken for an empty effusion of an opportunist. The next two moves prove Bustānī sincere in his sentiments. At the height of the communal bitterness following the events of 1860, he launched an occasional sheet[118] in which he preached the gospel of

[114] *Kitāb At-Tuḥfah Al-Bustāniyyah fī'l Asfār Al-Karūziyyah* (Beirut, 1861). Here again Bustānī was not a pioneer. Robinson Crusoe had already been translated into Arabic and printed anonymously in Malta in 1835

[115] *Kitāb Miftāḥ Al-Miṣbāḥ* (Beirut, 1862)

[116] The use of this term by a Christian Arab should be of interest to certain contemporary writers who often assert that the idea of the Ottoman Caliphate was largely developed under ʿAbdul-Hamid II

[117] Subjoined to this loyal page is a note from Simeon Calhoun, Principal of ʿAbeih Seminary, and Cornelius Van Dyck, Manager of the American Press, recommending the book to both teachers and pupils

[118] *Nafīr Sūriyya*. The first number was published on September 29, 1860, addressed to "fellow compatriots" from "a lover of the fatherland" who does not print his name. He reminds the Syrians that despite the recent internecine strife they were bound together by common fatherland, language, customs and interests.

reconciliation and concord among the communities and of general enlightenment through schools, books, libraries. Bustānī was now forty-one, but even at the age of twenty-six he had showed similar restraint and sense in reporting on the earlier Druze–Maronite war. In a letter dated July 9, 1845, addressed to Eli Smith, he definitely states that "the Christians were this time the aggressors, since the Druzes had from the beginning no design to fight". The Christians, he adds, were bent on exterminating the Druzes and "took no account of the [Ottoman] Government". Bustānī's estimate of the events of 1845 is strikingly similar to Jessup's of the events of 1860. But while Jessup had little or no sympathy with the Ottoman authorities, Bustānī was for law and order under the legitimate government. He saw clearly that the welfare of the fatherland (*Al-waṭan*) demanded enlightenment within the framework of Ottoman rule.

The boys' boarding school[119] which he established in 1863 in Beirut was another logical step in this direction, and also a step away from the system of the mission.[120] As its name, *Al-Madrasah Al-Waṭaniyyah*, implies it was based on general patriotic as opposed to sectarian lines.[121] It was an immediate success, so that within two years of its opening it had 150 pupils on roll.[122] According to its founder, it was established

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He hopes that they will forget the past in their own interest and that of the country, and that he will address them on the subject again. He did so in a dozen issues. From the fourth number a subtitle was added *Al-Waṭaniyya Ar-Rābi'a* = the fourth patriotic (circular). The interval between one issue and another varied from one week at first to two months towards the end. Thus No. 10 came out on February 22, 1861 and No. 11 on April 22, 1861. In the second number the editor supported Fuād Pasha's mission

[119] There was already a native girls school established in Beirut in 1862 by Michel 'Aramān, Bustānī's successor at 'Abeih and one of the shining stars of the first products of missionary labour. 'Aramān with his wife, who like Bustānī's wife was educated in missionary families and in the Female Seminary, were running the school. The Female Seminary, after an experimental period in Beirut, was moved in 1861 to Sūq Al-Gharb, under the direction of Daniel Bliss and his wife

[120] Indeed there is evidence that, through his presidency of the Beirut Bible Society (*Jam'iyyat Bairūt Al-Injīliyyah*) established in 1862, he managed native missionary work independent of the American. See First Annual Report of the Society, Beirut, 1863, pp. 6–8

[121] The word "national" for *waṭaniyyah* has been deliberately avoided. The school was not "national" in the full sense of the word. It was actually an inter-denominational Christian institution which, in contrast to the mission schools, stressed no particular creed or dogma. It attracted pupils not only from Syria but also from Egypt, Iraq and even Turkey and Greece

[122] Buṭrus Al-Bustānī, *Kitāb Dā'irat Al-Ma'ārif* (Beirut, 1881), vol. V, p. 751; cf. *The Missionary Herald*, LXI (1865), p. 5

on "national" principles (*ussisat ʿalā mabādiʾ waṭaniyyah*); it was non-sectarian; it fostered the language of the fatherland; it cultivated the love of the fatherland; it promoted among its pupils patriotic relations; and finally it won the favour of the Ottoman government.[123]

When he made these statements in 1870, Bustānī struck a characteristic note. The period of originality in his thought and practice had already begun some ten years earlier. To this period belong his more enduring literary productions. In 1862 he announced that he was compiling an Arab dictionary "the like of which has never been conceived".[124] But he actually first thought of it in 1855 when he was still working with Smith on the translation of the Bible. In a letter to Smith he enquired whether he could come to an agreement with the American Press for the publication of "a short Arabic dictionary for the benefit of schools and the public in Egypt, modelled on the European system in the order of its vocabulary".[125] In the same letter, Bustānī was preparing the tools to start work on the dictionary "this summer". It took some fifteen years to see the light.[126]

The dictionary deserves more than ordinary notice. At least in its system it forged a new footpath in the forest of Arabic lexicography. Based largely on the *Qāmūs* of Al-Fīrūzābādī,[127] it introduced numerous scientific terms, neologisms, foreign terms, and colloquialisms.[128] Aware that he was departing from a practice consecrated by more authoritative lexicographers, Bustānī had to apologize for the innovation. He says while he "condescended" to include such vocabulary he was careful to call attention to its nature in every case.[129]

The single page introduction offers the dictionary "as a small service

[123] *Al-Jinān* (Beirut, 1870), vol. I, pp. 70–1. This was on the occasion of the annual visit to the school of the *mutasarrif* of Beirut

[124] On the final page of his *Kitāb Miftāḥ Al-Miṣbāḥ* (Beirut, 1862), p. 144; here again Bustānī is not strictly original. Once more his model seems to be another work by Jibrīl (Germanus) Farḥāt, *Iḥkām Bāb al-Iʿrāb ʿan Lughat al-Aʿrāb* (Marseilles, 1849). The French title is more explicitly *Dictionnaire Arabe*. The introduction clearly states that Farḥāt's work was a simplification and abridgement of Al-Fīrūzābādī

[125] Letter dated July 18, 1855, from Bustānī to Smith

[126] *Kitāb Muḥit Al-Muḥiṭ*, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1869–70). These two dates are mentioned at the end of the second volume

[127] An advertisement issued in 1870 adds the *Ṣaḥāḥ* of Al-Jauhari (see cover of *Al-Jinān*)

[128] Of those who questioned some of his judgments see R. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes* (Leiden, 1881), p. xi

[129] *Muḥiṭ Al-Muḥiṭ*, vol. I, p. 847. This occurs in a note dated July 21, 1866, printed at the end of the letter *Rāʾ*

from a lover of the fatherland (*muḥibb lil-waṭan*)[130] whose highest ambitions and aims are to witness the progress of his compatriots in learning and civilization through the medium of their noble language". This reveals very clearly the two elements we have already detected in Bustānī's patriotism. The first is promotion of enlightenment through the medium of Arabic; the second, acceptance of Ottoman legitimacy. Both are underlined in the same introduction. The dictionary is dedicated to Sultan ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz in terms similar to those quoted above.[131] The author was amply rewarded. He was granted a monetary prize of £T 250 and awarded the Majīdī Order, third class, a decoration which Bustānī must have been proud to earn. All his extant photographs show him with this decoration on his breast.[132]

To this period belongs a significant lecture published in forty-two pages.[133] Its central theme is the need for more schools, journals, printing presses and more improvements in Syria in general and Beirut in particular, with a digression to compare Arab with European social habits and customs. It makes an interesting assessment of the efforts of *Al-Jamʿiyyah Al-ʿIlmiyyah As-Sūriyyah*[134] still as "inadequate to meet the demands of the situation". The significance of this society is perhaps merely symbolic. Its members were prominent Muslims, Druzes and Christians who forgot their sectarian connection in pursuit of their "liberal" interests. Buṭrus Al-Bustānī is mentioned among its early members, and so far as could be discovered the only non-Arab member was Eli Smith.[135]

Also to this period belongs another general work such as Bustānī had produced in the experimental period. It must have had its inspiration in the French expeditionary force which came to Lebanon in 1860, too late to perform anything of a military nature. The book in question

[130] Cf. *Muḥiṭ Al-Muḥiṭ*, vol. I, p. 848: *fi sabīl khidmat al-waṭan* (= in the service of the fatherland)

[131] An offshoot of this dictionary was the simultaneous publication of what purports to be an abridgement under the title of *Kitāb Qatr Al-Muḥīṭ* also in two volumes, for use "by students". This dictionary is dedicated to Saʿīd Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt

[132] Cf. J. Zaidān, *Mashāhīr Ash-Sharq*, vol. II, p. 27; *Al-Mashriq*, vol. XII (1909), p. 929

[133] *Khiṭāb fi'l Haiʾa Al-Ijtimāʿiyyah* (Beirut, 1869)

[134] This is the society of which George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, 53–4, says that it was established in 1857 and which he describes as "the first outward manifestation of a collective [Arab] national consciousness".

[135] Cf. L. Cheikho, *La Littérature arabe au XIXe Siècle* (Beirut, 1908), vol. I, p. 71. Further research is required to establish the connection with the *majmaʿ* (1846) and *ʿumdah* (1860) mentioned above, pp. 161, 168

was the story of Napoleon.[136] Bustānī's production of books was greatly facilitated at this stage by his establishment, in partnership with Khalīl Sarkīs, of *Maṭbaʿat Al-Maʿārif* in 1867, a partnership which lasted till 1874 when Sarkīs on his own established *Al-Maṭbaʿah Al-Adabiyya*. Many of Bustānī's works were printed at the former press.

Meanwhile the American mission was facing a crisis affecting not only its school system but its very existence. The Syrian disorders did only minor damage compared with the effects of the American civil war. Contributions to the funds of the Board in Boston became irregular and less generous, and the depreciation in the American currency increased greatly all expenses on salaries and equipment. Missions of the Board all over the world were required to cut down their expenses and concentrate on essential services.[137]

[136] *Tārīkh Nābulyūn Al-Awwal* (Beirut, 1868). This is the only work ascribed to Bustānī which is not authenticated. No copy could be found in the British Museum, or in the school of Oriental Studies in London, or in Oxford. While in Beirut early in 1962 a search was made in the National Library, the American University and the Université St Joseph. Nothing could be found in the first two institutions, but in the library of the third there is a work entitled *Kitāb Tārikh Nābulyūn Bonbārta Al-Awwal*, the second edition of which was printed at Al-Maṭbaʿa Al-Wataniya in Beirut in 1868. Bustānī's name does not appear on it, but it may be safely assumed that this is the work listed uncritically by most bibliographers under his name. The genesis of this work is not without interest. In 1839 lists of Arabic books ordered by various centres in Syria and Palestine were sent to Cairo (see enclosures to Sharīf Pasha's letter dated 24 Jumāda I, 1255, document No. 204 in Maḥfazah No. 257, *National Historical Archives*, Abdin Palace, Cairo), and among the books ordered by more than one centre is one called *Tārīkh Bonbārta*. This probably refers to a book by Nikōlā At-Turk printed in Paris in 1839 (with a French version) under the title of *Dhikr Tamalluk Jumhūr Al-Faransāwiyya Al-Aqṭār Al-Miṣriyya wal-Bilād Ash-Shāmiyya*. Another book by Colonel Chevalier Louis Calligaris was published in Paris in 1856 in French as *Histoire de L'Empereur Napoleon 1er* and in Arabic as *Kitāb Sīrat Napulyūn Al-Awwal Imbratūr Al-Farānsāwiyya*. The introduction of the book ascribed to Bustānī admits ambiguously that additional material for it was culled from "an Arabic history written by a learned man", who lived at the time of the French invasion of Egypt and Syria. It also admits in a roundabout manner that the Arabic translation of Calligaris was also utilized. If Bustānī's "authorship" of the book published in Beirut is accepted, as it is indeed asserted not only by later bibliographers like Sarkīs, Brockelmann, Graf and Dāghir, but also by earlier writers like Edward Van Dyck (*Kitāb Ikitfā' Al-Qunū' bimā huwa Matū'*, Cairo, 1896, pp. 410–11), it is safe to assume that Bustānī's contribution was no more than an adaptation and simplification of Nikōlā At-Turk and Louis Calligaris

[137] Cf. *The Missionary Herald*, LVIII (1862), p. 143; cf. further the appeal by the Treasurer printed at the end of the January number (1863) asking for contributions towards expenses amounting to not less than $450,000

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Anderson's philosophy has always been that preaching should take precedence over teaching. Missionary schools were simply "a convenient method of inculcating a knowledge of the gospel",[138] and their ultimate object was the training of native preachers. Therefore any venture in post-primary education by the American mission, such as the two seminaries for boys and girls, was not for general education. "The Board has been obliged," wrote Anderson, "in the progress of its work, to decline connection with expensive institutions for general education, to prepare young men for secular and worldly pursuits." [139] This being the general policy, schools tended to be the first service to suffer stagnation or curtailment in a financial crisis. But despite the known policy of the American Board in regard to secular education, despite civil wars in Syria and America, and despite financial stringency, the American mission in Beirut had to consider the educational situation around them and its bearing on the future of their work.

The Roman Catholic missions in Syria antedate the American mission by two centuries. In the first half of the nineteenth century they renewed their efforts with increased vigour and ample financial support, largely from France. Post-primary schools for boys were thus started at, among other centres, Antoura and Ghazīr and similar schools for girls were simultaneously started by sisters of charity and the nuns of St Joseph.[140] The Maronites of course had their native schools, at the apex of which stood ʿAin Warqah. The other communities were perhaps not as fortunate, but each community had its own traditional system.

Bustānī's "national" school was unique in such a sectarian surrounding. Two years after its establishment, the Greek Orthodox community and the Greek Catholic community each established a "modern" school adopting Bustānī's system but not his ideals. The traditional Muslim system of education based on the *kuttāb* and the *madrasah* was similarly communal, attended almost entirely by Muslim children.

The American mission contributed its share to this communal educational set-up. In fact they aggravated it, by creating a new sect and schools to cater for its needs. It is true that their schools were open to children from all the communities, but the primary object of these

[138] R. Anderson, *Missionary Schools* (ABCFM Pamphlet, Boston, 1838), p. 21

[139] *Missionary Schools* (another ABCFM Pamphlet different from the first, Boston, 1861), pp. 17–18

[140] Cf. L. Cheikho, *La Littérature arabe*, vol. I, p. 45

schools was always to bring up the children in the Protestant faith. In the course of time, the American mission schools were, to a great extent, attended by children of converts to Protestantism. What were the missionaries to do when after the disturbances of 1860 they found their seminaries inadequate to absorb the product of their own primary schools? What attitude were they to adopt to the new Roman Catholic schools, the new schools of the other Christian communities, to the native private schools, to the Lebanon Schools Committee in connection with the Free Church in Scotland,[141] and to the schools of a new English mission initiated in 1860 by a dedicated woman.[142]

All the new schools, foreign and native, taught languages such as French and English besides Arabic. The American seminary, after its reconstitution at ʿAbeih, taught a little English only to those of its students who were prepared for the ministry. That was no longer adequate. The shrewd Lebanese saw little chance of advancement for his son in the growing commercial prosperity of Beirut if he only knew Arabic.[143] The mission was obviously in an embarrassing situation. Some native Protestants, converts through American labour, were constrained, in the absence of American institutions catering for the demand for foreign languages, to send their offsprings to other schools. Indeed the Jesuits, who had been multiplying their institutions in various parts of the country, were actually attracting "the children and youth of the Protestants", and one prominent Protestant did in fact send his son to a Jesuit college.[144]

Thus the inadequacy of ʿAbeih, competition with the Roman Catholic missions, rivalry between the American mission schools and the schools initiated by the British Syrian mission, private and ecclesiastical native initiative in establishing "modern" schools, the restlessness of the native Protestant community, the growing need of mercan-

[141] The schools owe their origin to local initiative, but in 1856 following a visit by a Scottish school inspector connection with the Free Church was established. See *Colonial Committee Minutes* (1856–60), pp. 11 ff. (These minutes are deposited with the Church of Scotland, Edinburgh.)

[142] This refers to the "British Syrian Mission" begun in 1860 by Elizabeth Lloyd, widow of Dr. James Bowen Thompson. See *Sunrise in Syria*, a history of the mission, (London, 1930), pp. 19 ff.

[143] As contemporary evidence of the demand for foreign languages even in girls schools see *Hadīqat Al-Akhbār*, No. 41, October, 4/16, 1858, p. 4. A native female teacher announces the opening of a private girls school and cites Buṭrus Bustānī as a referee. For pupils taking the general course the fees were 90 Piastres per term, but those wishing instruction in English an additional fee of 30 Piastres was charged

[144] *The Missionary Herald*, LIX (1863), p. 38

tile Beirut[145] for a "liberal" and "business" training of its youth, and other factors, all influenced the members of the American mission in Beirut to think that the time had come for a departure from the "narrow" aims of purely missionary schools. In January 1862[146] they decided to seek the Board's approval for the establishment of a collegiate literary institution. This was the first step towards the opening in 1866 of the Syrian Protestant College, now renowned as the American University of Beirut.

Since a study of the genesis of the college is reserved for another occasion,[147] the purpose of this essay would be served with a brief clarification of the connection between the college and the mission on the one hand, and between it and Bustānī's school on the other. While the college was missionary in conception, aims and proceedings, it was started as an independent institution with its own funds and board of managers. It was opened on December 3, 1866, with sixteen students in a small hired building, the property of Bustānī.[148] His school next door had already been a going concern as a boarding establishment for some three years, and even before the opening of the college an agreement was reached to associate it with the school. "The Board of Managers", wrote Daniel Bliss, the first principal of the college, "has adopted Mr Bistany's school as a preparatory department." [149] This arrangement was continued for three years and then the college moved to another hired building, terminating the agreement with Bustānī.

The application of "different rules and regulations" is blamed for "slowly developing friction".[150] That was perhaps inevitable, even with smooth discipline maintained. Bustānī was already committed to a patriotic support of the Ottoman regime on the one hand, and to a scheme of education without proselytism on the other. Perhaps it was

[145] "Beirut became the centre of trade for Syria and Palestine." Thus declares a most informative article, with particular details of imports and exports, in *Ḥadīqat Al-Akhbār*, No. 34, 12/28 August 1858, p. 4

[146] *A Brief Chronicle of the Syria Mission* (Mrs Bayard Dodge's copy), p. 19

[147] A monograph on the "origin and character of the Syrian Protestant College, 1860–1875" is being prepared for publication on the first centenary of the founding of the college, based largely on manuscripts not utilized in the histories of the institution written by its first and two other presidents, namely *The Reminiscences of Daniel Bliss* (New York, 1920); Stephen B. L. Penrose, *That They May Have Life – the story of the American University of Beirut 1866–1941* (New York, 1941); Bayard Dodge, *The American University of Beirut – a brief history* (Beirut, 1958)

[148] Daniel Bliss, *Reminiscences*, 187; Stephen Penrose, *The Story of the American University of Beirut*, 24

[149] Confidential letter dated 16 December, 1865 to Anderson

[150] Stephen Penrose, *op. cit.*, p. 29

on the second score that the arrangement with the college broke down. Bustānī had skilfully overcome the problem of religious service for pupils belonging to different denominations by arranging for pupils in his school to go to the church of their parents' choice, escorted by a teacher in each case. As a missionary institution, the college could not tolerate such an arrangement. It actually sought to unite all its pupils, including those under Bustānī's roof, in the American Protestant form of worship. Perhaps this episode represents the last intimate cooperation between the mission and Bustānī.[151] For, although an independent institution, the college was a child of the mission, presided over by a former member of the mission, and staffed, to begin with, by active members of the mission. Henceforth Bustānī's activities were in no way connected with the mission. The object of discussing them below is simply to complete the story, not to indicate missionary influence. That influence is implicit in the development of a courageous and indefatigable writer. Having given up his post at the consulate in favour of his son, and having gradually entrusted him with the management of the school, Bustānī devoted the rest of his life to literary production. His remaining output to be noted here falls into two categories: (*a*) three journals bearing horticultural names, (*b*) an encyclopedia of general knowledge.

In January 1870 a biweekly journal called *Al-Jinān* was launched, professedly for the diffusion of general knowledge on scientific, literary, historical, industrial, commercial and civil subjects, and with the double aim of "reviving the [Arabic] language and its improvement" and "encouragement of native (*waṭaniyyah*) elements in these branches". It adopted as its motto "Love of the fatherland is part of belief [in God]".[152] Before the end of the year, a weekly journal called *Al-Jannah* was issued and a share in editing it was assigned to Salīm Bustānī who was by now collaborating with his father in all his projects. In the following year a third journal *Al-Junainah* was established.[153]

[151] The "Syria Mission" of the ABCFM was transferred in 1870 to the Board of Foreign Mission of the Presbyterian Church, and their records examined by the writer contain no mention of Bustānī, not even his death in 1883. His personal relations with Daniel Bliss, however, remained cordial to the end. See *Reminiscences*, p. 234

[152] *Al-Jinān*, I (1870) – see both sides of the title page. Cf. an article bearing the motto of the journal as its title, pp. 302–3. The same motto had already been adopted by *Hurriyet*, the organ of the Young Ottomans, launched in 1868

[153] The order of the appearance of these journals is reversed, and the appearance of the third is advanced by one year in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, I, 805. The new edition defers the subject of Bustānī to a forthcoming supplement

None of these journals was political in the strict meaning of the term, though they carried some items of political news or history.[154] The first two survived the editor by one year, when they ceased publication in 1884, while the third was published only till 1875.

Here again Bustānī's significance seems to be not so much in being a pioneer as in the spirit in which he put forward his work. For journals similar to his existed in Syria, not only before his horticultural trio but even before the earlier and shortlived *Nafīr Suriyya*." [155] On the other hand, the three publications provide ample evidence of their editor's pursuance of the aim of serving the fatherland by the diffusion of knowledge through the medium of Arabic. Whether as a teacher, or as a translator, or as an adaptor and writer of textbooks, or as an active member of literary societies, or as a promoter of publication, or as a lexicographer, or finally as a journalist and an encyclopedist, he had been the true patriot and the lover of his mother-tongue.[156]

His final effort was a project which he did not live to complete. It grew out of his work on the Arabic dictionary and was intended as a biographical dictionary of similar size.[157] But the plan was radically revised, and Bustānī embarked in 1875 on a very ambitious scheme of writing an encyclopedia of general knowledge which he called "*Kitāb Dā'irat Al-Ma'ārif – Encyclopédie arabe*". Experience had taught him that apart from laborious research the project required public financial backing. He accordingly drafted a sample section of the proposed work and submitted it to, among others, a former grand vizier, a former governor of Syria and the Khedive Ismā'īl. The first urged Bustānī to proceed with it and assured him of official financial support which in Ottoman practice usually came after, not in advance, of publication.

The Khedive's patronage was generous and decisive. Not only did he order the Egyptian government to subscribe for a thousand copies of the encyclopedia, but also to provide Bustānī with a library of references, some of them printed in Būlāq, to facilitate his work. Bustānī

[154] Contrary to the editor's own statement quoted above, some writers assert that these journals were political (*siyāsiyyah*). See for example Fuād Afrām Al-Bustānī, *Al-Mu'allim Buṭrus Al-Bustāni* (Rawā'i' Series No. 22, Beirut, 1929), pp. 'K' and 'L'; George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 50

[155] *Hadīqat Al-Akhbār*, established in 1858, must be reckoned first. One of the earliest projects for an Arabic newspaper was outlined by Salīm Naufal in an Arabic letter to Eli Smith dated London, August 1, 1851

[156] Cf. *Al-Muqtaṭaf*, I (1883), p. 6; "He was fanatic only in [his love] of the fatherland."

[157] As envisaged in a 14-page advertisement published under the title of *Al-Kauthar* in 1874

pays glowing tribute to his patron in the introduction to the first volume,[158] and expresses the hope that the Ottoman government, who had rewarded him for the dictionary after publication, would do likewise with the encyclopedia. He further expresses, in flowery prose and in seven lines of indifferent verse, his loyalty to Sultan Murād, during whose "caliphate" the first volume was completed.[159] From 1876 to 1883, when Bustānī died suddenly, six volumes, each in about 800 pages, were issued, and the seventh was left unfinished.[160]

Bustānī characteristically states that he intended the encyclopedia for "all communities and creeds". He was careful therefore to make it as comprehensive as the sources at his disposal permitted. These were, in his words, "Arabic and Western books, used with reconciliation". His range, for the times, was remarkably wide, if not always deep. Nothing of legitimate intellectual interest was considered unworthy of inclusion, "except what is contrary to public morals which we were constrained in some places either to revise or omit altogether". For a single man to undertake a work of such magnitude required not simply wide liberal interests, but power of assimilation, facility of expression, and capacity for simplification. As the volumes of his work clearly show, Bustānī's industry must have been extraordinary. Some of the material has of course been rendered, through the advance in science, out-of-date, but much still remains as a monument of the author's erudition and useful for reference purpose.[161]

(viii)

"A pioneer in many branches of literary activity."[162] Thus succinctly wrote an acute scholar estimating Bustānī's place in the history of Arabic literature in Syria in the nineteenth century. One of the objects of the analysis of Bustānī's intellectual development and literary production in the foregoing pages has been to show precisely in what sense

[158] *Kitāb Dā'irat Al-Ma'ārif* (Beirut, 1876), pp. 2–3. This tribute contrasts very sharply with the half-hearted mention of the patronage by Bustānī's family in 1883 (see *ibid.*, vol. VII, p. 591)

[159] See notice of the first and second volumes by Fleischer in *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XXXIV (1880), pp. 579–82

[160] This volume was completed by Salīm Bustānī. Vol. 8 was issued in 1884; vol. 9 in 1887, vol. 10 (in Cairo) in 1898 and vol. 11 (also in Cairo) in 1900, by members of the Bustānī family. No further volumes were published

[161] Cf. for example vol. V, pp. 744–52 under "Beirut". The list of schools, presses, journals and hospitals (8.751 f.) is still very useful

[162] H. A. R. Gibb, "Studies in Contemporary Arabic Literature", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, IV (1926–8), p. 750

he was a pioneer. Long after he gave up teaching he continued to describe himself as the *muʿallim*. Indeed he did so to the end of his life. Hence almost all his works up to 1870 were intended for use by pupils and teachers, and the works of the last ten years of his career were primarily useful for schools, and for the limited number of literates who passed through them with a cultivated taste for reading.

Bustānī's originality was perhaps not so much in the subject matter of his works as in his method of presentation and in the principles that inspired him. Care has been taken to give above as clear an estimate of every literary production according to the standards of his times and to relate it to the proper stage in his career. There is as yet no study of the man or of his works, and such cursory notice as is made of him and of his works in general literary histories or reference books often does him less than justice. Thus the fact of his conversion to Protestantism is mentioned by some as if it was a shameful episode,[163] and by others as if it did not cause any influence on his literary career. His other, not less significant, conversion to patriotism, within the framework of the Ottoman system, has not even been sufficiently noticed. Nor are the few biographical facts about his early life presented in a systematic way,[164] or his works arranged by bibliographers in a chronological order.[165] A well-known authority even ascribed to him books which were written by a namesake in this century.[166]

[163] Cf. L. Cheikho, *La Littérature arabe*, vol. II, p. 112, who refers to members of the Bustānī family "whose religious faith remained untarnished, unlike that of the muʿallim Buṭrus"

[164] Consider for example the statement that he learnt English while at ʿAin Warqah (J. Zaidān, *Mashāhir Ash-Sharq*, vol. II, p. 24; F. A. Bustānī, *Rawāiʿ*, No. 22, p. *'Jim'*). This would mean that English was taught at this school, or at least that some members of the staff could teach it. There is no evidence to support either. Cf. *Dāʾirat Al-Maʿārif*, vol. VII (1883), p. 589, where English is not mentioned by Bustānī's family among his attainments. Cf. p. 593 where Van Dyck says that Bustānī came to Beirut in 1840 "knowing Arabic, Syriac, Latin and Italian, but before long learned English"

[165] Sarkis, *Muʿjam*, p. 558 (who lists *Kashf Al-Ḥijāb* published in 1848 after *Qatr al-Muḥīt* published in 1870); cf. *Dāʾirat Al-Maʿārif*, vol. VII, p. 591, where the pamphlets translated for the American mission in the 1840's are listed after books published in the 1870's

[166] C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, Suppl. II (Leiden, 1938), p. 768, last item, *Udabāʾ Al-ʿArab*, in three volumes of which the first was published in Beirut in 1937. The eminent German scholar would have seen this himself had he read the one page introduction. *Tanbīhāt Al-Yāziji ʿalā Muḥīṭ Al-Muḥīt* (ed. by Salim Shamʿūn and Jubrān Naḥḥās, Alexandria, 1933), though clearly stated in the introduction to be by Ibrāhim Al-Yāzijī is wrongly ascribed by Brockelmann to Nāsīf Al-Yāzijī

Similar confusion is shown in general literary works hazarding summary estimates of the writer. The verdict quoted at the beginning of this section can easily be substantiated. But the sweeping generalizations of, for example, Jurjī Zaidān are very difficult to sustain. He asserts that Bustānī was "the leader of the literary movement of his age in regard to schools, societies, newspapers, journals, language, science and literature".[167] More recent writers are equally extravagant. Thus according to a well-known bibliographer, Bustānī was "the leading Arab educator in modern times . . . the first to engage in journalism and [the diffusion of] culture".[168]

No doubt Bustānī's constribution was, by the standards of his times, outstanding, but it was not unique. His knowledge of foreign languages opened for him horizons which were practically closed to, for example, his contemporary and senior, Nāsīf Al-Yāzijī. Experience in translation trained his mind to assimilate and adapt heterogeneous material. His early writings betray traces, in phraseology and style, which sometimes border on the colloquial. But gradually he acquired simplicity and smoothness which contrast with the style of the purists in his days.

His claim to fame does not, however, rest on his literary style, nor on the content of his works. It rests perhaps more legitimately on the ideas that inspired his work in the literary and educational fields. While still limited to writing school textbooks, he introduced his Arabic grammar in 1854 as "intended for the benefit of the children of the Christians." His Arabic dictionary was offered in 1870 as a small patriotic service to all "the children of the fatherland". Finally he began publishing his Arabic encyclopedia in 1876 for the benefit of "all religious communities and all denominations" not only in his native Lebanon or Syria, but throughout the Arabic-speaking countries. This is a remarkable transformation. Bustānī's story, in sum, is one of literary development that went hand in hand with spiritual and patriotic development. It is an excellent example of the outcome of a successful and balanced interaction of Western ideas and methods with Arabic ideas and methods.

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[167] *Ta'rikh Ādāb Al-Lughah Al-'Arabiyyah* (Cairo, 1914), vol. IV, p. 299

[168] Yūsuf As'ad Dāghir, *Masādir Ad-Dirāsah Al-Adabiyya*, (Beirut, 1955), vol. II, p. 180

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